Calvary Christian School, Inc. v. Huffstuttler

117 OPINION DISSENTING SUPPLEMENTAL OF REHEARING DENIAL ON 21,2006 SEPTEMBER I wоuld grant petition dissenting. Justice, Jim Gunter, court, we have 29,2006, of this opinion rehearing.By June our own overlooked precedent. to be within conduct presumed an attorney’s have held We State,321 v. conduct. of reasonable professional a wide range Johnson Further, held that we have 117, (1995). 940 900 S.W.2d Ark. to overcome presumption has the burden 37 Rule petitioner 833, 836, State, 957 330 Ark. v. Seek the attorney’s competency. the Rule this presumption, To overcome 711 S.W.2d deficient prejudice both performance must 37 prove petitioner Daniel, Ark. SeeState from the deficient performance. resulting deficiency 571, 575, (1999). By presuming 998 S.W.2d this contradicts our opinion instead of competence, June law. settled our decision consider aligning should grant rehearing We our own with precedent. J., joins opinion.

Dickey, SCHOOL, Neeley, INC., Terry CHRISTIAN CALVARY Lewellen, Borden, David Individually M.C. Rogers, Michael Jr., School Christian as Directors Calvary and In Their Capacities Huffstuttler, HUFFSTUTTLER, Dorma Hess v. Ted Suzanne Huffstuttler and Preston S.W.3d58 05-343 of Arkansas Court Supreme 29, 2006 delivered Opinion June 7, 2006.*] denied [Rehearing September * rehearing. Dickey,JJ., grant would GLAZE Tillman, P.A., & Reynolds W. Sharpe, Christopher Morledge, for appellants. ShelbySharpe, by: J. P.A., Proctor, L. Wilcox, and Richard

Tony appellees. case Imber, This concerns

Annabelle Clinton Justice. Preston Huffstuttler (Pre the disenrollment of Appellee School, Inc. (Calvary Christian). Christian ston) Calvary by Appellant contract, for breach of intentional A Preston awarded jury damages contract, and defamation. also interference with a jury outrage, mother, Huffstutder, Dorma for awarded Preston’s damages Appellee Christian, Terral defamation. On Calvary Neeley, appeal, Appellants Lewellen, Borden, individu M.C. David Rodgers, Michael Jr., Christian, and in directors their Calvary ally capacity Hess, ten can be raise ten for reversal. Those points Suzanne points the circuit court did not have into three categories: (1) grouped case, event the circuit of this in the (2) subject-mattеr jurisdiction their did court erred in directed- court denying jurisdiction, claims, all the if the directed- verdict motions on (3) alleged denied, the award of should verdict motions were damages correctly in affirm in and reverse and dismiss part. be reversed. We part in located Forrest Christian a school Calvary parochial Preston, school, in had It is junior high City. undisputed Preston’s attended Christian since kindergarten. During Calvary 2001, a video Preston discovered camera year, junior September of his duct work ventilation school hidden (the system) He the video camera’s classroom at Christian. Calvary reported teacher, Hall, Rhea and to his to his parents, Appellees presence Ted and was Huffstuttler. Because classroom also used Dorma events, the Huffstuttlers as a room for school became dressing concerned about the camera to school authorities and complained Hess, other Suzanne one at a school attended meeting parents. of the school’s denied the of the principals, initially presence camera, but later it admitted was there a school board placed member, Thereafter, M.C. Lewellen. concern- “Buddy” dispute the school’sloss of accreditation and the use aof hidden video ing camera between Christian and Ted and Dorma developed Calvary 10, 2002, Huffstuttler. On the Huffstuttlers were asked to January a new their sign would to agreement,1 whereby family agree staff, and administration of the policies, support school. The procedures, all Huffstuttlers On signed agreement. January however, the board of decided Christian governing Calvary disenrollment, disenroll Preston. Preston’s Immediately following the Huffstuttlers filed a their son complaint, seeking keep enrolled in the school. the Huffstuttlers nonsuited their Although 28, 2002, on March reinstituted the complaint another suit they by filing on 2003. In that complaint September complaint, contract, Huffstuttlers for breach sought damages intentional interference with contractual and defama- relationships, outrage, tion. In addition to the Huffstuttlers compensatory damages, filed a motion to requested punitive damages. and, dismiss Appellants essence, for alternatively, summary judgment. Appellants the circuit court’s because challenged subject-matter jurisdiction the case involved a school. The circuit denied court parochial motion, and then filed a for a ofwrit Appellants petition prohibi- court, tion with this was denied on 2004. petition May trial, The suit and the favor found in proceeded jury $10,000 Huffstuttlers. awarded the Huffstuttlers They (1) contract, $25,000 breach of Preston in (2) compensatory damages $75,000 and in the for tort of punitive damages outrage, (3) $25,000 Preston $25,000 in and in compensatory damages puni- tive for intentional interference with the damages contract be- Christian, tween $10,000 the Huffstuttlers and Preston Calvary (4) $15,000 in and for compensatory damages for punitive damages defamation, and Dorma zero (5) and compensatory damages $5,000 for for defamation. the punitive damages circuit Following 18, 2004, court’s on October entry filed a judgment Appellants motion for the judgment verdict notwithstanding QNOV), trial, for new on October 2004. alternatively Pursuant to Ark. that, The record reveals new academic school the HufFstutders every year, agreed a reenrollment in which form, with the school’s completed they comply policies. deemed the motion was (2006), P.-Civil 4(b) R. posttrial App. filed a notice timely on November 2004. denied Appellant 1, 2004. on December appeal Arkansas this court the case been certified to has first an issue of as a case Court of involving impression, Appeals interest, substantial

federal constitutional public interpretation, of the law. Our clarification and one development needing to Ark. Ct. R. is therefore pursuant Sup. jurisdiction proper & (3), (5) (2006). 2(b)(1), (4), 1— contend second on

