Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep Ranch
658 P.2d 972
Idaho
1983
Check Treatment

*1 CALVIN, George Plaintiff-Appellant, RANCH, part

SALMON RIVER SHEEP

nership and W. Fawn and Rosa

Rupp, wife, husband and and Jim E. and Ilene V. husband and individually partners Sheep Ranch,

Salmon River and J.B. Co., corporation,

Lumber Defendants-

Respondents.

No. 13841.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb.

action on purchase agreement. a timber The basic this Court is issue before whether properly plain- ruled that tiff-appellant failed to introduce Calvin substantial competent evidence quantity probative value that a reason- able have found in his could favor. The facts inquiry relevant to our in this case are as follows: The known as the Salmon River Idaho, Riggins, Ranch near was ac- quired by Fawn and Jim Rupp brothers a contract dated December men were Although both married at the time of their names— purchase, the names of their wives—were purchasers listed as the contract. Fawn testified at trial that during 1978 the Ranch was operated partnership composed as a Rupp, Fawn Rosa husband and and Jim and llene husband and wife. spring plaintiff-appellant, In the Calvin, Fawn George contacted re- garding possibility purchasing timber meetings located on the ranch. Several subsequently held between Calvin and undisputed Rupps. although It is were in llene and Rosa attendance at they did not meetings, some of these take negotiations. parties between the meetings culmi- purchase agreement in a nated timber dat- July ed stated Ranch, was between “Salmon R. ... George ‘buy- ... ‘seller’ and Calvin ” er,’ signed by and was Rupp. agreement provided that agreed “to sell all merchantable tim- seller ber” the land described 750,000 buyer agreed “to to move” try Jr., MacGregor, Grangeville, W.C. during feet the two-year board of timber plaintiff-appellant. term contract. The fur- provided purchase price ther Blake, Lewiston, Wynne M. and Michael per timber was thousand board to be $60 Orofino, McNichols, E. for defendants-re- feet, paid to be on mill scale. spondents. onto land In June 1978 Calvin went HUNTLEY, Justice. operations pur- logging and commenced his He agreement. oral granting alleged This from an order suant is an easements, crew, a built and for the in an hired obtained defendants tive, began logging. damages alone. He set forth several renovated roads and action, including: June into an breach of On Calvin entered causes of Company partnership, estoppel agreement with J.B. Lumber valid contract deny validity its mill in deliver cut on the ranch to Clarkston, (contract by Washington. or the contract conspiracy by and J.B. estoppel), direction, carried others *3 on Lumber, misrepresentation and fraud the June of logging operations on between Rupps, the and unwarranted part the of 10,1979, and deliv- and March by with the contract J.B. Lum- interference 800,000 feet of ering approximately board the defendants’ motion to dis- ber. After J.B. Lum- logs. logs were delivered to complaint miss was denied the trial the 1979, which time February until ber court, answer was filed and the case their log delivery Lumber terminated its J.B. was set for trial. Thereafter, with the agreement Calvin. Indus- logs were delivered to Wickes Forest the A was commenced and at jury trial River Grangeville, in Idaho. tries Salmon case, plaintiff’s the the de- conclusion of Sheep paid Ranch was for all cut and As for a directed fendants moved verdict. according to the established delivered rate judgment, stated in the the trial court con- agreement July alleging sidered as the motion 10,1979, March personally On Calvin was contract had not signed said been “[T]hat informed Fawn and Jim that his separately acknowledged by or either with agreement Sheep the Salmon River wives, Rupp; Rosa or llene V. said was void and that it was therefore had plaintiff prove failed to that terminated. On the same Calvin re- day in any engaged either wife had at time ceived a letter from attoniey the Rupps’ with any plaintiff conversation the con informing him that the had in- timber or the contract there cerning the volved the sale of community and for, in any way misrepresen nor had that since the agreement had not been the plaintiff concerning the ted misled signed acknowledged and by the wives of the ownership, and that timber or and Jim void. The was failed to had that said letter continued on to “You state: should wives benefitted from said purported had not undertake to cut trees for if any more contract other the timber sale than to do we will you sue to recover treble dam- deposits of money payment extent of in ages timber removed from after the and therefor in account of the your date of receipt of this letter.” which no defendants contended was of 10,1979, defendants Calvin testified that as of March benefit inasmuch as price he had cut and had down defendants’ worth the paid, on the timber was 127,040 pine showing any board feet of there no act on was 197,820 board feet of fir. He further testi- wife which of either would in operations invalidity fied he discontinued his as them asserting estop date was left of that cut timber in question.” of the contract ranch property. found the The trial court defendants’ alle- true and also found that 3,1979, gations to be since May complaint On Calvin filed his contract,” evidence of a valid there was “no naming River Salmon Ranch, conspiracy there was “no evidence of a part- (individually such contract.” Ranch) ners of the interfere with Wig- sought J.B. Lumber as trial court concluded that Fairchild v. defendants. Calvin (1963),1 specific performance July gins, or, the alterna- damages, controlling, and directed a verdict in favor ing Wiggins, Fairchild v. of I.C. 32-912. Fairchild (1963), fully text, P.2d 6 the wife of a more infra. Court held that discussed estopped from claim- seller timber was not that the trial court erred present appeal sequently, the defendants. The hold perfected granting from the order the di- a verdict favor of rected verdict. Ranch. and the Salmon applicable The rules to review of an primary issue granting order a directed verdict are well- whether Rosa and established: protection provided by claiming “A directed verdict be should 32-912,3 part: provides I.C. § granted when the evidence is so clear and the wife shall “Either the husband or undisputed that all reasonable minds control the manage have the right must reach the same conclusion.... On bind may either community property, and a motion for a contract, ex- community property by 50(a), moving I.R.C.P. admits party wife the husband nor cept that neither the truth of the adverse evidence and sell, the commu- convey or encumber may every inference legitimately be joins in real estate unless the other nity *4 drawn from it.... Where there is sub- the deed or executing acknowledging and stantial competent tending evidence conveyance, by instrument of other case, plaintiff’s establish or where reason- sold, conveyed or en- the real estate is may able minds differ as to the conclu- ” cumbered .... evidence, sion to be reached from the the cause jury.” should be submitted to the respon- The trial court concluded and the Green, 879, Shields & Co. v. 100 Idaho estoppel of dents contend 882, 983, (citations (1980) 606 P.2d 986 in this case is controlled this Court’s omitted). Wiggins, decision in Fairchild v. 85 Idaho 402, agree. We cannot reviewing After the record in this case, agree with the trial court that the Fairchild, In the wife of the seller was compe record does not contain substantial present during portion a of the conversa- tent evidence from which a could have day tions that occurred on one and led to an conspiracy found the existence of a between agreement day. to sell timber the next Al- Similarly, the and J.B. Lumber. no though opinion does not disclose which a produced such evidence was elapsed amount of time which from the jury could have found that J.B. Lumber Wig- execution of the bill of sale until the of unlawful interference with contract, gins validity denied the of the it Therefore, contract. we hold that the trial does disclose that Fairchild was never al- not err in a verdict in did go begin cutting lowed to on the land and of J.B. Lumber. favor timber. The that there had Court found proof any been “no affirmative action on

