CAMILLE SEDAR v. RESTON TOWN CENTER PROPERTY, LLC; BOSTON PROPERTIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and BOSTON PROPERTIES, INC; BEACON CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, CDA INCORPORATED, d/b/a MaxSent
No. 19-1972
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
February 22, 2021
PUBLISHED. Argued: January 25, 2021. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cv-01111-CMH-TCB)
ARGUED: David J. Sensenig, PARK SENSENIG LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. David Drake Hudgins, HUDGINS LAW FIRM, PC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Andrew R. Park, PARK SENSENIG LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph P. Moriarty, WILLCOX & SAVAGE, PC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees.
This premises liability case involves the application of the well-established standards for summary judgment. Following a serious fall down a short flight of stairs, Camille Sedar sued the defendants for negligence and negligence per se. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Sedar did not offer sufficient evidence that there was a dangerous condition, that the defendants had notice of the condition or that the alleged dangerous condition caused her fall. Because the record contains enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to these issues, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
On a pleasant November afternoon, Sedar and several of her colleagues drove to Reston Town Center to celebrate a friend‘s overseas deployment over lunch. Sedar drove herself and two others, while the rest traveled in a separate car. Sedar‘s car arrived first and parked on the ground level of a parking garage available to Reston Town Center patrons.
To exit the garage, pedestrians had to climb a short flight of stairs inside the garage, cross a landing paved with bricks and descend a flight of five concrete steps to the sidewalk outside. While exiting the garage, Sedar, several steps ahead of her companions, was wearing flat-soled shoes and carrying a two-to-three-foot-wide photograph in one hand and her wallet in the other. At some point, when she either was crossing the landing or beginning to descend the stairs, Sedar tripped and fell, landing face first on the concrete
Sedar has no memory of the fall. The last thing she remembers is walking through the garage toward the pedestrian exit. And neither of Sedar‘s companions, who were trailing several steps behind her in conversation, saw precisely what caused her to trip. One colleague only noticed Sedar as she hit the ground “face down.” J.A. 223. The other saw Sedar “disappear from [his] field of vision” as she fell over the stairs before seeing the photograph she was carrying in the air. J.A. 264-67.
Sedar‘s companions did, however, provide more information on Sedar‘s path of travel. Although there are some differences in their testimonies regarding Sedar‘s path, both place her over loose bricks right before the top of the stairs. One immediately noticed loose bricks at the top of the stairs, which created “space between the brick and the actual ground.” J.A. 228. She testified that those loose bricks must have caused Sedar‘s fall. When rushing to assist Sedar, she “walked over to the side” to avoid the bricks. J.A. 229. After ensuring emergency help was on the way, she returned to the top of the stairs to examine the bricks, bringing them to others’ attention. The other colleague noticed the loose bricks when he went back after lunch with others to investigate. When he inspected the landing, he discovered loose bricks “directly in front of the area where we were walking down the stairs.” J.A. 281.
After Sedar‘s fall, the rest of the group arrived and took several photographs and a video of the scene. The video depicts a loose brick at the top of the stairs to the right of
When Sedar retrieved her shoes upon leaving the hospital, she immediately noticed a large gray scuff at the tip of her right shoe. She claims this scuff had not been present before the fall.
Sedar retained a structural engineer to review the evidence and prepare an expert report. Relying on the witness testimony, photographs and the scuff on Sedar‘s shoe, her expert determined that the evidence demonstrated loose and unstable bricks and deteriorating caulk at the landing, which was “structurally unsound and a hazard that violated applicable building and maintenance codes.” J.A. 434. He also opined that this hazard “most likely caused [Sedar] to lose her balance and fall down the stairway.” J.A. 434.
II.
Turning now to the procedural background, Sedar sued the property owner, Reston Town Center Property (“RTCP“), and the property manager, Boston Properties, in state court asserting claims of negligence and negligence per se. The defendants then removed the case to federal court and brought a third-party complaint against MaxSent, with whom they had contracted to provide security, emergency service and monitoring of the property
The district court granted the defendants’ motion. It held Sedar could not succeed on her claims because she “produced no evidence that Defendants had either actual or constructive notice of the defects in the bricks and caulking” on the landing. J.A. 1042. The district court also stated that “Virginia law does not impose liability under the ordinary duty of care to remedy sidewalk irregularities that are, as here, under an inch or two.” J.A. 1042. In addition, even if Sedar had enough evidence of negligence, the district court held that she “produced no more than mere speculation that [the alleged defects] were the cause of her accident.” J.A. 1073.