In the first and Appellants points appeal, dismiss in thе motion to that the circuit court erred denying are claims out of Preston’s disenrollment because all the arising order, In its the circuit court’s jurisdiction. outside subject-matter information the court concluded that there was insufficient circuit law, Christian, a was a to conclude that as matter Calvary to the and immunities of institution entitled “religious protections The circuit court further the First and Fourteenth Amendment.” exist. These ruled that absolute immunity excep- “exceptions resolve the tions include instances wherein Court may dispute of neutral of law and where the through application principles morals, at welfare and conduct issue affects the safety.” public court reviews a trial court’s decision on motion to Our dismiss facts in true by treating alleged complaint them most to the in the favorable Clowers light viewing plaintiff. Lassiter, the facts in 363 Ark. 213 S.W.3d 6 In (2005). viewing most the facts should be favorable to liberally light plaintiff, construed favor. Id. Our rules fact plaintiffs require plead- facts, conclusions, and a must state not mere ing, complaint Id.; order to entitle the to relief. Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) pleader (2006). court

To that the circuit was without support position to rule on the claims out of Preston’s disenroll jurisdiction arising ment, contend that educational institutions Appellants religious, be free from civil court constitutionally protected right in the argument interference. Their rooted U.S. Supreme Watson, Court’s decision Watson v. 80 U.S. 679 Jones, first involvement in a Court considered issue of judicial hierarchical2 church’s the Court was dispute. Specifically, property had asked to which sect of the church control over determine 122

church As a result of the Court’s that the civil holding property. courts were not in the allowed interfere property dispute, case became the landmark case for the that the principle judiciary — cannot into church it matters is without inquire juris simply held, diction to do so. The Court in part:

All who unite themselves to such do so with an body implied consent to this are government, and bound to submit to it. But it would a vain be consent and would lead to total subversion of bodies, such if one religious aggrieved one of their decisions by could to the secular and have It courts them reversed. is the appeal unions, essence of religious these and of their to establish right themselves, tribunals for the of decision questions among arising that those should decisions be in all cases of binding ecclesiastical cognizance, to such subject only appeals as itself organism for. provides Watson, at 729.

Id. Since Court has dealt with a of Supreme gamut cases the issue of concerning when civil courts have jurisdiction Alexander, determine Bouldin v. U.S. church-disputes. (1872); Manila, Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Archbishop of v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral the Russian Orthodox Church Kedroff of Am., North 344 U.S. 94 v. (1952); Church Elizabeth Presbyterian Mary Church, Hull Blue Mem. 393 U.S. 440 Serbian Eastern Orthodox (1969); the United States Am. & v. Canada 426 U.S. 696 Milivojevich, for of Yet, v. (1976); U.S. all Wolf, but one of Jones cases, these Serbiаn Eastern Orthodox States United & America for Canada v. dealt with church Milivojevich, In supra, property disputes.3 sum, the steadfast rule announced the Court was that unless by 2 In Church (Okla. 1989), Guinn v. Christ P.2d Collinsville,775 n.18 766, 773 Oklahoma Court noted Court had addressed civil-court Supreme Supreme inquiry into ecclesiastical decisions made hierarchical but the Court churches, had not by yet self-governing addressed issue in the of a context church congregational which is form. The Oklahoma ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍a religious organization’s Court concluded that ecclesiastical Supreme decisions should be judicial organization from whether “congrega protected scrutiny or agree tional” “hierarchical.” We ecclesiastical doctrinal decisions made self- governing religious organizations deserving judicial no are less deference than decisions religious organizations made structured in a hierarchical fashion. also Ewing Court’s in Eversonv. decisions Bd. Appellants rely upon Supreme (1947) 330 U.S. 1 (1940),but Connecticut, Cantwell 310 U.S. 296 those casesare Township, Everson, board of education, authorized reimburse inapposite. appellee, township ment to in accordance with a statute, them for their children’s parents, money expended by of ecclesiastical of judicial “neutral law” scrutiny apply, principles rule settled of the First Amendment. This banned under doctrine is law, however, diluted with the Court recognizing has since been Catholic review. In Roman of civil court Gonzalez possibility Manila, the Court stated: supra, Archbishop of fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, the decisions of or the absence of In ecclesiastical, al- tribunals on matters purely church the proper before civil are affecting rights, accepted litigation though conclusive, in interest made because the parties secular courts or otherwise. them so contract “fraud, however, Thereafter, its the Court retracted

