Callison v. Brake, 129 F. 196

129 F. 196 | 5th Cir. | 1904

McCORMICK, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). In the opinion of the majority of this court, the judgment of the Circuit Court in this case should be affirmed. We do not deem it necessary to notice in detail, and in the order in which they have been presented by the respective counsel, the questions which were raised on the trial and have been submitted to us on the hearing of this writ of error. We notice only a few of the points, which we deem require some attention.

The trial judge, amongst other things, in the charge which he gave the jury on his own motion, instructed-them substantially that the liability of the defendant, under the declaration, is based upon two statutes, under one of which this suit is brought by the plaintiff as administrator, and under which the defendant may be liable for any act of a servant, agent, or employé, acting by the authority of the defendant; but in such case the damages are limited to the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff in such character of administrator — that is, the value of the estate. Eater on, he instructed further to the effect, substantially, that under the second and fourth counts of the declaration the1 defendant would be liable for any act or negligence of any agent or employé of his, acting in the line of duty to which he had been appointed, or for which he had been employed; but for such act Or negligence nothing could be recovered for mental suffering or for the services of the deceased before he reached the age of 21. So, if you find the defendant liable under these counts, the only damages that can be given would be such as would be coming to the plaintiff as administrator ; that is, the present worth of what you find the deceased would have accumulated during his natural life, considering his probable earnings, expenses, and savings, and the probable length of his life. Of these matters you are the sole judges according to your best judgment. The jury should take into consideration the age, occupation, habits, character, and ability, mental and physical, of defendant, and the probable continuance of his life, in arriving at this estimate.

In reference to the other counts under the declaration, the trial judge instructed the jury to the effect that, if you find for the plaintiff upon the issues of either of these counts, it will be necessary for you to determine the damage that plaintiff has suffered. Under these counts the defendant can only be held liable for his own personal acts or negligence. If you find the death of the deceased was caused by such personal act or negligence, damage may be allowed the plaintiff, as parent, for the net services of deceased until he reached the age of 21 years, making allowance for all expenses of his education and support, and for the mental pain and suffering of his parents. There is no rule by which these can be determined, except by your own judgment under the light of , all the circumstances and the evidence in the case. You are to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances, and upon the testimony, tested by your own general knowledge of human nature, determine in your own mind what was the distress and anguish of mind, the mental pain and suffering, of these parents, caused by the death of their son under these circumstances; and upon your deliberate judgment and individual conscience make such an award as you deem just.

The statutes of Florida, to which the trial judge referred, and under which the action was brought, are sections 2342 and 2343 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Florida of 1892, and chapter 4722, p. 114, of the Raws of Florida, approved June 3, 1899. The provisions of these statutes, so far as they affect this case, are as follows;

“Sec. 2342. Whenever the death of any person in this state shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any individual, * * * and the act, negligence, carelessness or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain an action for damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who would have been liable in damages, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding that the death shall have been caused under circumstances as would make it in law amount to a felony.

“Sec. 2343. Every such action shall be brought by, and in the name of, the widow or husband, as the case may be, and where there is neither widow nor husband surviving the deceased, then the minor child or children may maintain an action; and where there is neither widow, nor husband, nor minor child or children, then the action may be maintained by any person or persons dependent upon such person killed for a support; and where [there] is neither of the above classes of persons to sue, then the action may be maintained by the executor or administrator, as the case may be, of the person so killed, and in every such case the jury shall give such damages as the party or parties entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death of the party killed.”

Chapter 4722, § 1. “Whenever the death of any minor child shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, or default of any individual, * * * the father of such minor child, or if the father be not living, the mother, as the legal representative of such deceased minor child, may maintain an action against such, individual, * * * and may recover, not only for tlie loss of services of sucli minor child, hut in addition thereto such sum for the mental pain and suffering of the parent or parents as the jury may assess.”

In this case the issues which were presented and decided by the Circuit Court, affecting so much of the action as looks to sections 2342 and 2343 of the Revised Statutes of Florida of 1892, are substantially the same as those which were presented in the case of Sullivan, by administrator, v. The Florida Central P. R. Co., which was heretofore tried in the same Circuit Court, and brought by writ of error to this court under the style of “Florida Central & P. R. Co. v. Sullivan,” and here affirmed, as appears from the report of our action thereon in 120 Fed. 799, 57 C. C. A. 167, 61 L. R. A. 410. In the case we are now considering the learned judge of the Circuit Court, who had formerly tried the Sullivan Case, fpllowed substantially herein the rulings that he made therein, and which we had affirmed, 'as to the right of the administrator to sue, the right to recover under these statutes, and the measure of damages;, and, as we have seen no occasion to change the views then expressed, we must, on the authority of that case, hold that, as to so much of this case as rests on those sections of the Revised Statutes, the Circuit Court did not err in its rulings and action.

The effort herein to recover under the act of June 3, 1899, occasioned the presentation of two questions which we ought to notice:

First, whether that act was constitutionally passed by the Legislature of Florida? The counsel for the plaintiff in error, assuming, on the authority of State v. Hocker, 36 Fla. 358, 18 South. 767, and Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. Ed. 154, that this court takes judicial notice of the journals of the Legislature of Florida to ascertain whether or not a bill has been constitutionally passed into a law, prints in his brief “extracts from the journals of the Legislature of Florida for its session of 1899, showing all the entries relating to the supposed passage of chapter 4722, p. 1x4, of the Laws of Florida, the act on which the first and third counts of the declaration are based.” We have examined these journal entries with minute care, and, in connection therewith, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of State v. Hocker, supra, and State v. Dillon, 42 Fla. 95, 28 South. 781, and we conclude that the record of the action of the Legislature, read in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida, does not support the objection made by the plaintiff in error to the validity of the act in question.

The other question is whether recovery under both statutes may be sought and had by the administrator in his character as legal representative in one action? The later statute is recent, and no decision under it is reported. Its language appears to authorize recovery under both, when the administrator is the father or the mother of the deceased. The damages in each case grow out of the same transaction. The proof, in the very nature of the case, must be substantially the same in each as to the wrong done and as to the liability of the defendant. The action is by one natural person as the legal representative of one intestate decedent, and against one natural person, to recover damages ■for wrongfully causing the death of the deceased. The later statute seems to supplement the earlier one, and to carry the remedy, in the same direction, farther towards completion. The time, place, and circumstances of the wrong alleged to have been done are the same. The nature of the relief sought is the same. It seems to us that to conclude and hold that in such suit there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, or a misjoinder of causes of action, would involve the surrender of our faculties to the duress of distinctions which, in the olden time, learned experts in the- science of pleading treated as substantial, but which in their essence are shadowy and highly technical.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.