*1 arson, infhcts-serious-injury alternative without first-degree ed which re- offense committing injury. also willful quired showing the defendant said, “caused” a fire. We context “[i]n merged offenses are therefore The two statutes, [‘causing’ both terms fire 701.9, section and the under Iowa Code ‘using’ required separate the utilization of judgment fire] and sentence for willful injury must be vacated. Because we have endanger.” harm or fire with intent to merger resolved the issue on the basis of (Iowa 1989) (emphasis 641-42 701.9, Iowa section we do not ad- Code added). argument dress Hickman’s alternative Waller, v. was wheth- State issue merger the law of the became case. burglary “intent” er under our statute was We vacate the of the court of decision “purpose” similar sufficiently to the word appeals, affirm the and sentence trespass criminal statute to under our first-degree robbery, judg- vacate the trespass make criminal offense included injury, ment and sentence for willful burglary. We concluded it was: entry remand the case for of an order dismissing injury charge. the willful design Intent has been defined as the AP- DECISION OF COURT OF purpose acting. or of an individual VACATED; PEALS JUDGMENT AND Thus, “purpose” the word as contained SENTENCE FOR FIRST-DEGREE 716.7(2)(c) synonymous AFFIRMED; ROBBERY JUDGMENT Although “intent.” the words are differ- AND IN- SENTENCE FOR WILLFUL ent, thought conveyed in these con- VACATED; JURY REMANDED CASE person texts is the same. A whose act ENTRY FOR OF AN ORDER DIS- felony, evidences intent to commit a as- MISSING WILLFUL INJURY sault, burglary theft or under the stat- CHARGE. necessarily pur- ute has also evinced the pose unduly interfering with the use Thus, property by
of the others. it is
impossible greater to commit the offense committing
without the lesser offense. result, CALLENDER, Appellee, As a the offense of un- burglary Charles E. entering der the alternative cannot be committed committing without SKILES, Appellant, Rebecca D. trespass pursuant
criminal to section Skiles, Respondent. Rick L. 716.7(2)(c). No. 00-0069. Waller, State v. Supreme Court of Iowa. 1990) (citations omitted). March 2001.
Applying pragmatic approach Royer, Waller and we conclude the words
“purposely injury” inflicts ... a serious first-degree robbery
under the statute and injury”
“intended to cause ... serious un- statute, willful-injury
der the convey the thought:
same the defendant intended to injury
cause serious (specific the victim
intent), to do the act that resulted intent). injury
in serious (general Under impossible analysis, to commit
first-degree robbery purposely- under the *2 Wells,
R. Douglas of Wells Wells & P.L.C., Davenport, appellant. for Associates, Tyler Tyler
M. Leanne of & P.C., Davenport, appellee. Cirivello, Davenport, A.
Jill for minor child.
SNELL, Justice. Skiles,
Rebecca D. of mother Skiles, appeals mantha of amount visi- daughter tation of her that granted was biological She father. dis- trict court best in- conducted analysis. ap- terest of the child She peals mandating the district court’s order tell lineage. when to the child her true appeal, On we find the amount proper supported by visitation However, agree child’s best interest. mother the act parentage not have should Accordingly, been court. ordered we affirm the district court’s decision as modified.
I. Factual Background Procedure application This case of its involves by our predecessor decided court. Callen (Iowa 1999) Skiles, der v. (Callender I). case, In that we reversed previ putative and remanded the father’s ously attempt standing to obtain denied relationship daughter. with his establish to the district court We sent case back overcoming for a determination of whether to the granting putative father at 192. was warranted. Id. background only provide described in We hold our statute Callender must I necessary to this is as follows. procedural mechanism for claims to be Charles Callender and Rebecca Sidles had brought. leave the substantive We an intimate while Rebecca was claim parenting for further determi- husband, separated from her Rick Skiles. gov- nation under the similar standards reconciled, *3 Rick Rebecca but not be- erning challenge of an established pregnant fore Rebecca became with anoth- father, including the best interest of the accepted er man’s child. Rick the child as child. own, couple his and the and their other I, at (referring Callender 591 N.W.2d 192 together baby children now live with 600B.41A(6)(a)(2)). § to Iowa Code mantha a family. as Within six months of remand, On the district court terminated birth, sought prove Samantha’s Charles to parental rights of Rick. It established he biological was the father to obtain cus- paternity four-year-old of then Samantha visitation, tody, sup- and establish child with Charles and determined a visitation port. The district court ordered that a begin immediately. schedule to Rebecca performed, blood test be which established appeals. Specifically, she that the certainty with statistical that Charles improperly district court fac- considered was biological father. parameters tors outside the of section minimal Charles was then allowed visita- 600B.41A. She asserts that I Callender daughter tion with his at a neutral site. does authorize the use of Iowa Code Charles became unsatisfied with ar- this presumption section 598.41’s in tandem interaction, rangement sought greater factors as well as the termination of Rick Skiles’s 600B.41A(6)(a)(2). Rick did not parental rights to Samantha. Rick and paternal disestablishment of his relation- argued Rebecca that Charles had no ship with Samantha. standing challenge paternity, to and the district court agreed the relevant statute Scope II. and Standard of Review provide did not right Charles with the to Questions are re pursue this action. legal viewed on error. Id. at 184. As Callender I addressed whether Charles such, by only we are bound those factual standing