Id. at 16-17. dictum. collusion, that was or arbitrarinеss” noting only exception, & Canada v. Orthodox the United States America In Serbian Eastern for noted: Court Milivojevich, supra, court review” or not is room for civil “marginal Whether there when church the narrow rubrics of “fraud” or “collusion” under for “arbitrariness” act bad faith secular no purposes, tribunals — in of an whether the decisions of the the sense inquiry exception tribunal of a hierarchical church with complied ecclesiastical highest — with the constitutional church laws and is consistent regulations of the courts are bound to the decisions accept mandate civil a a hierarchical religious judicatories organization highest faith, or discipline, organization, on matters of internal polity custom, rule, or ecclesiastical law. result, at a the Court has eliminated the “arbitrariness” Id. 713. As courts to the rule that civil are from adjudicating exception prohibited Court, however, has not revisited issue of religious disputes. “fraud” ecclеsiastical or whether civil courts can review decisions “collusion.” challenging right A of the board to reimburse suit,

bus filed transportation. taxpayer The Court affirmed the New Court’s school students. Jersey Supreme parents parochial holding, not conflict with either the state federal constitution. finding that statute did statute In under Cantwell, was criminally prosecuted breach-of-the-peace appellant religion, he entitled an attack on the Catholic phonograph “Enemies,” when record played The Court Cantwell’s hearing within the of two Roman Catholic men. overturned harm concluding intangible that the caused Amendment, conviction as violative First justify civil or While religious were insufficient to criminal Cantwell’s beliefs liability. government religious restrain do that the cannot both these cases support proposition religious case involved a institution. freedom, neither of these set forth in Watson and its light holdings a number of devel related issues been raised and progeny, instance, in the federal circuits and in state courts. For oped federal courts have addressed the issue of whether the “neutral doctrine to Title VII claims. McDowellv. Calvin principle” applies Church, 790 Cir. 397 F.3d v. Presbyterian (9th 2005); Bryce Episcopal Colorado, Churchin the Diocese 121 2d 1327 and (2000); F.Supp. of v. Smith The District the North Carolina the Raleigh of Conferenceof Church, Methodist 63 United 2d 692 (E.D.N.C. 1999). F.Supp. Likewise, courts, cases, state and federal courts in diversity been asked to decide whether the “neutral doctrine principle” to state and breach-of-contract tort claims. El-Farra v. applies 365 Ark. 226 S.W.3d Sayyed, 792 Guinn v. (2006); Churchof Collinsville, Gleason, Christ Williamsv. 26 S.W.3d (Tex. 54 supra; of Church, Ct. 2000); Drevlowv. Lutheran 991 F.2d 468 Cir. App. (8th West, 1993); Belinv. 315 Ark. S.W.2d 864 838 and Paul (1993); Inc., v. York, Watch towerBible& Tract New 819 F.2d (9th 875 Soc’yof Brown, Cir. Seealso v. 288 Ark. 1987). 706 S.W.2d 369 Gipson so (1986).4With federal and state courts in on the many weighing issue, it is no a that of surprise has With split authority developed. claims, to state respect breach-of-contract tort some courts have ruled that where an ecclesiastical issue underlies some of the claims, claim, a such as breach-of-contract all of the claims should dismissed, be the civil thereby court from precluding exercising instance, over the of claims. For jurisdiction v. Gaston Allentown, Diocese 712 A.2d (Pa. the 1998), appellants, of school, students at a catholic were The Diocese of expelled. Allentown of Education ratified the Department expulsion. Ap sued the of Diocese Allentown the pellants in tort for principal and intentional of negligence infliction emotional distress. The trial court dismissed the on complaint jurisdictional grounds, the action was an “stating civil involve courts in attempt rule, law, ecclesiastical custom and affirmed upheld of the Roman Catholic Church.” Id. at bishop 758. The Pennsyl affirmed, vania Court and dismissed Supreme the entire case for reliance on the Arkansas of Court decision in ‘Appellants’ Appeals’ Key Coryell, (2004), Ark. S.W.3d 334, 185 In that the mother of student App. case, misplaced. brought enrolled at school suit in tort and for breach of contract. The formerly parochial court affirmed the dismissal of lack subject-matter merits, on not for appeals complaint jurisdiction. hand, Circuit Court other Eighth On the lack jurisdiction. Church, dismissed only in Drevlow v. Lutheran supra, of Appeals to ecclesiastical issues permitted claims that related directly Drevlow, Drevlow to trial.5 Id. In claims to supra, remaining proceed of its services As one an ordained minister within Synod. was members, and circulated personal church Synod prepared interested hiring on its ministers to churches information files file in Drevlow’s a document stating The placed Synod pastors. married, statement was that his had been spouse previously result, that he was because As a Drevlow alleged injured untrue. if ministers churches within Synod automatically disqualify filed has been divorcеd. Drevlow their file reflects their spouse libel, and intentional a suit against Synod negligence, his interference with employment. legitimate expectancy all district court summary judgment, finding granted that should be between clergy claims involved matters strictly Thus, for a and the all of the claims were dismissed lack .church. deci- the district court’s jurisdiction. reversing subject-matter sion, in the of concluded Circuit Court part: Eighth Appeals secular courts by

