INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Adrian Camacho appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Target Corporation (Target) on Camacho's causes of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation, harassment causing a hostile work environment, failure to prevent harassment and discrimination, retaliation, constructive termination in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, and a violation of the Bane Act ( Civ. Code, § 52.1 ). The trial court concluded that language included in an addendum to a preprinted compromise and release form utilized to settle Camacho's workers' compensation action against Target constituted a broad release of any and all potential claims that
After reviewing the relevant language in the addendum and considering that language in the context of the entire settlement agreement, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that certain language contained in the addendum to the settlement agreement executed by the parties in Camacho's workers' compensation case constitutes a general release of all of Camacho's civil claims. We therefore reverse the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
Camacho began working as a cashier at Target in August 2012. Target has a zero-tolerance policy with respect to harassment and discrimination in the workplace. Camacho complained to his supervisor and to individuals in the Human Resources Department, and also called Target's "Anonymous Hotline," regarding repeated verbal harassment from his coworkers at Target based on the fact that he is gay. According to Camacho, his coworkers would ridicule, mimic, and mock him, sometimes in the presence of Target customers.
Camacho alleges that rather than take corrective action in response to his complaints, Target instead retaliated against him by denying him a promotion and allowing the hostile work conditions to continue, unabated.
According to Camacho, he was constructively discharged because the situation had become intolerable at his workplace and he "felt forced to resign." (Boldface omitted.) He resigned his employment with Target on September 30, 2014.
B. Procedural background
In August 2014, prior to resigning, Camacho filed a claim for workers' compensation
The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) issued an order approving the settlement between Camacho and Target approximately a week after the parties executed the C&R and Addendum.
In April 2015, Camacho received a right-to-sue letter from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH).
In August 2015, Camacho filed the operative First Amended Complaint, in which he asserted the following causes of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation; harassment causing a hostile work environment; failure to prevent harassment and discrimination; retaliation; constructive termination in violation of public policy; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; and a violation of the Bane Act ( Civ. Code, § 52.1 ).
Target answered the complaint.
In September 2016, Target moved for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication. After full briefing by the parties but prior to the hearing, the trial court issued a tentative ruling in favor of Target. After oral argument, the court adopted its tentative ruling and granted Target's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The trial court concluded that the C&R and Addendum executed by the parties in Camacho's workers' compensation case constitutes a general release of all potential civil claims that Camacho might have as a result of the harassment he experienced at Target. The court entered judgment in favor of Target.
Camacho filed a motion for new trial. After hearing oral argument on the motion for new trial, the court took the matter under submission. The court ultimately denied the motion.
Camacho filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary judgment standards
"Summary judgment and summary adjudication provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. [Citations.] A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication may demonstrate that the plaintiff's cause of action has no merit by showing that (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or (2) there is a complete defense to that cause of action." (
Generally, "the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if [that party] carries [t]his burden of production, [the moving party] causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact." ( Aguilarv. Atlantic Richfield Co . (2001)
"After the defendant meets its threshold burden [to demonstrate that a cause of action has no merit], the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or affirmative defense. [Citations.] The plaintiff may not simply rely on the allegations of its pleadings but, instead, must set forth the specific facts showing the existence of a triable issue of material fact. [Citation.] A triable issue of material fact exists if, and only if, the evidence reasonably permits the trier of fact to find the contested fact in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." ( Collin , supra ,
B. The relevant documents
The language of the C&R and the Addendum that form the basis of Target's contention that Camacho waived his right to bring the current claims against Target when he executed the settlement agreement in his workers' compensation case is central to this appeal.