However, say thing we cannot the same of false proof of the no as to the and the representation or concealment of material compe- Ranch. We find substantial fact, improve- which, proof any and no material when tent evidence the record 85 Idaho at property.” ment on the real every legitimate taken as true and when 406, addition, the Court tends 380 P.2d at inference is drawn in favor of noted, Mrs. appear that to establish at least with re- “Nowhere does Calvin’s case representa- affirmative spect Wiggins to some of his causes of action. Con- made subject findings It this statute is to the 2. The fact that the trial court included is clear v. Wood judgment equitable estoppel. See Grice of fact in the entered in this case rules of worth, 459, 466, (1904) modify If 80 P. 912 does not our standard of review. (statutes protection granted “are of married women motion for evidence, made, findings merely super- and are are in the nature of rules principles subject legal as are con fluous and the task this remains the to the same Court frauds, Yacte, veyances falling under the statute of Gmeiner same. 592 estoppel equitable and waiv and the rules of P.2d 61 er.”). Grice, apparently the seller had the wife of concerning acquiescence tions her buyer to the representations in made no sale of the timber.” Id. Court However, held that not es- the Court property. Fairchild held that the wife was statutory to invoke the claiming she was topped the sale 32-912. because she knew of protections yet improvements property, on the conduct of clearly In this objection. Upon rehearing, made no buyer upon in reliance argument majority addressed Fairchild, as is distinguishable from that in reasoned: specifically dissent more The record dem the conduct of the wives. si- “Equity permit does not her to remain leading up the negotiations onstrates that claims her conversa- lent as to her over a to the were carried on their encourage appellants tion to continue weeks and that one or both of the period of payments improvements proper- on the occasions. present wives were on several ty,” deny validity and then admit “that Rosa and Respondents candidly 10 Idaho at P. at 916. contract. knew their husbands Thus, the recognized Court Grice negotiating plaintiff.” They with the also acquiescence conduct from which can be admit “that knew the [the wives] inferred be sufficient to establish an pay their and that estoppel. being ments were received for their tim payments respondents ber.” The to the Burnside, recently More in Brown v. began September of 1978 and continued (1971), addition, through March of 1979. In properly Court held that the trial court record demonstrates that Calvin built and *5 protec found a wife to invoke the renovated roads on the property, tions of 32-912 I.C. because evidence § trails, purchased skid equipment cleared to “actually disclosed the wife was either carry operations,4 on his and cut and hauled convey prop aware of the contract” to timber to the agreement over the erty question “actually participated in or course of nine months. benefited from the during contract [in] falsely represented or concealed a material had establish an estoppel against respondents argue that llene and Rosa them, in order to Calvin Rupp its duration.” The wife’s interest in the not be invoked to defeat a § 32-912] exists for Court community protection reasoned: worthy [5] “[I.C. claim can against.it party where the wife has been a fact. They argue that because llene and to the benefits contract and has received Rosa Rupp did not take negotia- in the Waller, Finlayson therefrom.” Id. See tions leading up to the (although 626, 1069, 64 Idaho 134 P.2d were they present), there is no evidence (1943). from jury reasonable could con- they