Sedar timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2018). In so doing, we first review the well-settled principles for a summary judgment motion before applying those standards to the issues Sedar raises on appeal.
A.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. An issue of material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant.” Wai Man Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the nonmoving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate specific, material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Under this standard, “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in favor of the non-movant‘s position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). “Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion.” Wai Man Tom, 980 F.3d at 1037.
Yet, “[s]ummary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright et al.,
Utilizing those principles, we turn to Sedar‘s arguments on appeal.
1.
Sedar first contends the district court erred in concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a dangerous condition. Under Virginia law, a property owner owes an invitee a duty to exercise ordinary care to “render [the premises] reasonably safe for the invitee‘s visit.” Fultz v. Delhaize Am., Inc., 677 S.E.2d 272, 274 (Va. 2009). An owner need not, however, provide notice to an invitee of a dangerous condition that is “open and obvious.” Id. (quoting Knight v. Moore, 18 S.E.2d 266, 269 (Va. 1942)). If reasonable persons “differ as to whether an accident could or should have been reasonably anticipated” from a condition, the jury must decide whether the condition was dangerous. Id. (quoting City of Roanoke v. Sutherland, 167 S.E. 243, 246 (Va. 1933)).
To support her claim of a dangerous condition, Sedar offered photographs, taken the day of her fall, that depict unlevel bricks and sagging caulk, creating a lip where she contends someone could trip right before descending the stairs. She also points to the video taken after the incident that illustrates how the loose bricks move when stepped on. Next, she relies on the testimony of her colleagues. One colleague testified that she immediately noticed the danger as she rushed to help Sedar, while the other noticed afterwards that there were loose bricks in the area where Sedar fell. Finally, Sedar offered her expert‘s report and testimony. He concluded that the “large open gap adjacent to the loose brick likely creates a trip hazard as the front edge of the brick shifted downward.” J.A. 998.
But our situation is distinguishable from a sidewalk irregularity. First, this alleged hazard was not an irregularity in pavement that was fixed in place. The path here was made of bricks, some of which were loose. That is a different risk than stepping in a stationary depression or getting tripped up by something fixed in place. See City of Newport News, 223 S.E.2d at 870 (heel getting stuck in a pavement hole causing fall). Second, a sidewalk irregularity is typically visible to anyone who looks. But a loose brick may not be obvious to the reasonable person walking on a brick pathway. Third, the condition here was located at the top of stairs. If there is a fall, the risk of tripping at the top of stairs is arguably greater than the risk of falling on a flat surface.
For these reasons, the cases involving sidewalk irregularities do not control our outcome. The defendants certainly can argue to the jury that the conditions Sedar complains about are not significant enough to rise to the level of a dangerous condition. And they may win. But from our review of the record, construing facts in the light most favorable to Sedar, the photographs, videotape and testimony by fact and expert witnesses
2.
Sedar next contends the district court erred in concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the defendants’ notice of the dangerous condition. An owner is liable to an invitee injured from a dangerous condition if the owner “knew it existed, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered its existence, and failed to remedy the condition or otherwise to protect the invitee against the danger.” Appalachian Power Co. v. Sanders, 349 S.E.2d 101, 105 (Va. 1986).
Sedar claims the defendants had actual notice of the alleged dangerous condition, relying on the testimony of Anthony Swartz, a MaxSent employee and supervisor. Shortly after the fall, Swartz arrived to ensure Sedar was receiving aid, and he investigated the incident. He does not recall whether he identified any loose bricks, but he testified that it was “a very tricky area of the property.” J.A. 381. He explained that he had “almost tripped on the stairwell a thousand times” on “[e]ither the brick or the step itself” prior to Sedar‘s fall because of “the way that it transitions from the garage to the stairs.” J.A. 382-83.