The preprinted form C&R comprises nine pages. There are a number of places on the form where the parties are to fill in information and/or mark specific choices or options. In paragraph 1, which begins on page 3 of the C&R, the completed form states that "IT IS CLAIMED THAT" while Camacho was "employed as a(n) CASHIER/TEAM MEMBER" he "sustained injury arising out of and in the
In paragraph 2, the C&R includes the following language:
"Upon approval of this compromise agreement by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board or a workers' compensation administrative law judge and payment in accordance with the provisions hereof, the employee releases and forever discharges the above-named employer(s) and insurance carrier(s) from all claims and causes of action, whether now known or ascertained or which may hereafter arise or develop as a result of the above-referenced injury(ies), including any and all liability of the employer(s) and the insurance carrier(s) and each of them to the dependents, heirs, executors, representatives, administrators or assigns of the employee. Execution of this form has no effect onclaims that are not within the scope of the workers' compensation law or claims that are not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation law, unless otherwise expressly stated ." (Italics added.)
Paragraph 3 then clarifies that "[t]his agreement is limited to settlement of the body parts, conditions, or systems and for the dates of injury set forth in Paragraph No. 1 and further explained in Paragraph No. 9 despite any language to the contrary elsewhere in this document or any addendum ." (Italics added.)
The next relevant paragraph for our purposes is paragraph 9, which states, "The parties wish to settle these matters to avoid the costs, hazards and delays of further litigation, and agree that a serious dispute exists as to the following issues (initial only those that apply). ONLY ISSUES INITIALED BY THE APPLICANT OR HIS/HER REPRESENTATIVE AND DEFENDANTS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ARE INCLUDED WITHIN THIS SETTLEMENT." Below this is a list of terms. Camacho's initials and those of a representative of Target are placed next to the following items only:
"earnings," "temporary disability," "future medical treatment," "other[:] RETRO INDEMNITY BENEFITS, MILEAGE, OUT OF POCKET," "permanent disability APPLICANT WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO A MED-LEGAL AME OR PQME EVALUATION," "self-procured medical treatment, except as provided in Paragraph 7,[3 ]" and "vocational rehabilitation benefits/supplemental job displacement benefits."4
"THIS COMPROMISE AND RELEASE RESOLVES ALL ISSUES AND PARTS OF BODY ALLEGED RE CT CLAIM FROM: 10/01/2013-08/01/2014 TO NECK, DIGESTIVE SYSTEM-STOMACH, NERVOUS SYSTEM / PSYCHE."5
"A. PAYMENT CONDITIONS: It is agreed that all permanent disability advances made both before and after the execution of the Compromise and Release will be credited against the amount in paragraph #7, page 6. The applicant and applicant's attorney waived penalties and interest, if payment of the Compromise and Release is made within 30 days after the Order Approving Compromise and Release issues.
"B. CONDITIONS FOR THIS COMPROMISE AND RELEASE: The following are in issue: Parts of body injured, nature and extent of permanent disability, duration of temporary disability, need for further medical treatment, self-procured medical treatment, apportionment and rehabilitation. Applicant desires a lump sum settlement and to control future medical treatment. Defendants desire to buy their peace. All parties desire to settle the high risk of litigation and agree that the Compromise and Release is fair and reasonable. The entire medical record as filed by the parties is incorporated by reference thereto. The applicant stipulates that they have not sustained any other injuries while employed with the defendant.
"C. INFORMED CONSENT ON SETTLEMENT: APPLICANT AGREES THEY HAVE BEEN PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING WORKERS' COMPENSATION SETTLEMENTS, INCLUDING COMPROMISE AND RELEASE DOCUMENTS AND STIPULATIONS WITH REQUEST FOR AWARD. APPLICANT WISHES TO OBTAIN A LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT. APPLICANT HAS REVIEWED THE POSSIBLE FUTURE MEDICAL COSTS AND PERMANENT DISABILITY RATING AND AGREES THAT THE CURRENT SETTLEMENT IS FAIR. APPLICANT HAS REVIEWED THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND UNDERSTANDS THE PROVISIONS.
"D. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION/SUPPLEMENTAL JOB DISPLACEMENT BENEFITS[:] As part of this settlement consideration was given to resolve/buy out the Applicant's right to prospective Vocational Rehabilitation benefits/Supplemental Job Displacement Benefits.