challenge had paternity. to See findings by made trial court based (1997). Iowa Code ch. 600B We found that upon R.App. substantial evidence. Iowa chapter foreclosed Charles mak- 14(f)(1). However, P. where our review challenge because he was neither requires pass us on the rea person “interested” nor the “established sonableness court’s visitation and However, father.” this was not fatal be- award, custody we utilize a de novo review. cause we held such an outcome violated Forbes, Marriage In re right process. Charles’s to due (Iowa 1997); 759 Dye Geiger, 554 We remanded the case the district (Iowa 1996) (“Decisions N.W.2d court to if paternity determine should be ancillary question to the paternity, such established Charles if a relationship support, by are reviewed this court de between Charles and Samantha was war- novo.”). only give weight We need to the ranted. Our court asked the district court findings, trial court’s factual but are not (1) to ensure that: Charles had not waived bound them. See Iowa R.App. P. (2) right his challenge paternity; Pater- 14(f)(7); Weidner, In re Marriage nity Charles; could be established in 1983). (3) A between Charles and Rebecca is appealing the amount of visi- Samantha inwas her best interest. Our tation directed and the order to tell Sa- holding sufficiently limited Callen- mantha of her true standing, following der but we father directed the „district court court’s guid- where should look for disestablishment of Be- ance on remand. cause we believe she is not challenging the se, but rather A. The Best Interest Standard per disestablishment that, we will em- decisions from ancillary alleges the district court review. ploy a de novo impermissibly presumption considered the
found in section 598.41. This Appeal III. Issue on states: court, insofar as is reasonable and the best here concerns question child, in the best interest of the shall biological father is of a child whose
terest award, custody including order the lib- father. person she knows as her not the rights appropriate, eral visitation where is now the Specifically, because Charles opportu- which will assure father, type what of relation- established nity physi- maximum continuing for the ship between Charles par- cal and emotional contact with both *4 I directed her best interest? Callender ents .... consult the factors the district court to 598.41(l)(a). § Id. Rebecca believes A(6)(a)(2) .41 for a in section 600B found applied not in section 598.41 should be relationship type of what determination provision a uti- instant case because is statutory appropriate. The factors is custody disputes in between lized normal clude: parents divorcing. who are This sec- two determining In the best interest of places emphasis tion an on the tenet that a child, consider all of the the court shall already continuation of established contact following: in parents likely with is to be a child’s both (a) age The of the child. best interest. (b) of time since the estab- length The Here, unique complicated have a we paternity. lishment of Rick as her situation. Samantha knows relationship father and has an established (c) relationship between previous The Charles, biolog- with him in his home. father, in- child and the established father, with ical has not had visitation limited to the duration cluding but not she was two and one-half mantha since any periods time dur- frequency old, only begun now has years fa- ing which the and established pater- establishing after his visit Samantha in same household or ther resided facts, main- these nity. Under relationship parent-child in a as engaged preference for tains that section 598.41’s in section 600A.2. defined inappropriate fac- maximum contact is (d) possibility that the child could what amount of visitation tor to determine actual by establishing benefit child’s appropriate. matter, the court stated: On this (e) which the court Additional factors impression was to The Court’s initial are relevant to the individu- determines like a amount of visitation treat al situation. week- “typical” dissolution—alternate A(6)(a)(2) (emphasis § Iowa Code 600B.41 ends, major holidays, Father’s alternate added). birthday, and Day, alternate the child’s But visitation. ex- extended summer purport does not to be This section consider, among oth- in also needs to in the factors a best inter- Court listing clusive three children and things, er the other language sec- est determination. 600B.41A(6)(a)(2)(e) disruption what effect authorizes tion them and will have on factors visitation schedule to consider other relevant court such, relationship them. Because on her with As there is no language. outside its factors, that it the Court finds every child’s of these test for what is standard grant appropriate be would not every interest in case. relationship, granted and the benefit of estab- typically same visitation that is all subsumed in our lishing paternity are in a dissolution. determination. whole, opinion reading In the court’s do find that the noted not expert findings The record contains the it is applied. in section 598.41 was When testimony, His as well psychologist. so, child-to do in the best interest of the reports, as his indicate an intricate knowl- maximum contact may parties the court consider and their situation. He edge of the parents. deciding with both that a recommended using a best interest of the child interest. rights Charles was Samantha’s best 600B.41A(6)(a)(2),it There also favorable evidence detail- analysis under section lifestyle ability and his for a court to consider Charles’s Samantha, voluntary principles care for as well as his other established of visitation. 