The First Amendment intervention proscribes by organizations into decisions made many employment religious are religious based on doctrine or beliefs. Personnel decisions from interference where review civil courts civil court protected to doctrine or would courts require interpret apply religious 717-20, 96 at ecclesiasticallaw. See 426 U.S. at S.Ct. Milivojevich, of to defrock (review 2384 church decision Bishop impermissible of internal church where resolution required interpretation proce- Scharon, at VII 929 F.2d 363 of Title and ADEA dures); (resolution into faith claims of required good posi- impermissible inquiry Sheehan, tion asserted v. 707 by clergy-administrators); Kaufmann (8th 1983) 358 that church F.2d Cir. claim officials (priest’s 5 Virginia recognized The federal courts the “minis Court other Supreme aggrieved terial to the “neutral doctrine in cases where ministers have exception” principles” against religious Woo Church filed suit Cha institutions. Presbyterian v.Korean of Washington, Jae- (2001); Va. 64 722 F.2d 1164, General 262 Seventh-Day Rayburn Adventists, v. Conference of (4th 1985), (1986); Sw. 1167-98 Cir. 478 U.S. 1020 cert. v. Dester denied, Annual Weft (9th 2004); F.3d 1100 n.1Cir. Soc'y Bollard Prov. Calif. Conference, of Jesus, of 1999); (9th F.2d Seventh 940, 950 F.3d Cir. Day Lake Lewis v. Adventist Conference, Region (6th (1st & 1992), Christian 1575, 1577 and Natal v. 878 F.2d 940, 942 Cir. Missionary Alliance, 1989). Cir.

denied him due ecclesiastical and violated his canonical process to the heart of internal faith and rights goes church discipline); Knuth v. The ChurchMissouri 444 (D. Lutheran Synod, F.Supp. 1986) Kan. matter (court lacks to review re- subject jurisdiction roster). moval of minister The from First Amendment does clergy not shield made religious decisions employment organizations review, however, from civil court where the employment decisions beliefs, Scharon, do religious not or law. implicate procedures, See at (and 929 F.2d 363 n.3 cases cited therein).

At we are stage unable present litigation predict the evidence offered at trial will involve district court definitely in an impermissible inquiry bylaws into or Synod’s religious beliefs. Drevlow has over three hundred alleged although were in need of a he did congregations not receive an offer of pastor any from while the employment congregation Synod was circulat- false information about ing spouse. his Drevlow’s fitness as a is not minister his name on because was roster dispute Synod’s the relevant eligible during ministers period. Correspondence between President and Synod Drevlow indicates that after the file, falseinformation was removed from his did Drevlow receive an offer and is now a Drevlow claimsthat he was pastor. injured by the libel, Synod’s alleged negligence, intentional interference with his legitimate expectation employment. has not Synod offered explanation its religious might actions en- the court in a tangle religious in violation controversy First Amendment. an Drevlow is entitled to op- [Footnote omitted.] portunity his secular prove allegations at trial. remand, On the district court must exercise care ensure evidence at trial is presented secular nature. The court has concern that it expressed become may entangled inherently religious determinations of Drevlow’s fitness for the if ministry Drevlow to offer evidence at attempts trial of other efforts Synod to his fitness for It impugn pastoral office. is incumbent the court to limit the upon evidence at trial in ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍order to avoid determining controversies. If religious further reveal proceedings that this matter be cannot resolved without interpreting religious beliefs, or procedures district court should reconsider Synod’s motion to dismiss. Church,

Drevlow Lutheran 991 F.2d at 471-72 (internal citations We are omitted). Circuit’s in persuaded by Eighth analysis Dreulow, in the instant case those claims only Accordingly, supra. be doctrine or beliefs will protected which relate directly religious interference. from civil court contract, of filed claims for breach

The Huffstuttlers contract, defamation.6 a outrage, interference with intentional claim, we conclude a of each individual After review to address the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction interference with a of and intentional claims for breach contract contract, for out of Preston’s claim arising as well outrage disen reveals that Christian Calvary disenrollment. The record with the failure to rolled due to his comply Preston parents’ were expressly adopted by Matthew 18 Principles, principles in its handbook as the Christian Calvary approved procedure fact, the Huffstuttlers signed student/family conflict. handling form, in relevant intent which stated part: of a visible and willful bond

The this document signing represents Christian School. family Calvary the Huffstuttler between program, a student school’s entering any aspect Before care twelfth several basic day includes any through grade, must and intent of the school be relative to the philosophy aspects and the school enrolling body. agreed upon family that: document understands signing family By Christian world views and of The 2) integration application is course and every activity biblical principals required [sic] school program. Furthermore, family agrees: school because it The Huffstuttlers claim that the has no constitutional protection religious an organization.

not with a church or other unaffiliated However, affiliated congregational self-governing Here, is similar church. school Calvary parochial self-governing and is to no other Christian on Biblical thus answers operates principles religious Court to address the issue in the context organization. While the has Supreme yet such as conclude that such self-governing religious schools, we institutions, parochial religious afforded entitled to the constitutional to hierarchical institutions are same protection holding erred in v.Church Christ circuit court Collinsville, institutions. Guinn supra. otherwise.

1) the of faith To statement Christian School. respect Calvary teachers, 2) and verbally To the individual authoritatively support their classroom rules ....

