ORDER
The Plaintiff, James Calloway, initiated this action against the Defendant, Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. (Caraco), alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102. Currently pending is Cal-loway’s motion for class certification (ECF 15), in which he seeks (1) a certification of this lawsuit as a class action, (2) the appointment of the Kelman Loria, PLLC law firm as the class counsel, and (3) the approval of a proffered Notice of Class Action. The Defendant, Caraco, does not oppose this motion.
I.
Calloway alleges that Caraco, following a directive from a federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) order to shut down its facilities, laid off more than 300 hourly and salaried personnel who had been employed at two work facilities in the metropolitan Detroit area between June 25th and September 3rd of 2009. Caraco acknowledges having made these layoffs as a result of the action by the FDA. (Def. Answer at ¶ 7-8, 10-11, 14.) However, Calloway alleges that Caraco did not give written notice of the layoffs — all but 22 of which occurred by July 7, 2009, and the remainder having occurred on or before September 3, 2009 — to the employees or their union bargaining representatives until July 6, 2009.
On this issue, Calloway asserts this failure constituted a violation of the WARN Act, which requires layoffs to be preceded by a written notice of 60 days. 29 U.S.C. § 2102. The record in this cause suggests that some of the laid off employees appear to have waived their right to sue Caraco. Of those persons who were laid off, approximately 22 of them signed releases of all claims against their now-former employer. An additional 109 individuals signed an “Authorization and Understanding” form which limited their ability to file claims against Caraco for a period of six months following the termination of their employment. Of the remaining former employees, 72 signed an “Authorization and Understanding” form as part of their original job application that included an arbitration agreement — the validity of which Calloway disputes — and 97 did not sign any of the three forms.
II.
In support of this motion for class certification, Calloway argues that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) can be satisfied. Calloway and Caraco jointly submit the two proposed sub-classes:
(1) Employees who were terminated between June 25 and September 3, 2009 from a facility of Defendant at which there were at least 50 layoffs without 60 days notice and who a) had not signed an “Authorization and Understanding” as part of their employment application that contained either an arbitration agreement or a six-month statute of limitations, and b) did not sign a release of claims following termination.
(2) Employees who were terminated between June 25 and September 3,2009 from a facility of Defendant at which there were at least 50 layoffs without 60 days notice and who a) had previously signed an “Authorization and Understanding” as part of their application that contained an arbitration agreement but no six-month statute of limitations, and b) did not sign a release of claims following termination.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5) allows that “a class may be divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.” District courts have “broad discretion” to “divide a class action into subclasses.” Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co.,
A.
The plaintiff bears the burden of “establishing] his right” to class certification. Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc.,
The first prerequisite (i.e., numerosity) is that the proposed class is “so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). There is no “strict numerical test” that must be met for a class to be certified. Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
Here, the two proposed subclasses satisfy the numerosity requirement. The first subclass will have approximately 97 members, and the second sub-class will have approximately 72 members. Each group is well above the approximately 35 members that are sufficient to constitute a class within this Circuit. Thus, Calloway satisfies the numerosity and practicality requirement.
The second prerequisite (i.e., commonality) is that there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2). The relevant inquiry in this instance is whether a class action will “generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S.-,
Here, Calloway argues that the dis-positive issue will be whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the FDA would order Caraco to shut down. Caraco has already admitted to mass layoffs because of the FDA action without giving the required statutory notice. (Def. Answer, at ¶ 7-8, 10-11, 14). Caraco submits that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the FDA would issue a directive which would result in the closure of its facilities. (PI. Mot. to Certify Class Action, ¶ 3). Thus, the issue of whether the shutdown was reasonably foreseeable would “drive the resolution” of each potential class member’s case appears to be common to the class. The specific questions of each claimant’s rate of pay, medical expenses, and date of termination — while important to each individual — are comparatively minor and insufficient to defeat the overall commonality requirement.
The third prerequisite (i.e., typicality) is that “the claims ... of the representative parties are typical of the claims ... of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). The representative party has a claim that is typical
The fourth prerequisite (i.e. adequacy) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). The purpose of the adequacy requirement is to “uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am.,
Here, the record in this cause suggests that Calloway does not have any conflict of interests with any of other known members of has common interests, and no conflict of interest, with the rest of the class because all of them seek relief under the WARN Act, as demonstrated in the typicality analysis. Furthermore, it appears that the recommended counsel is qualified to pursue the interests of the class.