"E. SETTLEMENT ACCURALS [sic ][:] The amount in paragraph #7, page 6, includes consideration for the settlement by this Compromise and Release of any claimed, accrued medical temporary disability, vocationalrehabilitation, temporary disability, mileage, penalties and interest, reinstatement, lost wages, attorney fees, costs, or any other claims for reimbursement, benefits, damages, or relief of whatever nature, include [sic ] Labor Code § 132(a) (Discrimination for filing a work injury) or Labor Code § 4553 (for serious and willful misconduct by the employer) claims filed, threatened, or contemplated, through the date of the Order Approving Compromise and Release.
"I HAVE READ EACH OF THE ABOVE CONDITIONS AND PARAGRAPHS AND I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE TO EACH OF THEM AS INDICATED BY MY SIGNATURE BELOW."
C. Background on the workers' compensation system
1. Scope of workers' compensation law
"California's workers' compensation scheme was developed early in the 20th century as a result of the inadequacy of the common law that often denied injured workers any recovery for work-related injuries. [Citations.]" ( Claxton v. Waters (2004)
The workers' compensation law applies to employee injuries "arising out of and in the course of the employment" when the statutorily specified "conditions of compensation concur." ( Lab. Code, § 3600.) Generally, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for such injuries. (
"Liability under the workers' compensation law is founded in neither tort nor contract law. [Citation.] Instead, it is liability without fault [citations], to ensure that injured workers are quickly provided benefits to relieve the effects of the industrial injury [citation]. Thus, informal rules of pleading apply to such proceedings [citation], and workers may be represented by individuals other than attorneys [citation]." ( Claxton , supra ,
In addition, to safeguard injured workers from agreeing to unfair or unwise settlements, Labor Code section 5001 provides that no settlement is valid unless the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board or a workers' compensation referee approves the settlement. ( Steller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co . (2010)
D. Analysis
On appeal, Target contends that the trial court correctly concluded that Camacho settled his nonworkers' compensation claims through his execution of the C& R and accompanying attachments. Target asserts that language in Addendum A constitutes a general release of all claims, both workers' compensation claims and nonworkers' compensation claims, related to the harassment and discrimination that Camacho claims to have suffered while employed at Target. The language on which Target relies to support its contention that Camacho signed a general release of both workers' compensation claims and nonworkers' compensation claims stemming from the alleged harassment and discrimination is contained in paragraph E of Addendum A, titled "SETTLEMENT ACCURALS [sic ]." (Underscore omitted.) Specifically, Target highlights the fact that this paragraph states that the settlement amount of $12,000 "includes consideration for the settlement by this Compromise and Release of any claimed, accrued medical temporary disability, vocational rehabilitation, temporary disability, mileage, penalties and interest, reinstatement, lost wages, attorney fees, costs, or any other claims for reimbursement, benefits, damages, or relief of whatever nature , includ[ing] Labor Code § 132(a) (Discrimination for filing a work injury) or
In arguing that the trial court correctly interpreted the language of Addendum A, Target relies primarily on Jefferson v. Department of Youth Authority (2002)
In Jefferson , the plaintiff was employed as a teacher's assistant by the California Youth Authority from September 1992 to February 1994. She filed a workers' compensation claim in March 1994. The workers' compensation claim was based on sexual harassment that she experienced in the workplace. In October 1994, the plaintiff filed a sex discrimination claim with the DFEH, which issued her right-to-sue letter in October 1995. In July 1996, the plaintiff settled her workers' compensation claim for more than $41,000. As in this case, the settlement documents included a release form that had been approved by the WCAB. As the Jefferson court explained:
"In the preprinted section of the release form, Jefferson stated clearly that, upon approval by the WCAB and payment, she 'releases and forever discharges [the Youth Authority] from all claims and causes of action, whether now known or ascertained,or which may hereafter arise or develop as a result of [the claimed] injury.' " ( Jefferson , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 302 ,, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 391 .) 48 P.3d 423
The plaintiff in Jefferson also executed an attachment to the release form that differs in significant respects from the Addendum in this case. The Jefferson court described the attachment as follows:
"In a typed attachment to the release, [the plaintiff] added: 'The Applicant [Jefferson] desires to avoid the hazards of litigation and the defendants wish to buy their peace. ... The settlement is to compensate for all aspects of all injuries included herein. [¶] ... [A]pplicant agrees that this release will apply to all unknown and unanticipated injuries and damages resulting from such accident , and all rights under Sections [sic ] 1542 of the Civil Code of California are hereby expressly waived. [¶] ... [¶] ... [A]pplicant agrees that this release extends to and covers the ... employees of the defendants ....' The same attachment also quoted the text of Civil Code section 1542 (hereafter section 1542 ), which protects parties from inadvertently settling unknown claims ." ( Jefferson , supra , 28 Cal.4th at pp. 302-303,, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 391 , some italics added.) 48 P.3d 423
The WCAB approved the parties' settlement in early August 1996, and in late August the plaintiff filed a civil action against the California Youth Authority and the individual who had harassed her. After various other claims had been dismissed, a single cause of action for sex discrimination in violation of FEHA remained. ( Jefferson , supra ,
The Supreme Court concluded that the language of the release that the plaintiff had signed barred her FEHA civil action. ( Jefferson , supra ,
Two years later, the Supreme Court considered the scope of another workers' compensation settlement agreement in
The Claxton court noted that in the case before it, the compromise and release form contained the following language: " 'The nature, duration, extent and cause of the employee's disability are in dispute. Applicant desires to control his/her future medical expenses. Defendants desire to buy their peace. The parties desire to settle the hazards, risks, and delays of litigation for a lump sum certain. All parties agree that the Compromise and Release is a fair and equitable settlement. The parties require that the consideration for this Compromise and Release includes full compensation for all injuries sustained by the applicant while employed by defendants, including all specific injuries and continuous trauma . The medical record is herein incorporated by reference. The parties waive Labor Code § 5313 [the statute requiring the workers' compensation judge to make factual findings and a decision determining the rights of the parties].' " ( Claxton , supra ,
Despite this seemingly broad release language, the Claxton court explained that "[t]he form's references to disability, medical expenses, injuries sustained during employment, and a waiver of findings and decisions to be made by a workers' compensation judge, suggest that the release does not apply to claims outside the workers' compensation system." ( Claxton , supra ,
The Claxton court thus expressly held that "the standard language of the preprinted form used in settling workers'
"It would be a simple matter for parties who have agreed to settle not only workers' compensation claims but also claims outside the workers' compensation system to execute another document expressing that agreement. Thus, execution of the mandatory standard preprinted compromise and release form would only establish settlement of the workers' compensation claims; the intended settlement of claims outside the workers' compensation system would have to be reflected in a separate document. (See Jefferson , supra ,[ 28 Cal.4th 299 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 391 ] [attachment to workers' compensation form documented release of claims outside of workers' compensation]; Delaney [v. Superior Fast Freight (1993) ], supra , 14 Cal.App.4th [590] at p. 600 [ 48 P.3d 423 ] [parties should augment workers' compensation form to expressly refer to release of claims outside of workers' compensation].) As is true with settlements in civil actions generally, the separate document need not identify precise claims; it would be sufficient to refer generally to causes of action outside the workers' compensation law 'in clear and non-technical language .' [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 378, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 246 , italics added.) 96 P.3d 496
In response to the Claxton court's urging that the WCAB revise the preprinted compromise and release form to make explicit the fact that execution of the form did not constitute a release of claims outside the workers' compensation law, the WCAB amended the language of its preprinted form. The revised form, which is the form used by the parties in this case, includes the following language, which makes clear that no claims outside of workers' compensation law are being released by the standard compromise and release form: "Execution of this form has no effect on claims that are not within the scope of the workers' compensation law or claims that are not subject to the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation law, unless otherwise expressly stated."
