delivered the opinion of the court:
Cameo, Inc. (Cameo), the plaintiff, filed a forcible entry and detainer action against the defendant, Carol Lowery. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the trial court denied Ms. Lowery’s motion and granted Cameo’s motion for summary judgment. Ms. Lowery appeals from the trial court’s December 5, 2002, order granting Cameo’s motion and entering a judgment for possession of her apartment.
BACKGROUND
Cameo is the agent and manager for Van Burén Park Apartments (Van Burén), a privately owned housing project that is subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the “Section 8 New Construction Program” (hereinafter Section 8). See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(h) (2000). HUD has an approved lease for participants in its Section 8 program, and approved the leases that Van Burén entered into with its Section 8 tenants. On December 23, 1999, Van Burén entered into a lease with Ms. Lowery, a Section 8 tenant, for Unit 1301A, located at 2120 West Gladys (Unit 1301A). The lease provided that Ms. Lowery, as head of household, and her two sons, Prenis Lowery and A.L. (a minor and member of Ms. Lowery’s household), 1 were approved to reside in Unit 1301 A.
On April 26, 2002, Cameo served Ms. Lowery with a notice of termination of tenancy. The notice stated that Ms. Lowery’s tenancy was being terminated for material noncompliance with the terms of her lease with Van Buren. The notice stated that Ms. Lowery violated her lease on March 27, 2002, when the Chicago police raided her unit and arrested her son, A.L., for selling and possessing illegal drugs in violation of paragraphs 13(b), 13(c), 23(b), and 24 of the lease. Paragraph 13(b) of the lease provides that the tenant shall not use the unit for unlawful purposes. In paragraph 13(c) of the lease, the tenant agrees not to:
“c. engage in or permit unlawful activities in the unit, in the common areas or on the project grounds;
1. Tenant, any member of the Tenant’s household, or guest or other person under the Tenant’s control shall not engage in criminal activity, including drug related criminal activity, on or off project premises. Drug related criminal activity means the illegal manufacture, sale distribution, use of possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use of a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act {21 U.S.C. 802».
2. Tenant, any member of the Tenant’s household, or a guest or other person under the Tenant’s control shall not engage in any act intended to facilitate criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity, on or off project premises.
3. Tenant or members of the household will not permit the dwelling unit to be used for, or to facilitate, criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity, on or off project premises.
4. Tenant or members of the household will not engage in the manufacture, sale, or distribution of illegal drugs at any location, whether on or off project premises or otherwise.
6. VIOLATION OF THE ABOVE PROVISIONS SHALL BE A MATERIAL VIOLATION OF THE LEASE AND GOOD CAUSE FOR TERMINATION OF TENANCY. A single violation of any of the provisions of this clause shall be deemed a serious violation and a material noncompliance with this Agreement. It is understood and agreed that a single violation shall be good cause for termination of this Agreement. Unless otherwise provided by law, proof of violation shall not require criminal conviction, but shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Emphasis in original.)
Paragraph 23(b) of the lease provides that the landlord may only terminate the lease for: (1) the tenant’s material noncompliance with the terms of the agreement; (2) the tenant’s material failure to carry out obligations under any state landlord and tenant act; or (3) criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants, or any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises engaged in by the tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or person under the tenant’s control. Finally, paragraph 24 of the lease provides that the tenant shall not undertake, or permit his or her family or guests to engage in, any hazardous acts or do anything that will increase the project’s premiums. Ms. Lowery was advised in the notice that if she remained in the leased unit after May 14, 2002, the date specified for termination, the landlord would terminate her tenancy by bringing a judicial action.
On May 30, 2002, Cameo filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Ms. Lowery, and the complaint alleged that she breached paragraphs 13(b), 13(c), 23(b), and 24 of the lease. After filing the complaint, Cameo initiated discovery. Cameo served Chicago police tactical officer Jesse Sandoval (Officer Sandoval) with a subpoena which set a date for his discovery deposition. Cameo also served a subpoena duces tecum on the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services, and received an affidavit in lieu of court appearance and a laboratory report with an analysis of the contraband found in Unit 1301A on March 27, 2002.