3) To determine to use the carefully Matthew 18 principle differences first with the most reconciling conferring immediate staff related member to the incident in and then question, only chain of when pursuing proper, progressive authority matters are not resolved. acceptably Christian, between the and

During Huffstuttlers dispute Calvary the Huffstuttlers recommitted to to the school’s adhering policies a new which stated in procedures by signing “The agreement, part, staff, to fаmily agrees support and adminis- policies, procedures, tration will not We make com- [Calvary any negative Christian]. ments that could possibly destroy ministry unity [Calvary letter, The disenrollment sent to the Huffstuttlers seven Christian].” later, stated: days specifically know, As we met you with for a due you conference to recently made, school concerns the had about comments and it was discussed with you the conditions under which Preston would be allowed to continue a student Christian Calvary School without inter- time, that At each of an ruption. you signed agreement support staff, the policies, procedures, and administration of the school. A copy attached this letter although should be aware of you its contents. then,

Since the school has learned that you violated the terms of this agreement. Additionally, school has based on philosophy, Biblical with the home in principles, cooperate the education of the child. The comments actions last several days indicate school cannot fulfill this case of philosophy Preston. The school is concerned also comments been may made be defamatory. After careful of all review involved, circumstances the school board has determined that the school is no in a it longer position where can continue the enrollment of Preston.

A review of this information reveals that the school disenrolled Preston because his failed to with parents school comply policies, are rooted in Matthew 18 of whether principles. Any analyses the school breached with interfered its with Huff- agreement stuttlers would us did, to determine whether Huffstuttlers require

129 Likewise, not, claim the with Matthew 18. outrage or did comply a similar deter- would out of Preston’s disenrollment require arising because, contrast, claims survive mination. In the Huffstuttlers’ other Preston, filed a he could have if the school had not disenrolled even school, the tort the tort of defamation and lawsuit the alleging against Thus, we of surveillance at the school. based on of outrage allegations of intentional interference that the claims for breach contract and hold contract, out Preston’s as the claim for of with a well outrage arising disenrollment, tbe circuit court’s are the of subject- outside purview matter jurisdiction. in contend that circuit court erred next the

Appellants their motion on the outrage directed-verdict remaining denying We A claim out of the surveillance allegations. agree. arising the for directed verdict is a to the of motion sufficiency challenge issue, the evidence. the we first view addressing sufficiency the the evidence in most favorable to the whom against light party verdict is evidence highest sought give probative value, all inferences can be into account reasonable taking Strother, it. Inc. v. Ark. 13 derived from S.W.3d Conagra, be A for a directed verdict should motiоn only granted to when the evidence viewed is so insubstantial as require be Id. A verdict for the set aside. motion for jury’s party directed verdict be denied there is a conflict in the should when or the evidence is that fair-minded evidence when such people reach different conclusions. Under those circumstances a Id. might and a is directed verdict jury question presented inappropriate. fact; Id. It is not this court’s issues we province try simply determine if substantial examine record to there is evidence verdict. Id. Substantial evidence is defined as jury support evidence of sufficient force and character to a conclusion compel one or another with reasonable it force the way must certainty; mind to Id. pass beyond suspicion conjecture. must

To establish a claim for demonstrate outrage, plaintiff elements: actor intended to inflict emotional (1) following knew distress or or should known that emotional distress was cоnduct; result his the conduct was “extreme and (2) likely was all bounds outrageous,” “beyond possible decency,” in a was intolerable civilized the actions “utterly community;” (3) distress; the defendant the cause s and (4) were of the plaintiff the emotional distress sustained was so severe that plaintiff no reasonable could be to endure it. Crockett person expected Essex, Ark. v. Alex- S.W.3d 585 (2000)(citing Angle ander,328 Ark. 945 S.W.2d 933 of conduct (1997)). type that meets the standard for must be determined on a outrage basis. Id. This court a narrow view case-by-case to the tort of gives clear-cut to establish the outrage, requires proof elements cases. Id. outrage conduct as Merely describing outrageous however, does not make it so. Id. Clear-cut does not mean proof, than a proof greater evidence. Id. We have preponderance taken a strict approach determining validity outrage claims, and that “the tort of should recognized not and outrage does not the doors of the courts to open insult or every slight one must endure in life.” Id. indignity trial,

Based the evidence at the circuit upon presented court should have the motion for granted directed verdict on the case, claim. In this the evidence outrage the fact that there supports awas video camera in Preston’s classroom where he present and other students clothes for occasionally other school changed record, however, events. The does not reflect evidence that any the video camera ever recorded at the any school. The footage essence of Preston’s claim is that the outrage school couldhaveused Yet, camera to record as he him clothes. based changed upon our strict in claims for approach the mere outrage, that possibility the school could have him does not taped claim for support outragе.

