47 Iowa 456 | Iowa | 1877
In the case at bar the court below attempted to discriminate between the mental suffering experienced by the wife from language and conduct of the husband not directed towards her, and the suffering from language and conduct which were directed toward liei*. The words “in person” are not understood by the court below to mean in body. An injury in person is understood to be synonymous with personal injury. Vulgar conduct of the husband in general, however mortifying and painful to her feelings, is thought by the court not to be a personal injury, but becomes so when it is directed to a person.
We are of the opinion that the court misconceived the meaning of the words “in person.” We think that they mean m body. That was evidently the view of the court in Mulford v. Clewell, above cited. The statute gives a right of action to any one who shall be injured in person. To hold that it was designed to give a right of action to every one to whom a threatening or vulgar remark should be addressed by an intoxicated person would in our opinion be putting a construction upon the statute of which it is not properly susceptible. If we are correct, then threatening language or vulgar conduct although directed to the plaintiff, but not resulting in the impairment of her health, does not constitute a ground for the recoveiy of actual damages, and the court erred in instructing the jury that they might be considered in that connection.
In proceeding to determine it, we may observe, in the first place, that exemplary damages cannot be recovered in any case where no actual damages have been sustained. This proposition we presume no one will attempt to deny. In this case no actual damages are recoverable except for injury to the plaintiff’s means of support. To such actual damages can there be added exemplary damages for threatening language and vulgar conduct? We think not; there is no connection between the two. To actual damages for injury sustained by plaintiff'in her means of support there may be added exemplary damages, but they must be such as are called for by the circumstances under which the actual damages are sustained. Exemplary damages are given as punitive; they are given because the defendant was guilty of malice or wantonness. They are allowed by statute in an action like the present, because Avhoever causes injury by the sale of intoxicating liquor causes it wantonly. In no such case can the defendant be regarded as wholly without guilt. Exemplary damages when given are given with reference to the defendant’s guilt, and should be in proportion to it. In adding exemplary damages to the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff in her means of support, if such were added, it was proper for the jury to consider the defendant’s guilt in causing such injury. If the defendant sold the plaintiff’s husband liquor against the plaintiff’s protest, that would be an agravating circumstance, and would enhance the defendant’s guilt. So, if the defendant knew that the plaintiff was being injured in her means of support and continued to sell her husband liquor after the knowledge was obtained, such knowledge would enhance his guilt. Greater exemplaiy damages might be given by reason of the guilt thus enhanced.
Reversed.