589 S.E.2d 834 | Ga. Ct. App. | 2003
Kenneth E. Cameron and Lucille W. Cameron appeal the order denying their motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) in their personal injury action against Ronald M. Peterson arising from a rear-end collision. The Camerons enumerate as error the denial of their motion for a directed verdict on the issue of Peterson’s negligence. We affirm.
A directed verdict or j.n.o.v. is authorized only when there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demands the verdict sought.
So viewed, the evidence shows that when the collision occurred, Cameron’s truck had reached the front of a long line of traffic in the right-hand turn lane on Pleasant Hill Road in Gwinnett County. Cameron was preparing to turn right onto Peachtree Industrial
Peterson testified that immediately before the impact, he was looking at Cameron’s vehicle as well as looking to the left to check the traffic flow. He further testified that he applied his brakes when he saw the truck stopped, but that his car rocked forward and struck the track. According to Peterson, the intersection was clear when Cameron reached it and there appeared to be no reason for him to have stopped a second time. Peterson testified that he was approximately two feet behind Cameron’s vehicle before the second stop and that he was traveling at two to five mph at the point of impact.
After Peterson testified, Cameron moved for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence. The trial court denied the motion,
On appeal, Cameron essentially argues that the evidence was undisputed that Peterson failed to keep a proper lookout and that Cameron was properly stopped while trying to determine whether it was safe to turn right against a red light. In reviewing this argument, we are mindful that directed verdicts are not favored in rear-end collision cases.
All drivers of vehicles using the highways are held to the exercise of due care. A leading vehicle has no absolute legal position superior to that of one following. . . . Just how close to a vehicle in the lead a following vehicle, ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, be driven, just what precautions a driver of such a vehicle must in the exercise of ordinary care take to avoid colliding with a leading vehicle which slows, stops, or swerves in front of him, just what signals or warn*3 ings the driver of a leading vehicle must, in the exercise of due care, give before stopping or slowing up of his intention to do so, may not be laid down in any hard and fast or general rule. In each case except when reasonable minds may not differ, what due care required, and whether it was exercised, is for the jury.5
As we recently noted in Beckett v. Monroe,
This case is not one of those “rare circumstances” which warrant the grant of a directed verdict. Peterson did not admit liability,
Judgment affirmed.
OCGA § 9-11-50.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lucas v. Love, 238 Ga. App. 463 (1) (519 SE2d 253) (1999).
Id.
Cameron had moved for summary judgment as to liability. This Court granted Cameron’s application for interlocutory appeal from the order denying the motion, but we subsequently dismissed the appeal. Cameron v. Peterson, Case No. A98A1616, decided November 6, 1998, cert. denied, Case No. S99C0469,1999 Ga. LEXIS 344 (April 9, 1999).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 236 Ga. 448, 450 (224 SE2d 25) (1976).
249 Ga. App. 615 (548 SE2d 131) (2001).
Id. at 616 (2), citing Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra.
Compare Hambrick v. Makuch, 228 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1) (491 SE2d 71) (1997) (defendant admitted negligence in her answer); Nail v. Green, 147 Ga. App. 660, 661 (249 SE2d 666) (1978) (defendant admitted not keeping a proper lookout).
228 Ga. App. 542 (492 SE2d 304) (1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supra at 450.
Daves, supra at 542-543 (1). See also Lucas, supra (defendant applied her brakes, but skidded on wet road and rear-ended plaintiff).