B.
After the prerequisites found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) are satisfied, there are three ways in which to maintain a class action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). Here, Cal-loway seeks the third type, namely, a 23(b)(3) class action certification which requires a court to find that “the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3).
The predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is met if a single factual or legal question is “at the heart of the litigation.” Powers v. Hamilton County Pub. Defender Comm’n,
Common facts and issues predominate and Calloway alleges a single course of wrongful conduct here. Each potential claimant was terminated from employment with Caraco around the same time. Each potential class member’s claim is that the termination was in violation of the 60 day notice requirement of the WARN Act. The question “at the heart of the litigation” for every claimant is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the FDA would close down Caraco. Thus, the predominance requirement is met.
The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is met if the class action is a better way than individual litigation to adjudicate a claim. See Daffin v. Ford Motor Co.,
III.
Calloway further argues that having certified the class, this Court should appoint Kel-man Loria, PLLC as class counsel. When a court certifies a class, the court “must appoint class counsel.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g). Rule 23(g)(1)(A) lists four factors that a court must consider when appointing class counsel: (1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;” (2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;” (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law;” and (4) “the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class[.]”
Here, proposed counsel, Kelman Loria, PLLC, has already investigated potential claims in this action. It has initiated discovery, identified possible members of the class, and obtained the last known contact information from Caraeo. Second, Calloway claims, without opposition from Caraeo, that Kelman Loria, PLLC has experience handling class action and other complex employment cases. Third, Calloway contends, without opposition, that Kelman Loria, PLLC is familiar with this area of law. Fourth, Calloway claims— and this Court expects — that Kelman Loria, PLLC is committed to providing the resources necessary to vigorously represent the class. Thus, the Court appoints Kelman Loria, PLLC as class counsel in this case.
IV.
Finally, Calloway argues this Court should approve the proposed Notice of Class Action. After a class is certified, the court must “direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B). The notice must clearly and concisely state in understandable language (1) the nature of the action, (2) the definition of the class, (3) the claims, issues or defenses, (4) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if he or she so desires, (5) that any class member who wants to be excluded will be excluded by the court, (6) when and how to request exclusion, and (7) the binding effect of class judgment on members. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vii).
Calloway and Caraeo agree on the proposed language within the recommended Notice of Class Action Their proposed notice meets the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2). First, it states the nature of the action, explaining that Calloway is seeking relief for violation of the WARN Act. Second, it defines the two sub-classes. Third, it identifies the issue (i.e., Calloway and other similarly situated employees were terminated in 2009 in violation of specific WARN Act requirements) and clearly explains all four of Cara-co’s affirmative defenses. Fourth, it explains that a class member “may appear by [his or her] own counsel.” Fifth, it states that those class members, who do not desire to become a member of the class can be excluded. Sixth, it explains that to be excluded a potential class member must “complete the form below and mail [it] ... to Kelman Loria.” Seventh, it states that “a class member [is] bound by any judgment (whether favorable or unfavorable).” Having met the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B), the Court directs this Notice of Class Action to be sent to class members.
V.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the motion to certify class (ECF 15):
(1) Certifies the following two sub-classes: (A) Employees who were terminated between June 25 and September 3, 2009*409 from a facility of Defendant at which there were at least 50 layoffs without 60 days notice and who a) had not signed an “Authorization and Understanding” as part of their employment application that contained either an arbitration agreement or a six-month statute of limitations, and b) did not sign a release of claims following termination.
(B) Employees who were terminated between June 25 and September 3, 2009 from a facility of Defendant at which there were at least 50 layoffs without 60 days notice and who a) had previously signed an “Authorization and Understanding” as part of their application that contained an arbitration agreement but no six-month statute of limitations, and b) did not sign a release of claims following termination.
(2) Appoints the law firm of Kelman Loria, PLLC, as class counsel.
(3) Directs the Notice of Class action, which has been agreed upon by Callo-way and Caraco as written in Defendant’s Response Brief to be sent to class members.
IT IS SO ORDERED.'