Officer Sandoval’s discovery deposition was set for August 29, 2002. At the deposition, Officer Sandoval produced a copy of A.L.’s arrest report and testified that he, his partner, Officer Frenzy, and their sergeant, set up surveillance at Unit 1301A of the Van Burén Apartments. According to Officer Sandoval, when their sergeant witnessed what appeared to be a narcotics transaction occurring at the front door of Unit 1301 A, he instructed Officers Sandoval and Frenzy to approach Unit 1301A. Once the officers arrived at Unit 1301A, they detained an adult male who threw several bags of a substance believed to be cannabis to the ground. Shortly thereafter, the police placed the adult male under arrest and knocked on the door for Unit 1301 A. Officer Sandoval testified that A.L. answered the door with a large bag in his hand, which Officer Sandoval believed contained suspected cannabis. A.L. was taken into custody and the officers confiscated what they believed to be additional suspected contraband inside an open Igloo cooler in Unit 1301A. Officer Sandoval testified that the recovered substances were sent to the lab for analysis and tested positive for cannabis. During the deposition, Officer Sandoval identified A.L. by using his name, rather than his initials, and testified that he was found guilty of felony possession of cannabis.
On August 29, 2002, Ms. Lowery filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that she did not violate her lease and that she did not know or have reason to know of A.L.’s conduct. In her motion, Ms. Lowery also maintained: (1) that she did not violate paragraph 13(b) or 13(c) of the lease because she did not use her apartment for any unlawful purpose and did not permit A.L. to engage in unlawful activity or use or sell drugs; (2) that she did not violate paragraph 23(b) of the lease because she did not engage in any criminal activity and was at work when A.L. was arrested, so she was unable to control his actions; and (3) that she did not violate paragraph 24 of the lease because she did not engage in any hazardous acts and did not permit A.L. to engage in any hazardous acts. Finally, the allegations in Ms. Lowery’s motion for summary judgment were supported by her affidavit and a memorandum.
On October 7, 2002, Cameo filed its motion for summary judgment alleging: (1) that Ms. Lowery occupied Unit 1301A under a written rental agreement with Cameo; (2) that Ms. Lowery’s son, A.L., also occupied Unit 1301A; (3) that on March 27, 2002, A.L. was arrested in Unit 1301A by the Chicago police and charged with possession and delivery of illegal drags; (4) that the substances confiscated from A.L. tested positive for cannabis; and (5) that Ms. Lowery was served with a notice of termination of tenancy as a result of the possession and sale of illegal drugs by A.L., a member of her household. Cameo maintained in its motion for summary judgment that, according to the lease and federal law, the possession and sale of cannabis on the premises by Ms. Lowery’s son, A.L., constituted grounds for termination of her tenancy. Cameo’s motion for summary judgment was supported by the certification of Ceola Johnson (Van Burén’s property manager), by a memorandum, and by three exhibits: (1) the transcript from Officer Sandoval’s deposition; (2) a March 27, 2002, arrest report; and (3) the affidavit and lab report of Mohammad Sarwar, forensic chemist for the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services.
On October 29, 2002, Ms. Lowery filed a motion to strike the three exhibits appended to Cameo’s motion, which she referred to as law enforcement testimony (Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript) and law enforcement records (the arrest report and the lab report). Ms. Lowery argued that the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) provides that law enforcement records relating to minors who have been arrested or taken into custody before their seventeenth birthday shall be kept confidential (705 ILCS 405/1 — 7(A) (West 2004)), and that law enforcement officers may not disclose the identity of a minor when releasing information to the general public related to the arrest, investigation or disposition of any case involving a minor. 705 ILCS 405/1 — -7(E) (West 2004). Therefore, Ms. Lowery argued that all the evidence in the exhibits produced by Cameo to support its motion for summary judgment was inadmissible under the Act and that Cameo was prohibited from using this evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 1 et seq. (West 2004).
