57 Cal. 476 | Cal. | 1881
This was an action to recover damages for unlawfully preventing the plaintiff from pasturing his sheep upon certain stubble, to wit: the growth of wheat, oats, and barley remaining after harvest time upon the cultivated and uncultivated portions of a certain tract of land which the assignor of the plaintiff had leased to the defendant.
It appears that on the 28th of October, 1876, one Aurrecochea leased to the defendant for the farming season to end
Defendant sowed the entire premises in grain, as provided by the lease, but cut only about two hundred acres, leaving the remainder uncut, because, in consequence of the extreme dryness of the season, the crop was of scanty growth, and although there was some little grain in it, yet there was not enough to make it worth harvesting. So, instead of cutting it, he turned in upon it his sheep, and pastured them there during the months of August and September, 1877; and in the month of August, when the plaintiff to whom Aurrecochea had assigned the stubble drove about 2,000 sheep upon the land for pasturage, he drove them away and prevented the plaintiff from using it for that purpose, upon the ground that the uncut grain was not stubble, to which the landlord, or the plaintiff as his assignee, was entitled under the lease. And that was the question at issue.
In order to prove that it was stubble, the plaintiff, on the trial of the case, offered to prove that, by the custom of the country in the locality of the premises, the word “ stubble,” used in the agreement, included and designated whatever is left
We think that was error. It was the duty of the Court to construe the contract in such a way as to render it operative and effectual to carry out the purpose of the parties, as expressed in the language and terms which they used. As a general rule, the words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning; but if they are used in a technical sense, they should be interpreted as usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate; or if they have a special meaning given to them by usage, the meaning should be followed. (§§ 1644, 1645, Civ. Code.) In such a case, evidence explanatory of the words is admissible, not for the purpose of adding to, or qualifying, or contradicting the contract, but for the purpose of ascertaining it by expounding the language, and so enabling the Court to interpret it according to the actual intention of the parties, and the law and usage of the place where it is to be performed. (§§ 1636,1646, Civ. Code.)
If there was an existing usage among farmers as to the meaning of the word “ stubble,” when this contract was made, it must be inferred that the contracting parties, being farmers, contracted with reference to it, and that they used the word in the broader meaning which was given to it by that usage, and not in the ordinary or popular sense. Evidence of such usage and meaning was, therefore, admissible to define and explain the peculiar or local meaning of the word as it was used in the contract, and the Court below should have overruled the objection to the offer made by the plaintiff.
Judgment and order reversed, and cause remanded to the Superior Court of Alameda County for a new trial.
Ross, J., and McKinstry, J., concurred.