In cases where this court has affirmed a claim for outrage, instance, conduct occurred.For outrageous Treece, in Hess v. 434, Ark. 693 S.W.2d 792 we (1985), affirmed the award of defendant, where compensatory punitive damages moti- vated by carried on a personal animosity, two-year campaign cause as a plaintiffs officer discharge police by having plaintiff watched, and false with filing reports plaintiffs supervisors. Likewise, in Growth I v. Cannon, 282 Ark. Properties S.W.2d 447 (1984), we affirmed compensatory punitive case, In that damages outrage. owners con- cemetery structed a french drain and in the drove process heavy equipment across several gravesites, the vaults of the exposed plaintiffs deceased relatives. Upon we affirming damages, emphasized that the construction had alternative means to company accom- plish that would drainage not have project involved the desecration of the Id. graves. is that there is a fine line point between inten

tional conduct that could have been it had occurredand outrageous if there was no Because it did occur. because conduct that outrageous at recorded activity video camera ever that the evidence this case school, ever recorded Preston disrobing, much less that it could have been the conduct cases where falls in line with ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍of actual surveil- Absent if it had occurred.7 any proof outrageous lance, the directed-verdict erred in the circuit court failing grant circuit reverse the claim.8 We therefore on the motion outrage court on point. erred in the circuit court denying also assert that Appellants In defamation claim.9 motion on Preston’s

their directed-verdict defamation, Preston had to claim for prove order to establish his a false that he (2) published sustained (1) damages, Appellants him, of the fact was that the statement (3) statement concerning with acted knowledge (4) defamatory, Appellants false, of the statement that the (5) statement was publication AMI Civ. 407. cause of was a damages. proximate defamation, we have stated that a claim for plaintiff explaining but the actual to his necessary must establish damage reputation, Price, Ellis v. 337 Ark. 990 S.W.2d of harm is slight. showing that the statement(s) A must defamatory prove plaintiff and that the statements have have been communicated others jury, suggestion that we have the role of the to the dissent’s Contrary usurped outrage evidence jury’s Preston on his claim for is not verdict in favor of supported the verdict is is, or another with reasonable a conclusion one certainty; compels way conjecture. on of the verdict a series based on sheer depends speculation Specifically, a video camera was located in Preston’s classroom: inferences drawn from the mere faсt that in classroom; that it recorded first, second, the camera was activity finally, operable; in in the dissent’s own “that Preston was filmed whilst a state undress.” Such words, nothing not amounting to more than do our inferences, attenuated speculation, satisfy Treece,supra; PropertiesI cases. Hess v. Growth v. outrage of clear-cut requirements proof Cannon,supra. charges being there was evidence of criminal filed as a result We also note that no alleged surveillance at the school. seek reversal on Dorma’s defamation claim. Dorma also Specifically, Appellants alleged Moreover, Main, that Ms. Hess defamed her when she called her “Satan.” Mark In addition, testified that Ms. Hess called Dorma a “devil woman.” Ms. Hess coach, school it was a she referred to Dorma as “Satan” herself testified that possibility presence argument, the Huffstutders conceded the merits of however, others. At the oral Appеllants’ damages the award of when argument for reversalbasedonourcase law that punitive prohibits McManus, damages. Bellv. 294 Ark. 742 S.W.2d559 there is no award of compensatory damages to award her jury awarded Dorma but failed any compensa punitive damages. tory affected those relations. Id. The law does not

detrimentally require of actual Id. proof out-of-pocket expenses.

The Huffstuttlers claimed that Suzanne Hess called Preston a classroom, “liar” after he located the video camera in the and she later accused him of “in and lewd engaging vulgar behavior” her the at a football by giving With “finger” game. camera, to the video Ms. Hess regard at first denied the existence of the video surveillance to several individuals at a system parent- teacher conference. She and the other re Appellants eventually canted and admitted that the video camera was in the placed members, ventilation one of the school’s board system by M.C. Lewellen, With “Buddy” to the inci regard alleged “finger” Jr. dent, Preston claimed that Ms. Hess defamed him when she told that he her the at a football people gave “finger” game. Specifi Ms. Hess testified that she cally, had a of what she photo perceived to be Preston her While she no had giving “finger.” longer Ms. Hess admitted photo, school board and the other telling school Alan high that she had a principal, Jackson, photograph Preston her the at a school function. “giving finger” According mother, Preston’s Mr. called her to tell her that Ms. Hess Jackson had a of Preston her the photo giving no “finger.” Again, photo was ever shown to the Huffstuttlers or at trial. Review produced Preston, evidence in the ing most favorable to we light cannot that the evidence is so say insubstantial as to require jury’s verdict on his claim for defamation to be set aside. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of the directed-verdict motion on Preston’s defamation claim. award of reviewing jury’s on compensatory damages claim, said,

Preston’s defamation we have “When an award of excessive, on to be damages alleged we review appeal the proof and all reasonable inferences most favorable to the Appellee determine whether the verdict is so as to shock our great con- science or demonstrate on the passion prejudice part Evans, Bank Eureka jury.” 353 Ark. Springs S.W.3d 672 (2003). “The standard of review in such a case is that motion, i.e., for a new trial appropriate whether there is substantial evidence to the verdict.” Advocat, Id. support Sauer, Inc. v. (citing 29, 353 Ark. 111 S.W.3d 346 to the (2003)). issue of Turning award, when punitive such an damages, we consider the reviewing extent and enormity intent of the wrong, com- party circumstances, all the mitting wrong, the financial and

133 Price, v. Ellis condition and social standing erring party. be Punitive are to Ark. 990 S.W.2d damages for conduct that is malicious or done with the deliberate penalty Id. intent another. to injure

Under contend that Pre argument, Appellants an but ston’s defamation claim “centers on alleged photograph,” less of that “no one testified saw they picture thought Preston as a result of it.” Appellants misapprehend scope Preston’s defamation claim. One of the bases for his defamation claim was Ms. Hess’s statement to others at Christian Calvary she had a of Preston in and lewd behavior photo engaging vulgar her the at a football A basis for by giving “finger” game. separate the claim involved statements made Ms. Hess in which she denied the existence of a surveillance camera video after Preston his of the video camera to school authorities. reported discovery Moreover, award of Appellants’ arguments concerning jury’s on Preston’s defamation claim are It is damages merely conclusory. well settled that without au conclusоry arguments, supporting Fred’sInc. v. Jefferson, will not be considered on thority, appeal. State, v. (2005); Kelly Ark. S.W.3d 238 350 Ark. S.W.3d 893 (2002).

