Mаy an insurer avoid liability on a policy of casualty insurance when, through the fault of its agent, the name of the interested premium-paying party is omitted from the policy? We hold that it may not, and therefore reverse.
Cross-plaintiff-appellant Alfred Callis works as a contract hauler for plaintiff Architectural Brick & Tile, Inc. (Architectural Brick). He purchased one of Architectural Brick's tractor trailer trucks on contract. Under the parties' agreed payment arrangement, Architectural Brick retained monthly payments and casualty insurance premiums from Callis's freight fees.
In March 1980, the truck was insured by defendant-appellee State Autоmobile Insurance Company (State Auto), through State Auto's agent, Bert Wren. At the time of contracting for the policy, Callis informed Wren that Callis had an interest as contract buyer in the truck. Wren was aware of the arrangement under which Architectural Brick forwardеd the retained freight fees to Wren as Callis's premium payments. Through Wren's omission, whether willful or negligent, the policy was issued naming Architectural Brick as the owner and General Electric Credit Corporation, which had a secured interest in the truck, as loss payee. Nowhere did Callis's interest appear in the policy. Nonetheless, the policy listed Centerton, Indiana, Wren's home, as the truсk's garaging location, though Architectural Brick's facilities were in Indianapolis.
The policy expired in 1981 and was not renewed. Wrеn, however, continued to accept premiums under the arrangement between Callis and Architectural Brick and to assure Cаllis and Architectural Brick the policy was in force. He even delivered bogus renewal certificates while pocketing the premiums. In 1988, the truck was destroyed by fire. Wren assured Callis the *131 truck was covered, but when Callis and Architectural Brick investigated the matter, State Auto informed them the policy had been cancelled for two years.
Architectural Brick sued Wren and State Auto for sums due under the policy, naming Callis as a defendant to determine the extent of Callis's interest. 1 In turn, Callis brought a cross-claim against State Auto. Stаte Auto moved for summary judgment on the ground that, even if the policy had been in force on the day of the loss, Callis was not covered under the policy. The trial court granted the motion, and Callis now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
As is well known, we stand in the shoes of the trial cоurt when deciding an appeal from a summary judgment decision. We are required to construe the evidence in the light most favorаble to the non-movant. Tucher v. Brothers Auto Salvage Yard, Inc. (1991), Ind.App.,
Bearing in mind that State Auto has conceded for purposes of this summary judgment proceeding that the coverage was in effect on the date of loss in 1983, Record at 180, we note some preliminary remarks. It is true, of course, that an agent like Wren, who opеrates an independent insurance agency representing several insurers, is considered a broker. Stockberger v. Meridian Mutuаl Ins. Co. (1979),
Turning to the question of Cаllis's coverage, we think the principles enunciated in Property Owners Ins. Co. v. Hack (1990), Ind.App.,
After the arson, the insurer paid off the seller's mortgage and denied any further recovery to the seller when the seller demanded payment of the lesser of the balance of his contract price or the policy limit. Relying on Aetna Ins. Co. of the Midwеst, supra, and the "reasonable expectation" test laid down by Judge Cardozo in Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. (1920),
In the present case, Mr. Callis's affidavit in response to State Auto's summary judgment motion reveals that he, like the seller in Property Owners, informed Wren of the details of the sale arrangement. *132 Record at 200-01. Moreover, the policy states the truck was garaged in Callis's home town. Record at 185. Finally, the evidence most favorable to Callis reveals he pаid for all the premiums through his freight fee retention arrangement with Architectural Brick.
In a case such as this, the insurer cannot win a summary judgmеnt merely because the name of the party demanding coverage fails to appear on the policy. Indeed, Cаl-lis's position here is stronger than either that of the seller in Property Owners or the plaintiff in Aetra. Unlike the broker/agent in Aetna, Wren knew the exact nature of the situation, and unlike the seller in Property Owners, Callis actually paid for the insurance. That Wren failed to advise State Auto of Callis's interest is State Auto's responsibility, not Callis's.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The complaint also named two other insurance companies, which are not parties to this appeal, as defendants.