598.41, payment support. of child Unfavorable Some have been codified regarding evidence in the record the be- prior others have been delineated our parents havior is a relevant of Charles’s cases. determining the amount of visita- factor B. The Best Interest bearing on tion awarded Charles. As than follow a more usual Rather visitation, give we also consideration to the visitation, blueprint imposed the court consequent disruption to the Skiles home. a somewhat lesser schedule. The visita *5 sum, support we find that the facts tion schedule is as follows: by the visitation awarded the court. Such 1. For the first three months Charles necessary way arrangement an is a Saturday was allowed the first and third normalcy consistency create in the life p.m. each month from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 young biological parents of a child whose Thereafter, other, 2. Charles was allowed the have never been married to each capable willing first and third weekends of each month but who are both to be involved their child’s life. The district Saturday p.m. from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 Sun- court did not find identi- this situation was day. divorcing parents, cal to that of a child of granted every 3. Charles was Thanks- solely nor do we. Our determination is giving p.m. Friday weekend from 5:00 founded on what in the best interest of p.m. Sunday. 5:00 Samantha. period 4. Charles was allotted the day begins after winter break at 9:00 C. of Parentage Disclosure p.m. a.m. to 10:00 Eve. Christmas The district court also determined 5. one Charles received week each that Samantha should be informed that 2001, summer to begin summer of Charles is her father before kindergarten increasing to two weeks each summer in begins. It concluded in Samantha’s best n 2004. court-imposed terest dictated a timeline telling her of her true lineage. Notably, any Charles was not allowed Rebec ruling ca that this interferes with major spend holidays to with Samantha. family’s autonomy. The summer vacation award was also fair- ly Finally, conservative. Charles was not “recognizefd] We have provided Wednesday night visitation government is ill-equipped to dictate the granted. often among family details of social interaction
The district opinion appears court’s Olds, 571, members.” Olds v. thought be well out and mindful of the 1984). 574 This statement was parties’ anguish. court-ordered, Because our review on made in grand relation to novo, give this issue is de considerable parent parenting right, visitation. “[T]he weight findings, to the court’s factual but liberty is a fundamental interest by age, protected are not bound them. against unwarranted state intru Rick, her the length of sion.” Id.
857 TERNUS, J., justices except All concur recognized have jurisdictions also Other part part who concurs in and dissents family in child mat autonomy of the CADY, joined by and is CARTER and JJ. not have the trial court does ters. “The authority or the abili or the responsibility TERNUS, (concurring part Justice circumstances for the ty to create ideal dissenting part). Marriage Littlefield, 133 family.” In re opinion I concur in the court’s with the (1997). 1362, 1371 940 P.2d Wash.2d exception majority’s of the instruction that Moreover, test is not “the best interests shall make the Skiles decision the court to microman intended to allow to when should be told of custody entry from the of the age a child’s parentage. respectfully true dissent final until the child becomes portion opinion. from that of the court’s [Tjhese usually decisions should adult.... majority recognizes, govern- As the “the parents private.” be made ill-equipped ment is to dictate the details (Fla. Chant, 445, 448 v. 725 So.2d Chant family among of social interaction mem- Dist.Ct.App.1999). Olds, bers.” Olds (Iowa 1984). states, majority As the no instance where we have We can find respon- trial court does not have “[t]he timeline for upheld a court-ordered sibility authority ability or the or the Similarly, there is ancestry. a child of her family.” create ideal circumstances for the this. The statutory authority to do no Littlefield, P.2d Marriage In re to establish court is able (Wash. 1997). In accordance by viewing what is in a child’s majority finds principles, with these interest, this does not mean that but “dictating] court for fault with the district the child necessarily dictate when should paterni- the child be told of her when must be told of her must added.) Nonetheless, ty.” (Emphasis upon our de novo review Accordingly, majority proceeds to dictate who will make *6 trial court’s establishment of we affirm the respect telling the decision with and visitation schedule for child of her court and Samantha. The district Charles decision for cannot concur this two or im- not use an standard did all, unfairly reasons. First of the court permissibly rely on section 598.41. We the trial court for criticizing inconsistent pro- micromanaging family 598.41 and then believe the exer- ceeding to do that. We should among many a relevant factor for deter- enmeshing judicial cise restraint in a child’s interest. mining what is left to personal court in decisions best Clearly, preference if is not within a such parties to sort out without court interest, inappro- child’s best it would be addition, the court’s deci- volvement. visitation. Look- priate grant maximum reality is that sion is unenforceable. record, present at all facts in the can neither this court nor Rebecca Skiles maximum visitation schedule of less than party to this lawsuit prevent persons not a -in best interest at visitation is is her that Charles time. this illustrates that merely father. This fact re- modify We the court’s determination “ill-equipped to dictate the court is indeed should be told of garding when Samantha family mem- among interaction the social may agree parentage. Although attempt to do so bers.” We should not told sooner rather that she needs to be here. later, to Rebec-
than we leave the decision JJ., CADY, join this CARTER parent. ca as the sole custodial part. part and dissent concurrence responsible for their parties shall be attorney fees. Costs of own appellant. against
are assessed
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.