Affirmed in reversed and dismissed in part; part.

Brown, in in J., concurring part; dissenting part. Dickey,

Glaze JJ., dissenting. Brown,

Robert L. in and dissent Justice, concurring part I with the ing part. agree majority every opinion but I one. would dismiss the claim than rather respect tort-of-outrage address that issue. Church, Drevlow Lutheran Missouri is based on

My reasoning Synod, 991 F.2d 468 Cir. which dealt with the church’s (8th 1993), case, of a minister. In that Circuit Court of suspension Eighth said: Appeals

The Constitution forbids secular courts from whether deciding doctrine or ecclesiasticallaw decision religious supports particular made church authorities. The First Amendment does not shield decisions made employment review, however, from civil court where

by religious organizations beliefs, religious pro- decisionsdo not implicate

the employment Scharon, cedures, cited (and 929 F.2d at n. 3 cases or law. See therein). F.2d at 471. us, disenroll Preston did the decision to

In the case before as the beliefs and majority correctly procedures, implicate religious related tо claim of is holds. The Huffstuttler’s outrage directly Indeed, at at trial Preston testified Preston’s disenrollment. length him the distress was that caused greatest Calvary conduct which, course, decision, was disenrollment Christian School’s that the First Amend- tied to doctrine. To hold religious directly but then to allow a claim ment the disenrollment decision protects is inconsistent and based on that same decision of outrage logically the Free Exercise Clause. violates reasons, claim for lack these I would dismiss the For outrage of jurisdiction. to Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. According majority, — contract, of the Huffstuttlers’ claims breach of

three interference, disenrollment to Preston’s tortious outrage relating — this court to ecclesiastical that would involve require questions into church doctrine. finds majority inquire Consequently, address these claims. I with this this court lacks disagree jurisdiction dissent. conclusion respectfully The facts of this case are Christian School simple: Calvаry camera in the ventilation of a hidden video (CCS) system placed room for school students. classroom doubles as high dressing and, The Huffstuttlers became aware of the camera like any At reasonable demanded an from school. parents, explanation existence; then, first, denied the camera’s board of CCS CCS’s — — directors of four members voted to disenroll consisting continued in- Preston Huffstuttler in retaliation for his parent’s quiries.

Here, claims that Preston’s disenrollment was based on CCS the Huffstuttler’s failure to with school comply policies, CCS, are rooted in Matthew 18 Given according principles. case, it clear that is factual of this CCS’s argument background more than a avoid The fails to liability. majority nothing ploy charade, its see own. CCS’s through adopts argument difference be- missed fundamental majority respect, an ecclesiastical church and a school or institu- tween non-profit tion. is an relies on the false that CCS majority assumption of the rule

ecclesiastical institution that falls under protection articulated (13 in Watson 80 U.S. Jones, Wall.) church, is defined “Ecclesiastical” or to the as relating esp. “[o]f an Black’sLaw ed. More- (8th 2004). institution.” Dictionary over, an “ecclesiastical matter” is one that church “concerns doctrine, creed, or form of the and enforce- worship, adoption ment, association, within a of laws and religious regulations the the to exclude from govern membership, including power such an association those deemed unworthy membership.” Black’sLaw cited the 2004). ed. Each case Dictionary (8th by either a a that run involves church or school is majority parochial a diocese.1 These cases are from the set by distinguishable present institutions; of facts because are ecclesiastical on the they truly not. CCS is contrary, First, is with a CCS not affiliated religious organization.

Second, member, to one CCS board Terral the according Neely, school is there to students of denomination and is no open any Third, a that student or be a his Christian. CCS requirement family Instead, does not answer a is run CCS a religious hierarchy. by four-member school board which voted to disenroll Preston. for Preston and their is his to the Unfortunately parents, appeal ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍board, interest, school has an obvious conflict of as it was members, Lewellen, one of the board’s who M.C. was “Buddy” hidden camera used in the person responsible installing unlawful act of on students while spying disrobed. young they Overall, CCS is more than nothing non-profit organization actions; must be held for its has erred in responsible majority otherwise. holding

In that this court lacks finding jurisdiction, has majority allowed CCS and its behind four-member board to hide a religious cloak; reason, I for this dissent. I also dissent handed join down Dickey. Justice majority The school-related case cited is Gaston v.Diocese Allentown, only (Pa.1998). 712 A.2d 757 brought against Gaston, and Susan Gaston suit Joseph parochial school objection because their children were after the Gastons voiced their to a faith expelled based course. jurisdiction Court held that it lacked Ultimately, Pennsylvania Supreme hear the case because the reasons for would “involve matters of church expulsion necessarily doctrine.” case at bar, Unlike the involved an Gaston case ecclesiastical school that was affiliated with, Moreover, a church. the issue raised in Gaston involved by, operated clearly matters doctrine, of church while the does case not. present in this dissent. Dickey, JJ., join