The parties in the present case agree that the standard C& R executed in this case did not serve to release Camacho's civil claims that fall outside of the workers' compensation system. Their dispute centers around what claims Camacho released when he executed Addendum A. Target contends that Addendum A includes language that is effectively the same as the language in the attachment in Jefferson , supra , 28 Cal.4th at pages 302-303,
We interpret a release or settlement agreement under the same rules of construction that apply to contracts generally. ( Civ. Code, § 1635 ; Hess v. Ford Motor Co . (2002)
In interpreting a contract, we give the words their ordinary and popular meaning, unless the parties or usage have given the words a specialized or technical meaning. ( Civ. Code, § 1644 ; Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017)
After examining the language of the entire document, including the preprinted C&R and Addendum A and considering each term within the context of the others, it is clear that there is no reference in either the C&R or Addendum A to any causes of action outside the workers' compensation system, much less to a release of such claims in "clear and nontechnical language," as is required under Claxton . Target relies on Paragraph E in the Addendum, noting that it includes a reference to "consideration for the settlement by this Compromise and Release of ... any other claims for reimbursement, benefits, damages, or relief of whatever nature, ... filed, threatened, or contemplated, through the date of the Order Approving Compromise and Release." Although this language, when read in isolation, might appear to be sufficiently broad to cover claims outside of the workers' compensation system, we do not look at
First and foremost in our analysis is the fact that the language on which Target relies contains no mention of claims for relief that fall outside of the workers' compensation law. In addition, the specific words on which Target relies are found within a lengthy sentence that provides important context. Specifically, the entire sentence reads:
"The amount in paragraph #7, page 6, includes consideration for the settlement by this Compromise and Release of any claimed, accrued medical temporary disability, vocational rehabilitation, temporarydisability, mileage, penalties and interest, reinstatement, lost wages, attorney fees, costs, or any other claims for reimbursement, benefits, damages, or relief of whatever nature, include [sic ] Labor Code § 132(a) (Discrimination for filing a work injury) or Labor Code § 4553 (for serious and willful misconduct by the employer) claims filed, threatened, or contemplated, through the date of the Order Approving Compromise and Release."
Notably, all of the other references in this sentence are to items of relief that are within the scope of the workers' compensation system. Even the references to Labor Code claims are to specific claims for which specific relief is available pursuant to workers' compensation law. (See Lab. Code, § 132a [coming within Division 1, regarding the Department of Industrial Relations, Chapter 5, which sets forth the Division of Workers' Compensation, and making it illegal for employers to discharge, threaten to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he or she has filed or made known an intention to file a claim for workers' compensation, or because the employee "has received a rating, award, or settlement"]; see also Lab. Code, § 4553 [coming within Division 4 of the Labor Code, providing for workers' compensation and insurance generally, and providing that the amount of worker's compensation otherwise recoverable "shall be increased one-half, together with costs and expenses not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), where the employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful misconduct of" the employer or certain individuals if the employer is a partnership or corporation].)
The language in Paragraph E of Addendum A is similar to language that the Claxton court declined to interpret as a broad release of claims outside the workers' compensation system. The release at issue in Claxton included the following language: " 'consideration for this Compromise and Release includes full compensation for all injuries sustained by the applicant while employed by defendants , including all specific injuries and continuous trauma.' " ( Claxton , supra ,
The structure and formatting surrounding this language also suggests that it was
The fact that the language of Addendum A does not include the language from Civil Code section 1542, or language releasing claims against Target's employees-both of which were included in the general release found to have been a release of all of the plaintiff's civil causes of action in Jefferson , supra , 28 Cal.4th at pages 306-307,
That this language could be understood to constitute a general release of all claims arising from the harassment and discrimination that Camacho alleges occurred at his workplace becomes even less plausible when read in the context of other language in the paragraphs that surround it. Other portions of Addendum A and the C&R more clearly express that it was the parties' intention to limit the settlement to claims within the workers' compensation law. For example, Paragraph C of Addendum A, which is two paragraphs before the one on which Target relies, and which is titled "INFORMED CONSENT ON SETTLEMENT," states that Camacho agrees that he was "PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING WORKERS' COMPENSATION SETTLEMENTS ." (Italics added.) Paragraph C further states that