On December 5, 2002, a hearing was held on Ms. Lowery’s motion to strike and on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that a law enforcement officer was not releasing information to the general public when testifying in a court proceeding. Then the circuit court denied Ms. Lowery’s motion to strike Cameo’s law enforcement testimony and records; denied Ms. Lowery’s motion for summary judgment; and granted Cameo’s motion for summary judgment. On January 6, 2003, Ms. Lowery filed a notice of appeal. On January 29, 2003, the trial court granted Ms. Lowery’s motion for a stay of enforcement of Cameo’s judgment for possession pending this appeal. Finally, Ms. Lowery presents two issues for review in this appeal: (1) whether the law enforcement testimony and records disclosing the identity of A.L., a minor, and used by Cameo in support of its motion for summary judgment should be excluded under the Act; and (2) whether she and her family can be evicted for the actions of her 12-year-old son, when the lease prohibits the leaseholder from engaging in or permitting criminal activity, which she did not participate in or permit.
ANALYSIS
The first issue we must address in this appeal is whether the trial court erred when it denied Ms. Lowery’s motion to strike the three documents appended as exhibits to Cameo’s motion for summary judgment: (1) Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript; (2) the March 27, 2002, arrest report; and (3) the forensic chemist’s affidavit and lab report. Ms. Lowery argues that the law enforcement officer’s testimony and the records containing evidence which relates to A.L.’s arrest should have been deemed inadmissible and should not have been considered by the trial court when deciding Cameo’s motion for summary judgment because it disclosed A.L.’s identity and, therefore, violated the Act. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 1 et seq. (West 2004). Ms. Lowery also argues that Cameo should not have had A.L.’s arrest report or lab report in its possession because Cameo and its agents are not law enforcement agencies or officials entitled to have a juvenile’s records in its possession. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 8(A) (West 2004). Cameo contends that the Act is inapplicable in this case because there is no evidence that A.L.’s March 27, 2002, arrest report, the forensic chemist’s affidavit and lab report, or Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript was released to the general public.
THE MOTION TO STRIKE
By denying Ms. Lowery’s motion to strike the evidence contained in Cameo’s exhibits, the trial court made an evidentiary ruling. Generally, an abuse of discretion standard of review applies when this court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Jackson v. Graham,
A. THE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS IN THE JUVENILE COURT ACT
First, we must determine whether the arrest report, the lab report, and Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript, which were appended to Cameo’s motion for summary judgment, violated the disclosure provisions in the Act. If we find that there was a violation of the Act, we must then determine whether the evidence contained in the aforementioned exhibits was admissible and could be used to support Cameo’s motion for summary judgment.
The scope and application of the Act are defined solely by the legislature. In re M.M.,
The record establishes that the arrest report, the lab report and Officer Sandoval’s deposition were produced pursuant to subpoenas issued by Cameo. Supreme Court Rule 237(a) empowers a party to a lawsuit to issue a subpoena. 166 Ill. 2d R. 237(a). A subpoena is an order of the court and a party is required by law to comply with the court order. People ex rel. Fisher v. Carey,
Section 1 — 7(C) of the Act provides that the records of law enforcement officers cannot be disclosed to the public “except by order of the court.” 705 ILCS 405/1 — 7(0 (West 2004); see also 705 ILCS 405/5— 905(8) (West 2004). While no court order was entered in this case authorizing the disclosures at Officer Sandoval’s deposition or the release of the arrest report and the lab report to Cameo, we find that the law enforcement agencies and officers provided the testimony and released the law enforcement records pursuant to a subpoena, a court order. See Fisher,
Next, we must determine whether Cameo violated the confidentiality provisions of the Act when it obtained the documents relating to A.L., a minor, and placed the arrest report, the lab report, and Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript in the court file. We find that Cameo is not a law enforcement agency subject to the confidentiality provisions of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1 — 7 (West 2004)), but that it is a private corporation acting as an agent and property manager for Van Burén. We also find that the Act does not authorize Cameo to possess law enforcement records maintained by law enforcement agencies that relate to a minor who has been arrested or taken into custody before his seventeenth birthday. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 7(A) (West 2004).
