71 P. 104 | Cal. | 1902
This is a suit to quiet the plaintiff’s title to land described in the complaint, situate in the town of G-roveland, and known as the “Rhode Island Mining Claim.” The plaintiff had judgment, from which, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial, the defendant appeals.
TJie plaintiff deraigns title to the land in question under a mining location, originally made in the year 1854 by one Reid, and renewed by Reid and one Austin January 1, 1876, The defendant, under the patent of the townsite of Groveland, issued under the federal laws (Rev. Stats., sec. 2387 et seq. [6 Fed. Stats. Ann. 344; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1457]), and a deed of the patentee to Lawrence Murray, of date September 5, 1879, purporting to convey to him lot 8, block 6, as designated on the official map of the townsite, of which lot the land in question is part. The date of the' patent is February 10, 1886; that of the original entry of the townsite, October 3, 1877. It is found by the court that the land in question was duly located January 1, 1876, by plaintiff’s predecessors, whose title became vested in him March 26, 1896, and that “plaintiff ever since has been the owner and in the possession of said Rhode Island mining claim [specifically described in.the findings], and has been working and developing thé same as a mining claim.” And as conclusion of law it is found that at the date of the town-site entry, October 3, 1877, the land lying within the Rhode Island mining claim was withdrawn from sale or disposition by the government of the United States, and hence was reserved from the operation of the patent to the trustee of the townsite. It is urged by the appellant’s counsel that this conclusion of the court was erroneous, and that on the facts found the judgment should have been for defendant.
In this statement of the questions involved we use the expression “naked possession” advisedly, because it does not appear from the findings that the “possessory title” given to plaintiff’s predecessors, the locators of the mine, by section 2322 of the Revised Statutes (5 Fed. Stats. Ann. 13; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1425) has been kept alive by the performance of the annual amount of work required by section 2324 (5 Fed. Stats. Ann. 19; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1426). Accordingly, it is not contended by the respondent counsel—so far as appears from this brief-—-that the case comes within the operation of the provisions of section 2386 of the Revised Statutes (6 Fed. Stats. Ann. 343; U. S. Comp Stats. 1901, p. 1457), by the terms of which titles under the township act are made “subject” to the possessory rights of locators. Nor can such contention be successfully made. The possessory title of plaintiff’s predecessors was, indeed, valid at the time of the entry of the townsite (which was within the year following the year of the location, and therefore within the time 'allowed the locators to do the work required), and, had it been kept alive to the time of the commencement of the -suit, would have been sufficient to sustain plaintiff’s action. For by the express provisions of the law (Rev. Stats. 2386 [6 Fed. Stats. Ann. 343; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1457]) all titles under the townsite act are made subject to the possessory rights of miners; and j;o the same effect in section 10 of the state law: Stats. 1867-68, p. 696. But by the terms of the statute the right is granted to locators for “so long” only as the law shall be complied with; and upon default of compliance the term of the possessory right or lease given by the statute terminates, and the provisions of the statute no longer apply. The judgment can be affirmed, therefore, if at all, only- upon one of two grounds urged in the respondent’s brief; that is to say, upon the ground that the land in question was reserved from the operation of the patent by the provisions of section 2392 of the Revised Statutes (6 Fed. Stats. Ann. 351; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1459), or, failing this, upon the ground that (defendant
1. The former contention turns upon the construction of section 2392 of the Revised Statutes (6 Fed. Stats. Ann. 351; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1459), the provisions of which are that “no title shall be acquired, under the foregoing provisions of this chapter, to any mine of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper, or to any valid mining claim or possession held under existing laws.” It is not, however, nor can it be, contended, that the case comes within the exception provided for in the first of the two clauses of the section; for under the unvarying decisions of the courts, federal and state, the term “mine” is defined as including only mines valuable for their minerals, or, as expressed in the statute, “valuable mineral deposits” (Rev. Stats., sec. 2319 [5 Fed. Stats. Ann. 4; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1424]; Davis v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 517-519, 523, 35 L. Ed. 238, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628; Richards v. Dower, 81 Cal. 50, 22 Pac. 304; Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 662, 663, 38 L. Ed. 305, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452, and cases therein cited; Smith v. Hill, 89 Cal. 125, 26 Pac. 644; Barden v. Railroad Co., 154 U. S. 288, 