clude that guilty any misrep- the wives’ Our decisions demonstrate that Thus, or concealment. the re- resentation is participate negotiations failure to in the contend that the trial court did spondents estoppel. not determinative of the issue of in their not err in a verdict favor. Viewing favorably the facts most must, we find sufficient evidence as we respondents argument by made could con- jury from which a reasonable the dissent and re precisely by that made are es- Rupp clude that llene and Rosa jected v. Wood majority Grice worth, protections to invoke the of I.C. topped 10 Idaho 80 P. 912 pro- money September of 1978 5. 32-912 was amended in 1974 to § Calvin borrowed spouses payment for their inter- from J.B. Lumber vide for both for down equipment community property. logging operations, for in the use in his est giving assignment p. Sess. Laws ch. § monies receivable equipment he was to That deliver. repossessed was after Calvin was forced to logging operation. his terminate Thus, 32-912. the trial court § erred in defeats this claim. There is evidence directing a verdict favor of the in the record from which a reasonable tjie issue of estoppel. could conclude that was although bound argues that he is entitled to Fawn it. Rupp signed See I.C. 53-309.6 § recover regardless of whether there is suffi Thus, upon remand Calvin entitled cient evidence estoppel to establish an since (as pursue damages his claim for distin- the property was partnership guished specific performance) against from as property opposed to real community the partnership. Similarly, he is entitled to property. We cannot agree. The property pursue damage against claim Fawn in question acquired was in the names of individual, as an since Rupp there is suffi- Fawn and Jim at a time when both support cient evidence in the record to Thus, were married. the property pre was allegations complaint sumptively community property and the misrepresentation was burden of proving upon otherwise was Cal Cook, warranty. breach of vin. See Cook v. The record is respondents contend that Calvin devoid of evidence that property is not entitled to be reimbursed for the “acquired by purchase or otherwise on performed cutting services he the timber account of the partnership.” See I.C. property. They argue: that was left on the (defining 53-308 “partnership property”). § plaintiff contends that he “Though Similarly, there is no evidence of a valid prevented removing the down conveyance to the partner timber, that he was only the record shows ship after original acquisition. timber, prevented further hold that the question was com already the timber cut. removing munity all property at times relevant Accordingly, even if the were ben- result, this appeal. As a unless Calvin can way by efited in the efforts involv- some estoppel, establish an and Rosa timber, ing cutting received that are entitled protections to invoke the of I.C. benefit because the abandoned however, mean, 32-912. This does not the timber.” Calvin’s claims the Salmon (as a partnership) and agree. Although We Calvin’s testi- cannot