2
Nevertheless, the Act does not prohibit a non-law-enforcement agency, like Cameo, from obtaining a juvenile’s law enforcement records pursuant to a subpoena (705 ILCS 405/1 — 1 et seq. (West 2004)), nor does the Act prescribe sanctions if an entity like Cameo, which is not authorized to possess law enforcement records that are related to minors under 17 years old, discloses the contents of those records to the public and thereby violates the confidentiality provisions in the Act. See People v. Zepeda,
In order to determine if the arrest report, the lab report and Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript that were placed in the court file were released to the public, we must examine the Clerks of Courts Act. 705 ILCS 105/1 et seq. (West 2004). In section 16(6) of the Clerks of Courts Act, the Illinois legislature codified the common law right to access judicial records. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray,
“All records, dockets and books required by law to be kept by such clerks shall be deemed public records, and shall at all times be open to inspection without fee or reward, and all persons shall have free access for inspection and examination to such records, docket and books, and also to all papers on file in the different clerks’ offices and shall have the right to take memoranda and abstracts thereto.” 705 ILCS 105/16(6) (West 2004).
The public’s right to examine, inspect and review judicial records is clearly spelled out in section 16(6) of the Clerks of Courts Act. 705 ILCS 105/16(6) (West 2004). The arrest report, the lab report and Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript were appended to Cameo’s motion for summary judgment. We find that once Cameo filed its motion for summary judgment, with the arrest report, the lab report, and Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript appended, and the motion and exhibits became a part of the court file, the documents became public records and the public had a right to access all the documents in the court file. Skolnick,
We note that the law enforcement agencies and Officer Sandoval did not make a motion to quash the subpoenas (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1101 (West 2004))
3
or request a protective order restricting the disclosure of the officer’s testimony and the law enforcement records to the litigants in this case. 134 Ill. 2d R. 415(d).
4
We find that Cameo did not violate the confidentiality provisions of the Act when it placed the law enforcement records and the deposition transcript in the court file with its motion for summary judgment because the documents were obtained pursuant to a subpoena, which is a court order. See Fisher,
Ms. Lowery maintains, however, that the law enforcement records and the deposition testimony should not have been considered by the trial court. We note that even if we had found that Cameo violated the confidentiality provisions in the Act, the Act fails to prescribe a sanction for a violation of its confidentiality provisions. Zepeda,
In Zepeda, a 16-year-old juvenile provided a written statement to the police when he was arrested on the street with a codefendant and taken to a police station where he made admissions after 30 minutes of questions, and he was found guilty of murder after a bench trial. Zepeda,
In Lewis, the defendant was identified from a photo lineup by a victim who was shown photographs T om the defendant’s juvenile bureau records. The Lewis court ackno (edged that section 2 — 8v’l) of the Act restricts the disclosure of police records concerning minors to the public. Lewis,
We note that Zepeda and Lewis were decided in 1970 and 1981, respectively. Nonetheless, after a close examination of the Act, over 20 years later, we still find that there is no provision that prescribes a sanction if the Act is violated. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 1 et seq. (West 2004); Zepeda,
Ms. Lowery also argues in her brief that in addition to violating section 1 — 7 of the Act, Cameo also violated section 1 — 8 of the Act. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 7, 1 — 8 (West 2004). Section 1 — 8 of the Act protects minors by limiting who may copy and inspect their juvenile court records. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 8 (West 2004). The record establishes that Ms. Lowery never raised this issue in her motion to strike, in her motion for summary judgment or in the memorandum in support of her motion for summary judgment. The record establishes that the trial court did not consider section 1 — 8 of the Act when it granted Cameo’s motion for summary judgment. It is axiomatic that issues not raised in the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu,
Ms. Lowery argues that Cameo, or Cameo’s attorney, inspected A.L.’s juvenile court file, obtained information about A.L.’s arrest, and by doing so violated the confidentiality provisions of section 1 — 8 of the Act. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 8 (West 2004). The record fails to establish that Cameo inspected A.L.’s juvenile court file or obtained any of its exhibits, the arrest report, the lab report, or Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript from A.L.’s juvenile court file. The record establishes that Cameo obtained its exhibits pursuant to a subpoena. Therefore, section 1 — 8 of the Act was not violated because there is no evidence in the record to support Ms. Lowery’s contention that Cameo obtained its exhibits from A.L.’s juvenile court file. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 8 (West 2004).
B. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
Next, we must determine whether the information in the arrest report, the lab report, and Officer Sandoval’s deposition testimony is admissible in evidence and whether the information in the exhibits should have been stricken by the trial court because the information violated a rule of evidence. A basic principle of the law of evidence is that what is relevant is admissible. People v. Monroe,
Next, we must determine whether the information contained in the Illinois State Police lab report violates the hearsay rule. Section 115 — 15(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115 — 15(a) (West 2004)) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for lab reports involving any criminal prosecution for a violation of the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 2004)). The Code’s allowance for the use of laboratory reports in a criminal prosecution provided by section 115 — 5(a) is applicable in a civil case if the routines and procedures of the laboratory are shown by the evidence as having been commonly accepted by the forensic chemist profession, and the business of the laboratory is the securing, handling, and analysis of controlled substances, amongst other types of specimens. See Woolley v. Hafner’s Wagon Wheel, Inc.,
We find that the forensic chemist’s lab report and his notarized affidavit, which authenticates his lab report, meet the requirements of section 115 — 15(a) of the Code. Thus, the lab report is admissible in this civil proceeding because it was completed by an employee of the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services, an agency in the business of securing, handling, and analyzing specimens for law enforcement agencies, and the forensic chemist averred that scientifically accepted tests were utilized and that specimens were handled with established and accepted procedures. See Woolley,
Next, we must determine whether Officer Sandoval’s deposition testimony was admissible in evidence. Discovery depositions may be used for any purpose for which an affidavit may be used and can be used to support a motion for summary judgment. Howard v. County of Cook,
Cameo can use deposition testimony to support its motion for summary judgment; therefore, we must determine if Officer Sandoval’s testimony was relevant. Officer Sandoval’s deposition testimony was relevant and is probative of the issues in the case because it established: (1) that Officer Sandoval was present at Ms. Lowery’s apartment (Unit 1301A) on March 27, 2002; (2) that before A.L. was arrested, an adult male, Maurice Jackson, was arrested outside Unit 1301A with cannabis on his person; (3) that A.L. answered the police officers’ knock at the door of Unit 1301A while holding a large bag containing 24 smaU Ziploc bags of suspected cannabis in his hand; (4) that an Igloo cooler in Unit 1301A was found with suspected cannabis inside; (5) that over 96 bags of suspected cannabis weighing 211 grams were recovered from Unit 1301A; (6) that A.L. was arrested for possession and delivery of cannabis; and (7) that the suspected cannabis recovered from A.L. and the Igloo cooler in Unit 1301A tested positive for cannabis. We find that Officer Sandoval’s deposition testimony was admissible in evidence because he observed A.L. with drugs and, therefore, had personal knowledge of A.L.’s possession of drugs in Unit 1301A on March 27, 2001. Finally, we find that Officer Sandoval’s testimony that A.L. possessed bags that tested positive for cannabis is hearsay and inadmissible because that testimony was based on the findings of the forensic chemist. People v. Lawler,
In light of the fact that the Act does not provide a sanction for law enforcement testimony or records wrongfully disclosed, and since the lab report and Officer Sandoval’s deposition testimony are admissible in evidence, we find that the trial court did not err when it denied Ms. Lowery’s motion to strike the lab report and Officer Sandoval’s deposition testimony. We find, however, that the trial court did err when it failed to strike the arrest report. However, given the overwhelming admissible evidence in Officer Sandoval’s deposition transcript and the lab report, the admission of the arrest report was harmless. Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co.,
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The question now becomes whether Cameo was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the. light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co.,
In light of the fact that we have determined that the trial court properly considered the lab report and Officer Sandoval’s deposition testimony and concluded that the information in those documents established that Ms. Lowery violated the terms of her lease, there are no material facts in dispute in this case. The question becomes whether Cameo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
We believe a United States Supreme Court case, Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker,