38 L. Ed. 992, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030; Standard Quicksilver Co. v. Habishaw, 132 Cal. 123, 64 Pac. 113; 1 Lindley on Mines, secs. 86, 94), and there is nothing in the case to show that the mine in question is of that character. The contention of the respondent, therefore, more specifically stated, is that the case comes within the exception made by the latter clause of the section, and it is therefore the construction of this clausé only that is involved here. This, it is obvious, is susceptible of two constructions. It may refer either to the mine claimed or possessed, or to the claim or possession- of the mine. Under the former construction, supplying omitted words, it would read “or to any mine subject to a valid mining claim or possession,” etc. Under the latter it would refer to the “'possessory right” given to mining locators by the provisions of section 2322-of the Revised Statutes (5 Fed. Stats. Ann. 13; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1425); and, thus construed, its effect would be substantiálly the same as that of the provisions of section 2386 of the statute (6 Fed. Stats. Ann. 343; U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1457) and of section 10 of the state act; that is, it would except such rights from the operation of the patent so long as they should continue
2. The remaining objections made to the deed are: That the deed from the trustee of the townsite to the defendant’s predecessor, Murray, was void for want of delivery, or, if delivered, because in contravention of the terms of the trust; and that the title of Murray has not vested in the defendant. The last objection may be briefly disposed of. The defendant deraigns title under a deed from Mrs. Joanna Wilson, formerly Murray, to whom, by an order of the superior court of date March 5, 1900, the whole of the estate—being under the value of $1,500—was assigned, as the widow of the deceased, Murray, for the use and support of the family of said deceased, two of the three children of Murray joining in the deed, and the other being a minor. The point of the respondent’s objection is that “the order setting aside the property to Joanna Wilson was in excess of the jurisdiction of the probate court,” she having, by her remarriage, ceased to be the widow of the deceased. If such be the case (and we do not deem it necessary to pass on the point), it would follow simply that the order would be void, and the titles of the heirs would remain unaffected. Nor can we conceive of any process of reasoning to lead us to the conclusion that the effect of the void order could be to vest the title of the whole estate in the minor heir. It would have been, no doubt, in the power of the court, upon the assumption made, to assign the estate to the minor; but until such assignment her rights remain the same as those of the other heirs. The interests of the grantors in the deed as heirs therefore passed to the defendant which is sufficient to meet the objection. Nor are the objections that the deed of the trustee was not delivered to Murray, .and that the purchase money was not paid by him, more tenable. It is expressly found that the trustee, on September 5, 1879, being about to go abroad, “did make and execute [deeds] to the persons whose names appeared upon [the] official map of the town-site, .... as being entitled thereto, and who had not previously obtained conveyances,”' and among others to Murray, “whose name appeared upon said map on lot 8,
The remaining objection is that the trustee had no power to convey to anyone other than to occupants of the land conveyed, and that it is found that Murray did not come within this description. But neither the fact relied on nor the conclusion drawn from it can be admitted. As to the latter, it is a universal principle, except where' affected by express statutory provisions, that a deed of conveyance conveys all the interest of the grantor; and this applies equally to a legal title held in trust as to any other. For in the view of a court of law, or of a court exercising legal, as distinguished from equitable, functions, the equitable title is nonexistent, and the legal is, in fact the only title. Nor, with regard to the present case, is there any law making it an exception to the rule. It is, indeed, provided by section 870 of the Civil Code that, “when a trust in relation to real property is expressed in the instrument creating the estate, ’ ’ a deed in contravention of the trust is void. But here the trust expressed in the federal statute, and presumably in the patent, is not expressed otherwise than by reference to regulations thereafter to be enacted by the legislature of the state. The cases cited by the respondent do not affect this proposition. In Biddick v. Kobler, 110 Cal. 191, 42 Pac. 578, all that was held was that in a suit to recover possession by a grantee of the trustee, who was never the occupant, or entitled to the occupancy of the land conveyed, against one who was such occupant, and so entitled at the date of the entry, the equity of the latter could be relied on as a complete defense; all of which follows from familiar principles of equity, and also from the express provisions of section 10 of the state law, providing that the deeds of
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the land in question was conveyed by the patent, and that the title is vested in the defendant, and, consequently, that the judgment can