48 App. D.C. 119 | D.C. Cir. | 1918
delivered tbe opinion of tbe Court:
This was an action by tbe appellant, William B. Calvert, as administrator of tbe estate of bis deceased wife, Pearl J. Calvert, to recover damages resulting to him by reason of bis wife’s death through tbe negligence, as be alleges, of tbe appellee, the Terminal Taxicab Company. Tbe wife died intestate, leaving surviving her a father and mother as well as her husband, but no children or descendants of children. Tbe court instructed tbe jury to return a verdict for tbe defendant on tbe ground that tbe statute did not give a husband a right to recover damages . accruing to him from such a cause. Tbe administrator appeals; and tbe problem presented is to be determined by a correct construction of secs. 1301, 1303, and 1160 of tbe Code [31 Stat. at L. 1394, 1395, 1375, chap. 854].
By sec. 1301 it is provided that “whenever by an injury, done or happening within tbe limits of tbe District of Columbia tbe death of a person shall be caused by tbe wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person or corporation, and the act,
Section 1303 says that “the damages recovered in such action shall not be appropriated to the payment of the debts or liabilities of such deceased person, but shall inure to the benefit of his or her family and be distributed according to the provisions of the Statute of Distribution in force in the said District of Columbia.”
Section 1160 declares that after the payment of a married woman’s debts where she dies intestate her “personal estate shall be the property of her husband.”
The statute giving damages on account of death resulting from the wrongful act of another is remedial, and as such must be liberally construed. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Richards, 33 App. D. C. 410, 417; Bechtel v. United States, 101 U. S. 597, 25 L. ed. 1019. It is also a rule of construction that all parts of the Code in pari materia must be read in the light of each other and harmonized wherever possible. Southern R. Co. v. Hawkins, 35 App. D. C. 313, 21 Ann. Cas. 926.
The case before us turns upon whether the words, “next of kin,” in sec. 1301, comprehend the husband of the deceased. According to the old definition, “next of kin” included only those related to each other through consanguinity. If we take the section by itself, and disregard the other parts of the Cede which bear upon the same subject, perhaps that is the meaning which we should attribute to it here; but, as we have just seen, we may not do that. Section 1303 directs that the damages recovered under the other section of the Code “shall inure to
This court, speaking through Chief Justice Alvey many years ago, quoted with approval from Chancellor Kent the following with respect to the relation between a husband and wife: “The husband is her next of kin, by relation of marriage; and he takes in consequence of being her husband, and by reason of that relation.” McCarthy v. McCarthy, 20 App. D. C. 195, 208.
In Miller-Shoemaker Real Estate Co. v. Sturgeon, 31 App. D. C. 406, it was held that the husband was entitled “as the sole heir and beneficiary of the estate” of his deceased wife to damages caused to him by the wrongful death of his wife.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed at the costs of the appellee, with instructions to grant a new trial in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
Beversed.