Corbin Betty C. with the I dissenting. disagree Justice, Dickey, a directed verdict entitled to CCS majority’s finding out of the allegations claim arising outrage Preston Huffstuttler’s on its articulates The at the school. majority surveillance clandestine as follows: holding however, that the record, evidence not reflect does The essence of the school. at any footage ever recorded

video have used the school could claim is that Preston’s outrage Yet, on up clothes. based him as he changed to video tape camera the mere possibility in claimsfor outrage, our strict approach a claim for does not support him the school could taped outrage. decision, has the role usurped to its majority

In coming of review. For our standards contradiction of in direct jury reason, dissent. and I respectfully disagree fact; issues of we to try simply It is not this court’s province evidence to if there is substantial record to determine examine the Ark. Caddo verdict. Valley George, City jury support 203, exclusive It is the province 481 (2000). jury’s 9 S.W.3d of fact not established by and draw inferences the evidence weigh Lee, 253 Ark. 484 S.W.2d Erectors, Inc. v. direct Steel proof. 874 (1972). verdict, a for directed the denial of motion reviewing

When to the in the most favorable the evidence light this court reviews that evidence whom the verdict is sought gives against party value, all reasonablе into account taking the highest probative Strother, 340 Inc. v. be derived from it. that can Conagra, inferences Moreover, for a a motion 150 (2000). Ark. 13 S.W.3d the evidence viewed be when verdict should granted only directed set aside. Id. verdict to be as to is so insubstantial require jury’s be denied when a verdict should a motion for directed Finally, the evidence is such the evidence or when there is a conflict in Id. different conclusions. reach fair-minded might people mind, to turn to the it is these standards in appropriate With a evidence to if there was substantial support determine record to his claim for Huffstuttler on outrage in favor of Preston verdict as follows: The record indicates the surveillance. from stemming (cid:127) in a classroom was a hidden camera School officialsplaced students. room dressing

used as (cid:127) The hidden in a vent and to transmit designed camerawaslocated receiver, television,

video and VCR located in an adjoining room.

(cid:127) in the vent. The camerawas while it was operable (cid:127) in the vent. Preston in the room while the camerawas changed (cid:127) camera, When with the school discovery confronted

officials denied its existence. initially (cid:127) A of the TV teacher at school denied existence and VCR room,

in her other teachers testified that her did room though contain a TV and VCR.

(cid:127) camera, After the about the before complaints possible camera,

objective school officialsremoved investigation, had accessto the TV and VCR. we a narrow view to the tort of we Although give outrage, held, hold,

have never and should not that a cannot draw jury reasonable inferences from the evidence at trial. A presented was, fact, review of the record indicates that there substantial circumstantial evidence to a verdict in favor of Preston. See support Stores, Wal-Mart Inc. v. 308 Ark. S.W.2d Dolph, (1992), circumstantial evidence is sufficient to meet (holding the substantial evidence on direct test). By insisting proof surveillance, and the reasonable inferences that indicate ignoring surveillance, also standard of majority ignores applicable review in the case. present

The fact that the school a hidden camera in a placed dressing room used children alone rise to an inference of may give Allen, In v. 272 Ga. 613 S.E.2d 657 wrongdoing. App. Johnson of women filed suit (2004), group against Johnson, Timothy his Atlas Cold for invasion of inten- employer Storage, privacy, distress, tional infliction of emotional and fraud. The women that installed video surveillance in the alleged equipment Johnson women’s restroom located at Atlas. In Atlas response, argued the surveillance was installed to address rumors system drugs were sold on in the women’s being premises, specifically restroom. court of denied Atlas’s Ultimately, Georgia appeals — motion for based on the summary judgment holding — evidence a reasonable infer that an could presented jury and that camera wаs concealed in women’s restroom

operable of its existence. the defendants knew an Like Preston has evidence that presented oper- Johnson, knew of its In able camera was installed and that CCS addition, existence. when and its Preston has shown that CCS questioned, and mendacious in their statements con- were evasive employees Furthermore, removed the the camera’s existence. CCS cerning camera the occurrence of prior any possible investigation sum, actual there is circumstantial evidence that recording. that Preston was filmed could rise to a reasonable inference give such, the incorrect whilst in a state of undress. As was majority the role of the and decide this issue as a matter of law. usurp jury reasons, For the I dissent. I also in the foregoing join respectfully dissent handed down Glaze. by Justice J., joins

Glaze, in this dissent.

Dr. Lisa McGRAW Scott W. and Lizabeth Husband and Wife Jones, JONES 06-48 S.W.3d Court of Arkansas

Supreme 29, 2006 delivered Opinion June ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‍denied [Rehearing September 7, 2006.*] * Hannah, C.J., Gunter,JJ., grant rehearing. and Corbin and would

Case Details

Case Name: Calvary Christian School, Inc. v. Huffstuttler

Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas

Date Published: Jun 29, 2006

Citation: 238 S.W.3d 58

Docket Number: 05-343

Court Abbreviation: Ark.