162 A. 856 | Md. | 1932
The traverser was under indictment for an alleged violation of the local law which made it unlawful to sell, or to have in possession with the intent unlawfully to sell, intoxicating liquor within Anne Arundel County, without first having taken out a license. Section 184A of chapter 568 of the Acts of 1890, codified as article 2, sec. 34 (page 362) of the Code of Public Local Laws of Maryland (Flack's Ed. 1930); Molinari v. State,
The sale of intoxicating liquor was not only an offense under the federal statute, but it was also a misdemeanor under the local statute in force in Anne Arundel County. The traverser contends that, on the given facts, there was an illegal search and seizure, and so the evidence obtained is not admissible because the Bouse Act, section 4A of article 35 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland (Supp. 1929), provides: "No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be deemed admissible where the same shall have been procured by, through, or in consequence of any illegal search or seizure or of any search and seizure prohibited by the Declaration of Rights of this State."
The provisions of the statute here invoked have no application. By the traverser's acts and professions to the officer, he was at the time of his arrest engaged in the commission of what was at once a crime under the federal law and the local statute. His offense was therefore against both the sovereignty of the United States and that of the State of Maryland, and concerned a subject-matter which, in consummation of his crimes, he was about to deliver to the officer when his hand was stayed by the arrest. The traverser was taken in flagrante delicto, and his apprehension and the confiscation of the intoxicant were but the proper *301
discharge of an official duty. No constitutional right nor immunity was violated. If a misdemeanor be committed in the presence of an officer who is charged with the enforcement of the law, he is authorized, without warrant, to arrest the offender (Heyward v. State,
It has been argued, in support of the motion to suppress the evidence of the prosecution, that the traverser was induced by the officers, who made the arrest, to violate the law in order that a prosecution would result. There was, however, no testimony of an entrapment within the rule adopted in some jurisdictions, since there existed reasonable suspicion on the part of the officers that the party was engaged in the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor at the time it was ordered. Cornelius onSearch and Seizure, sec. 39. It is not *302
objectionable for an officer of the law to lay a trap or unite with others to detect an offender. The only effect would be to justify a more careful scrutiny of the evidence. Where the crime is not against the person nor the property of the instigator, it is not clear how, in the absence of special circumstances, the commission of a crime at the solicitation or procurement of another, although an officer of the law, makes the culprit any less guilty than if the criminal design had originated with the wrongdoer himself, but this problem is not now before the court for determination, since the requisite circumstances to raise the question of an adoption of the rule by this court do not exist on this record. See chapter 59 of 1 Bishop on Criminal Law (9th Ed.); Hummelshime v. State,
The second point raised is the judgment. The sentence was that the traverser should pay a fine of $900 and costs and be confined to the Maryland House of Correction for eleven months and thereafter be confined to the jail of Anne Arundel County until the fine and costs are paid. The statute for whose violation the traverser was convicted empowered the judge to impose a fine or imprisonment in the jail of Anne Arundel County or in the House of Correction or inflict both fine and imprisonment. The sentence of the court was within both the amount of the fine and the term and place of imprisonment. Flack's Code of Public Local Laws, art. 2, sec. 49, p. 367; Code, art. 27, sec. 700. The fact that the court directed that, after his period of confinement, the convict should be confined to jail until the fine and costs are paid, is not unusual, and does not invalidate the sentence in any way. The sentence is made certain and definite by fixing the place of confinement and the time when such confinement is to begin in the event there should be a failure to pay the fine and costs; and by section 3 of article 38 of the Code, which is read into the sentence as if there incorporated, and which prescribes the possible duration of the imprisonment for a failure to pay the fine and costs imposed to a period of six months. Dean v.State,
Perceiving no ground for reversal, the judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs to the appellee.