To give the language in Paragraph E of Addendum A the meaning that Target suggests-i.e., to interpret it as constituting a broad release of any and all claims arising from the alleged wrongful conduct, including nonworkers' compensation claims-would be to effectively nullify Paragraph C. It seems obvious that a paragraph purporting to establish that a plaintiff is acknowledging that he is acting pursuant to informed consent would serve no
Other portions of the C&R provide further context demonstrating that the parties did not intend for the language on which Target relies to serve as a broad release of any and all claims, both workers' compensation claims and nonworkers' compensation claims. For example, Paragraph 3 of the C&R specifies that "[t]his agreement is limited to settlement of the body parts, conditions, or systems and for the dates of injury set forth in Paragraph No. 1 and further explained in Paragraph No. 9 despite any language to the contrary elsewhere in this document or any addendum ." (Italics added.) Paragraph 1 identifies the "Body Part[s]" as to which Camacho was claiming he suffered injuries as his "HEAD," "NECK," "DIGESTIVE," and "PSYCH." In turn, Paragraph 9 provides a list of "issues." By placing their initials next to certain of the listed issues, the parties indicate that those are the issues that are in dispute and identify them as the issues that the parties intend to settle. Paragraph 9 states, "ONLY ISSUES INITIALED BY THE APPLICANT OR HIS/HER REPRESENTATIVE AND DEFENDANTS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ARE INCLUDED WITHIN THIS SETTLEMENT." Camacho's initials and those of a representative of Target are placed next to the following issues only: "earnings," "temporary disability," "future medical treatment," "other[:] RETRO INDEMNITY BENEFITS, MILEAGE, OUT OF POCKET,"
Paragraph B of Addendum A further supports the notion that the parties agreed to settle only those matters listed in Paragraphs 1 and 9 of the C&R, and that those matters relate solely to claims within the workers' compensation system. Paragraph B of Addendum A states:
"The following are in issue: Parts of body injured, nature and extent of permanent disability, duration of temporary disability, need for further medical treatment, self-procured medical treatment, apportionment and rehabilitation. Applicant desires a lump sum settlement and to control future medical treatment. Defendants desire to buy their peace. All parties desire to settle the high risk of litigation and agree that the Compromise and Release is fair and reasonable. The entire medical record as filed by the parties is incorporated by reference thereto."
Again, there is no mention of civil claims or tort injuries, or other nonworkers' compensation claims. Rather, everything referenced in Paragraph B, including "[p]arts of body injured," disability, temporary disability, medical treatment, rehabilitation, and the "medical record," indicates that what is at issue are claims that are addressed by, or that are exclusive to, the workers' compensation system. (See Claxton , supra ,
Claxton requires that the parties indicate a desire to settle claims that fall outside the workers' compensation system by "refer[ring] generally to causes of action outside the workers' compensation law 'in clear and non-technical language' " ( Claxton , supra ,
The trial court thus erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Target on the ground that Camacho released nonworkers' compensation claims when he executed his workers' compensation settlement documents. The judgment must therefore be reversed.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. Costs on appeal are awarded to appellant.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P.J.
O'ROURKE, J.
ADDENDUM A ATTACHMENT TO COMPROMISE AND RELEASE
A.PAYMENT CONDITIONS : It is agreed that all permanent disability advances made both before and after the execution of the Compromise and Release will be credited against the amount in paragraph #7, page 6. The applicant and applicant's attorney waived penalties and interest, if payment of the Compromise and Release is made within 30 days after the Order Approving Compromise and Release issues.
B.CONDITIONS FOR THIS COMPROMISE AND RELEASE : The following are in issue: Parts of body injured, nature and extent of permanent disability, duration of temporary disability, need for further medical treatment, self-procured medical treatment, apportionment and rehabilitation. Applicant desires a lump sum settlement and to control future medical treatment. Defendants desire to buy their peace. All parties desire to settle the high risk of litigation and agree that the Compromise and Release is fair and reasonable. The entire medical record as filed by the parties is incorporated by reference thereto. The applicant stipulates that they have not sustained any other injuries while employed with the defendant.
