41 Kan. 466 | Kan. | 1889
Opinion by
An act of the legislature of this state passed at the special session,'1886, entitled “An act to amend sections 1 and 3 of an act entitled ‘An act to enable cities of the second class to extend their corporate limits, and to repeal section 133 of chapter 100 of the Laws of 1872, and chapter 73 of the Laws of 1875/ approved March 4, 1875, and to repeal said original §§ 1 and 3,” provided that “ whenever the city council of any city of the second class desires to enlarge the limits thereof from the territory adjacent thereto, said council shall, in the name of said city, present a petition to the judge of the district court of the county in which said city is situated, setting forth by metes and bounds the territory sought to be added, and asking said judge to make a finding as to the advisability of adding said territory to said city.” Notice of the time and place of the presentation of the petition to the judge shall be published for three consecutive weeks in some newspaper published in the city, and proof of the publication of the notice shall be made at the hearing. Upon the hearing, if the judge “shall be satisfied that the adding of such territory to the city will be to its interest, and will cause no manifest injury to the persons owning real estate in the territory sought to be added, he shall so find, and thereupon the city council of said city may add such territory to said city, by an ordinance providing for the same.”
The statute does not in terms provide for any method by which these findings may be reviewed in this court, and unless they fall within section 542 of the code of civil procedure, the objection must be sustained. That section provides “that the supreme court may vacate or modify any of the following orders of the district court or a judge thereof: First, a final order; second, an order that grants or refuses a continuance, discharges vacates or modifies a provisional remedy; or grants, refuses or vacates an injunction; that grants or refuses a new trial; or that confirms or refuses to confirm the report of a referee; or that sustains or overrules a demurrer.”
By § 543 a final order is defined, among other things, as one affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding. If this petition in error can be sustained, it must be under such a construction of this section as holds these findings to be an order in a special proceeding. There are many difficulties to be encountered and overcome to reach such a conclusion. It would be a strange perversion of terms to call a finding an order. The judge is not authorized by the statute to make any order or render any judgment. The findings are made the basis of action by the city council, and are conditions precedent to the exercise of power by the council. The pi’oceeding is not an action, but may come under the head of special proceedings, as contemplated by § 543. In any view, the judge has made no order that is reviewable in this court.
It is recommended that the petition in error be dismissed.
By the Court: It is so ordered.