1. Cammon, Bolton and Hall enumerate the general grounds. The State’s evidence shows the following: On the night of the homicide, all three were at a nightclub. Cammon became involved in a fistfight with Adrian Woods. This fight ended when Cammon fled. Bolton and Hall left the nightclub for the apartment complex where Hall lived. They soon were joined by Cammon. Cammon stated to Bolton and Hall that “he needed to straighten his business, and he needed something to do it with.” Hall’s response was to give Cammon an unloaded Beretta pistol. Bolton, who also was armed, then supplied Cammon with bullets for the Beretta pistol. Shortly thereafter, a van carrying Woods and several others pulled into the apartment complex. Cammon recognized Woods and, as the van drove closer, Cammon took cover and opened fire. The occupants of the van shot back. Both Bolton and Hall attempted to fire at the van, but apparently the weapon they were sharing jammed. During the shoot-out, Ms. Ellison was struck and killed by a bullet as she stood in her living room. There was evidence that the bullet which killed Ms. Ellison could have been fired from a Beretta pistol. The claim of self-defense was contradicted by the evidence that Cammon, who was seeking revenge for his earlier fight with Woods, prepared an ambush and fired first before any оne in the van became aware of his presence or made a hostile move toward him.
This evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a
2. Cammon, Bolton and Hall urge that their convictions must be reversed becаuse of the State’s knowing use of perjured testimony. “Conviction of a crime following a trial in which perjured testimony on a material point is knowingly used by the prosecution is an infringement on the accused’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law. [Cits.]”
Kitchens v. State,
3. Cammon and Bolton urge that the trial court erred in allowing an оfficer, who was not qualified as an expert in ballistics, to give an opinion as to the trajectory of the bullet which killed the victim. The
record shows that the testimony was based upon the officer’s own extensive investigation of the homicide, wherein he established the facts from which he formed his opinion. Under these circumstances, the officer’s opinion as to the path of the bullet was admissible over the objection to his lack of expertise in the field of ballistics.
McGhee v. State,
The ultimate issue in the case was not the trajectory of the bullet, but whether Cammon, Bolton and Hall were guilty of an aggravated assault or not guilty by reason of self-defense. See
Ford-ham v. State,
4. Cammоn asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. To prevail on this claim, Cammon must show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that, but for the deficient performance, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have returned a different verdict.
Lowe v. State,
(a) The failure to request certain charges is cited as an example of ineffectiveness. According to trial counsel, he elected not to request chаrges on voluntary manslaughter and mutual combat because such charges were predicated upon Cammon’s willing participation in the shoot-out and would be inconsistent with the claim of self-defense. Thus, counsel made a tactical decision to present a consistent com- píete defense to Cammon’s criminal liability, rather than to acknowledge the possibility of guilt of a lesser offense than that charged.
In connection with Cammon’s claim of self-defense, his attorney did not
(b) Cammon’s attorney did not move to strike for cause a prospective juror who knew Ms. Ellison’s son. However, merely knowing the victim is not a sufficient ground for such a challenge.
Pope v. State,
(c) Counsel did not introduce evidence that, on the night of the homicide, someone shot at the house of Cammon’s mother. Cammоn urges that this was instance of ineffectiveness, because evidence of the shooting would have bolstered his claim of self-defense by showing that he was a target for Woods. However, there was no proof that the shooters were the occupants of the van or that the alleged incident was related to Cammon’s fight with Woods. For this reason, counsel indicated that he made the strategic decision not to raise the issue, since it might portray Cammon as someone who was accustomed to violent confrontations. Moreover, trial counsel noted his desire to avoid the issue because of concerns over calling Cammon’s mother as a witness.
(d) Cammon’s lawyer made a disparaging remark about the State’s counsel and was rebuked by the trial court. Cammon contends that this diminished the effectiveness of his attorney in the eyes of the jury. The record shows, however, that trial counsel apologized and the trial court acknowledged that the remark was the apparent result of an overly zealous and emotional representation of Cammon.
Holcomb v. State,
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court was authorized to find that the alleged instances of ineffectiveness were not the result of inadequate preparation or presentation by Cammon’s attorney.
Roberts v. State,
5. Under the evidence, Cammon intentionally fired the gun at the occupants of the van, thereby committing either the felony of aggravated assault or an act of self-defense. Thus, it was not error to refuse to give Cammon’s requested charge on reckless conduct. See
Waugh v. State,
6. Cammon enumerates as error the trial court’s failure to give the unrequested charge on threats and menaces. As previously discussed in Division 4 (a), such a charge does not appear to be authorized under the evidence and, in any event, the extensive charge on self-defense, as given, was otherwise full and fair.
7. Cammon urges that the trial court used improper language in responding to his trial counsel’s disparaging remark about the assistant district attorney. Under the circumstances, the trial court was authorized to rebuke counsel. OCGA § 17-8-75. Compare
Peeples v. State,
8. In its preliminary instructions to the jury, the trial court made reference to certain evidence that “will be developed” regarding the manner in which the alleged crimes had occurred. Cammon contends that this was an expression of an opinion by the trial court in violation of the mandate of OCGA § 17-8-57. However, the comment clearly was a preliminary refеrence to what the jury could expect to hear once the evidence began, and was not an unauthorized expression of an opinion by the trial court as to what actually had been proven in the case. See
Mays v. State,
9. In overruling the objection that the investigating officer lacked expertise in the area of ballistics, the trial court stated that the officer’s proposed testimony as to the trajectory of the bullet “was hardly science.” A timely оbjection was raised to this comment. However, there was no violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, because the comment was explanatory of the trial court’s ruling on the objection to the admission of the officer’s testimony.
McGinnis v. State,
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
The homicide occurred on August 4, 1996. The grand jury returned the indictment on September 4, 1996 and, on Nоvember 22, 1996, the jury returned the guilty verdicts. Hall filed his motion for new trial on December 12, 1996, Cammon filed his motion on December 16, 1996, and Bolton filed his motion on December 19, 1996. The trial court denied the motions on November 25, 1997. Cammon and Bolton filed their notices of appeal on December 19, 1997 and Hall filed his notice of appeal on December 22, 1997. The cases were docketed in this Court on February 5, 1998 and the appeals were submitted for decision on March 30, 1998.