Thе only questions necessary for a decision in this case are (1) whether the evidence offered by the plaintiff and ruled out by the court was admissible and sufficient to show that at the time of the collision Hоllis Ed Cockrell was the agent of M. F. Jones and acting in the prosecution of Jones’ business, and (2) whether the act of Jones in illegally lending a dealer’s tag to Cockrell estopped Jones from denying thаt Cockrell was his agent.
The testimony offered to prove that the truck operated by Cockrеll belonged to Jones and that Cockrell was the agent of Jones was inadmissible for that purpose. It was sought to be proved by witnesses at the scene of the collision that Cockrell stated some ten to fifteen minutes after the collision that the truck he was operating belonged to Jones. Such testimony was not admissible. It was not a part of the res gestae. It was not spontaneous and was not the kind of statement included in the res gestae principle. Even if the statement was res gestae thе testimony would not have been admissible because the rule forbidding the proof of agency by the mеre declaration of an agent applies to res gestae statements.
Franklin County Lmbr. Co. v. Grady County,
The plaintiff contends that M. F. Jоnes is liable for the negligence of Cockrell by reason of the fact that Jones illegally permitted Cockrell to use Jones’ dealer’s tag on the theory that Jones is estopped to deny the ownership of the truck in violation of Ga. L. 1963, p. 529
(Code Ann.
§ 68-213). Reese v. Reamore,
It is not necessary to pass upon other enumerations of error.
The court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of M. F. Jones or in overruling the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
Judgments affirmed.