C.INFORMED CONSENT ON SETTLEMENT : APPLICANT AGREES THEY HAVE BEEN PROVIDED INFORMATION CONCERNING WORKERS' COMPENSATION SETTLEMENTS, INCLUDING COMPROMISE AND RELEASE DOCUMENTS AND STIPULATIONS WITH REQUEST FOR AWARD. APPLICANT WISHES TO OBTAIN A LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT. APPLICANT HAS REVIEWED THE POSSIBLE FUTURE MEDICAL COSTS AND PERMANENT DISABILITY RATING AND AGREES THAT THE CURRENT SETTLEMENT IS FAIR. APPLICANT HAS REVIEWED THE ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND UNDERSTANDS THE PROVISIONS.
D.VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION/SUPPLEMENTAL JOB DISPLACEMENT BENEFITS As part of this settlement consideration was given to resolve/buy out the Applicant's right to prospective Vocational Rehabilitation benefits/Supplemental Job Displacement Benefits.
E.SETTLEMENT ACCURALS The amount in paragraph #7, page 6, includes consideration for the settlement by this Compromise and Release of any claimed, accrued medical temporary disability, vocational rehabilitation, temporary disability, mileage, penalties and interest, reinstatement, lost wages, attorney fees, costs, or any other claims for reimbursement, benefits, damages, or relief of whatever nature, include Labor Code § 132(a) (Discrimination for filing a work injury ) or Labor Code § 4553 (for serious and willful misconduct by the employer ) claims filed, threatened, or contemplated, through the date of the Order Approving Compromise and Release
I HAVE READ EACH OF THE ABOVE CONDITIONS AND PARAGRAPHS AND I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE TO EACH OF THEM AS INDICATED BY MY SIGNATURE BELOW.
By:
Applicant & Date
By:
Attorney for Applicant & Date
Notes
A customer who witnessed Camacho being harassed by coworkers reported one of these incidents to Target management.
We will provide the text of the provisions included in the Addendum later in this opinion.
It appears that the preprinted form's reference to paragraph 7 here may be an error. Paragraph 7 states, "The parties agree to settle the above claim(s) on account of the injury(ies) by the payment of the SUM OF $ ____," and provides for a listing of amounts to be deducted from the settlement amount, such as for advances that were made to the claimant. Paragraph 6, however, states, "The parties represent that the following facts are true: (if facts are disputed, state what each party contends under Paragraph No. 9.)" and includes a space for the claimant to state the "TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS PAID." It thus would appear that the reference to paragraph 7 in paragraph 9 may have been intended to be a reference to paragraph 6's statement of the total medical bills paid.
There is a handwritten note next to "vocational rehabilitation benefits/supplemental job displacement benefits" that states, "Based on no evidence of permanent disability, Defendant has no liability for voucher."
Another handwritten note is also included in the box. The note states, "Addendum A and B Re Medicare are hereby incorporated into this Agreement." It is not clear whether the reference to Addendum A in this note is a reference to the Addendum A at issue here, since the Addendum A at issue in this case makes no reference to Medicare.
We do not understand the Claxton court to be suggesting that an individual could bring a cause of action for discrimination or harassment under FEHA in a workers' compensation case, but rather, that the injury caused by the alleged discrimination or harassment may form the basis of claims for recovery pursuant to both workers' compensation law and civil tort law. Indeed, the Claxton court differentiated between claims that fall within workers' compensation law and its exclusivity provisions from those that are "outside" workers' compensation law, noting that it used the phrase "claims 'outside' the workers' compensation system" to refer to "claims that are either not within the scope of workers' compensation law or not subject to the exclusivity provisions of that law." (Claxton , supra ,
In Jefferson , which was decided two years before Claxton , the parties used the former version of the preprinted WCAB form that the Claxton court suggested should be modified to make clear the fact that claims outside the workers' compensation system were not being settled by execution of the form unless otherwise expressly stated elsewhere.
The capitalized portion appears to be an addition typed in by the parties in a space provided in the form.
The capitalized portion here also appears to be an addition typed in by the parties.
As previously indicated, there is also a handwritten note next to "vocational rehabilitation benefits/supplemental job displacement benefits" that states, "Based on no evidence of permanent disability, Defendant has no liability for voucher."