At first glance, this testimony appears to support Sedar‘s argument regarding actual notice. When considered fully in context, however, Swartz‘s testimony is not evidence of actual notice of the type of hazard Sedar alleges. Swartz describes his difficulties resulting not from loose bricks, but from “the layout” of the landing and “the way that it transitions
The requirement to construe the facts, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party does not require us to accept cherry-picked snippets of testimony divorced from their context. Thus, even if Swartz‘s notice could be imputed to the defendants, his testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact that he had notice of the hazard Sedar claims caused her fall.
But actual notice is not required to sustain Sedar‘s claim. She can satisfy the notice requirement by demonstrating constructive notice. See Grim v. Rahe, Inc., 434 S.E.2d 888, 889 (Va. 1993). Constructive notice “may be shown by evidence that the defect was noticeable and had existed for a sufficient length of time to charge its possessor with notice of its defective condition.” Id. at 890. Sedar contends she did this through her photographs which, according to her, indicate the loose bricks and resulting gap were not new and likely existed for a significant time prior to Sedar‘s fall. Sedar‘s expert, moreover, testified that “the sagging and deteriorating caulk joint immediately adjacent to the loose brick paver would have been visible during routine maintenance inspections and activities.” J.A. 895.
This evidence is more than conclusory allegations. To the contrary, it includes specific, material facts because they help prove the existence of a dispositive issue of Sedar‘s claim. It also creates a genuine issue because a reasonable jury could conclude that the conditions were in a well-trafficked area and “existed for such a length of time as to make it defendant‘s duty in the exercise of ordinary care to have discovered it.” Miracle Mart, Inc. v. Webb, 137 S.E.2d 887, 890 (Va. 1964). Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had constructive notice of the hazard.
3.
Sedar finally contends the district court erred in determining that she had not presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact concerning causation. Under Virginia law, in order to succeed on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show “why and how the incident happened; if the cause of the event is left to conjecture, guess, or random judgment, the plaintiff cannot recover.” Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).4
The defendants contend that because Sedar did not provide direct evidence that she actually stepped on a specific brick or lip, her case cannot go to the jury. But causation can be proved by circumstantial evidence. In fact, “circumstantial evidence is treated no
Sedar first presents her colleagues’ testimonies that establish her path of travel crossed over the loose bricks and lip created by the sagging caulk. Although neither specifically saw Sedar step on a loose brick or get her foot caught in the lip, they were aware of her general path, and both placed her crossing over the allegedly hazardous area. Second, one of the colleagues immediately noticed the condition right after Sedar had fallen and “walked over to the side” to avoid it in her rush to assist an unconscious Sedar. J.A. 228-29. Third, the photographic evidence shows the condition in line with Sedar‘s bloodstains at the foot of the stairs, from which a jury could infer that she crossed over the condition before her fall. Fourth, the tip of Sedar‘s right shoe has a noticeable gray scuff, which she testified was not present before her fall. A reasonable jury could conclude that this scuff is consistent with her shoe getting caught in the lip before the stairs. Fifth, Sedar fell headfirst, which she insists is more consistent with getting tripped up than with missing a step. Finally, Sedar‘s expert concluded, based on the evidence available to him, that a loose brick exposed her toe to the lip at the top of the stairs and “most likely caused [Sedar] to lose her balance and fall down the stairway.” J.A. 434.
The record contains evidence that support these arguments. And a jury could find them persuasive and reject Sedar‘s evidence. Or it could do the opposite. We make no comment on which parties’ evidence is more persuasive. We only ask whether Sedar has provided “evidence beyond speculation that provides a sufficient basis for a reasonable inference of causation.” Penley v. McDowell Cty. Bd. of Educ., 876 F.3d 646, 655 (4th Cir. 2017). We conclude that she has. Under Rule 56, when “causal facts are in dispute, . . . summary judgment is not appropriate.” Id. at 654-55.
IV.
Rule 56 is an important tool for district courts to use in the management of their cases. As the Supreme Court has noted, summary judgment is not “a disfavored procedural
REVERSED.