The tenants challenged HUD’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (Supp. V 1994) arguing that the statute does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of “innocent” tenants who lack knowledge of drug-related criminal activities. Rucker,
Here, the facts are similar to those in Rucker. Like the tenants in Rucker, Ms. Lowery lived in a housing project that was subsidized by HUD under the “Section 8 New Construction Program”; she signed a lease predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2000) that was approved by HUD; and, as a Section 8 tenant, she received federal assistance with her rent. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2000). By signing the lease, Ms. Lowery agreed that she could be evicted if a member of her household engaged in drug-related criminal activity. The family members in Rucker, the two tenants’ grandsons and the tenant’s daughter, are similar to A.L. because all were members of the leaseholders’ households and all were found in possession of illegal drugs in violation of the lease. In fact, A.L.’s violations were more serious than the violations of the household members in Rucker because A.L. possessed a large quantity of drugs inside the leased apartment, while in Rucker, the tenants’ grandsons were smoking marijuana in the apartment complex parking lot and the tenant’s daughter was found with cocaine and a cocaine crack pipe three blocks away from the apartment complex. The facts in Rucker are similar and difficult to distinguish from the facts in this case. Therefore, we find that Rucker applies and that Cameo was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rucker,
Ms. Lowery argues: (1) that the “engage in or permit” language of the lease required that she have knowledge of the illegal activity; (2) that the facts in Rucker are distinguishable from the facts in this case; and (3) that federal statutes and regulations Cameo cited in support of its motion for summary judgment are inapplicable in this case. Ms. Lowery supports her argument that the tenant must have knowledge of the illegal activity with Kimball Hill Management Co. v. Roper,
Ms. Lowery also argues that Rucker only applies to tenants who live in public housing authority projects. According to Ms. Lowery, Rucker does not apply to her case because she does not live in a public housing authority project, but in a private housing complex. The Rucker Court stated that “it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault evictions in order to ‘provide public and other federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs.’ ” Rucker,
Finally, Ms. Lowery argues that Cameo failed to draft a lease containing only the regulatory language of section 24 C.F.R. § 5.858 (2005) and should be required to show that she had knowledge of A.L.’s drug-related criminal activity because the lease contained additional “engage in or permit” language. 24 C.F.R. § 5.858 (2005). Rucker addressed Ms. Lowery’s argument that she is an innocent tenant because she had no knowledge of her son’s illegal activity. Rucker very clearly holds that landlords of federally assisted low-income housing may evict tenants for drug-related criminal activity of household members, even if the tenant has no knowledge of the illegal activity. Therefore, given the illegal activities of A.L., we find this argument devoid of merit. Rucker,
In conclusion, Cameo was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because Ms. Lowery violated the material provisions in her lease when her son, an occupant of Unit 1301A, became involved in drug-related criminal activity. Rucker,
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GALLAGHER, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
Notes
A.L.’s initials will be used throughout this opinion because of the confidentiality provisions in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. 705 ILCS 405/1— 5(6), 1 — 8 (West 2004).
Section 1 — 7(A) of the Act restricts possession of law enforcement records maintained by law enforcement agencies to the following parties and entities: (1) any local, State, or federal law enforcement officers of any jurisdiction, or agency when necessary for the discharge of official business; (2) prosecutors, probation officers, social workers, or other individuals assigned by the court; (3) adult and juvenile prison review board; (4) authorized military personnel; and (5) persons engaged in bona fide research with the permission of the presiding judge of the juvenile court and the chief executive of the respective law enforcement agency. 705 ILCS 405/1 — 7(A) (West 2004).
Section 2 — 1101 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides “Lf]or good cause shown, the court on motion may quash or modify any subpoena.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1101 (West 2004).
Rule 415(d) provides “[u]pon a showing of cause, the court may at any time order that specified disclosures be restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate, provided that all material and information to which a party is entitled must be disclosed in time to permit counsel to make beneficial use thereof.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 415(d).