Fawn Rupp as an individual fail. mony suggests that when Fawn and Jim Rupp told him the contract was void provided: this case re- parties contemplated that Calvin could good warrants that he has title “Seller cut, the letter already move the timber repre- above described timber and from the day by received later that good right sents that he has to sell and Rupps’ attorney suggests otherwise. timber; dispose of such hereby does whether jury it is for the to determine agree to warrant and defend such title for his ex- damages Calvin is entitled to right against persons claiming all left on the penses the timber to him.” adversely the tim- whether he abandoned property or complaint expressly Calvin’s states a cause Rupps. alleged ber as against Sheep action Salmon River that it is enti argues J.B. Lumber Ranch for breach of contract. The fact Although appeal. tled fees on community attorney’s from the directed verdict partnership property appealed and not in no Calvin partnership, provides part: unless is a member binds the 53-309 he authority partner acting has in fact no so Every partner agent part- “1. is an of the particular partnership in the for the to act business, nership purpose of for the matter, person with whom he is deal- and the every partner, including the act of the execu- knowledge ing fact that he has no has partnership tion in the name of instru- authority.” ment, apparently carrying for on in the usual the business of the of which

307 Freer, (1960); Lumber, Boesiger 357 374 v. favor of J.B. he has not P.2d orig- v. presented any argument support (1963); Wood Idaho Hill, inal claim that J.B. Lumber P.2d 391 interfering partici- with the contract in a

pation conspiracy. Accordingly, appeal against

hold that J.B. Lumber it is unreasonably pursued

entitled to fees. attorney’s its reasonable 54(e)(1).

I.R.C.P. judgment respon- is affirmed as to re- J.B. Lumber and reversed as to 658 P.2d 978 dent Bastian, and Arlon and Una hus spondents Salmon River Ranch BASTIAN wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, Rupps. The case is remanded for a new band and the Salmon Rupps, individually partners and the FALLS, municipal TWIN CITY OF Ranch. corporation, Defendant-Appellant. appellant. Costs to the No. 13658. BAKES, DONALDSON, C.J., J., and Appeals Idaho. Court of n SCOGGIN, Tern., J. Pro concur. Jan. SHEPARD, J., concurs in the result. Petition for Review Denied

BAKES, Justice, concurring: 29, 1983. March agree I majority reversing with the granted to the defendants. However, that, I do feel since this case is

being returned to the lower for

trial, pointed that, should be out under

the facts of plaintiff might pre- performance

vail on his specific claims

through application of the doctrine of

performance. part performance

The doctrine of is an which,

equitable though appli- doctrine

cable in an damages, apply action for would

in an action specific performance. Al- Moyle,

len v. long have Idaho courts held *7 amounting

where certain factors an oral

performance present, assent ab-

convey real be enforced compliance

sent with the statute of frauds.

Accordingly, appellant if the can did to sell Rupp spouses assent timber, part performance also show

through possession factors such as (timber, case), in this

real

making improvements, substantial payment, then he would be entitled

partial performance of the in- specific contract Auger,

volved. See McMahon