158 F. 988 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Iowa | 1908
This action is to recover damages for a personal injury alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff because of the neglect of an engineer of one of defendant’s trains. There have been two trials of the case. The first resulted in a disagreement of the jury; the second in a verdict of $100 for plaintiff, and he moves for a new trial upon various grounds, one of which is that such improper influences were exerted in the interests of the defendant upon some of the jurors during the trial as to vitiate the verdict. The case was closely contested upon both trials, and the evidence is such that different minds might.fairly reach different
The jury for the second trial was impaneled in the forenoon of Wednesday, April 3, 1907, the second day of the term; the cause was submitted to it April 8th, and the verdict returned April 9th. Shortly thereafter rumors were rife that the verdict was the result of improper influences exerted upon, and misconduct of, some of the jurors. In a motion for a new trial this was vaguely charged; whereupon the court called upon counsel for the plaintiff for a statement of the facts upon which the charge was based. They answered that rumors were current following the trial that one of the jurors had mysteriously received during the trial a letter containing money, or a check for money, for some improper purpose; that entertainment of some sort had been furnished to others of the jurors by the claim agents of the defendant, or others in its behalf; that these and other similar rumors had become so widespread that voluntary information could not then be obtained to substantiate such charges; but if certain of the jurors and other persons named could be brought before the court and examined, they believed the charges could be sustained. The court thereupon ordered that specific charges be put in writing and filed as a part of the motion for a new trial, and that several of the jurors and other named persons be summoned to appear for examination in regard to such charges. The jurors and persons so named and others have been summoned and examined, and the matter is now finally submitted for determination. From the evidence thus taken, the charge of the improper receipt of money, or a check for money, by one of the jurors is wholly without foundation, and that charge needs no further consideration. It may also be said that others of the rumors are but gross exaggerations of trivial facts occurring during the trial that could not in any event have influenced the verdict. Others of the charges, however, cannot be thus disposed of.
It appears that there was drawn upon the original panel of the trial jury three persons from Hardin county and two from Grundy county. On the first day of the term the panel had been reduced by excuses, or for other reasons, so that it became necessary to draw additional jurors. In this drawing three of those drawn were from Hardin county and three from Grundy county; so that of the trial jurors for that term six were from Hardin county and five from Grundy county. These counties adjoin each other — Grundy lying east of Hardin, in the northwestern part of this division of the district. This case was the first for trial, and upon the completion of the second drawing of jurors in the afternoon of the first day Mr. Earhart, one of defendant’s claim agents, and whose duty it was to investigate and obtain information as to jurors, summoned, to enable defendant’s attorneys to properly exercise its challenges in cases it had for trial, requested, by telephone he says, J. W. Pepperman, of Grundy Center in Grundy county, to come to Cedar Rapids in order that he might get from him information as to the jurors drawn from that vicinity. He also communicated with
J. W. Pepperman of Grundy Center, Grundy county, also came to Cedar Rapids that week, but the date he is unable to state, and it does not appear, but it was at least a day or two after the jury was impaneled. He arrived about midnight or later, saw Mr. Earhart shortly after he arrived and had a few minutes conversation with him about jurors. About noon the next day Pepperman left Cedar Rapids with a Mr. Thompson, went to North Liberty, and returned to Cedar Rapids about 6 o’clock in the evening. He is not certain that he saw the juror Miller before he left that day; but on his return in the evening he again saw and conversed with Earhart, but what passed between them is not stated. He then met the juror Miller of Grundy Center, with whom he was well acquainted, in a billiard room and played billiards with him until about 8 o’clock, and then they went to a show of some kind — he is unable to state what. Either on the street, or at the hotel
Mr. Weimer is, or had been, a member of the board of supervisors of Hardin county, and is a man of good character and standing; but his acceptance of the invitation of, and entertainment from, Shaw, instead of reporting his conduct to the court, after he had attempted to poison his mind against the plaintiff, subjects him to criticism, though doubtless he did not realize that he was doing anything improper. That Pepperman’s conduct was also pernicious, and but little less reprehensible than that of Shaw, is also clear, though he and Miller both say that no word was spoken between them with reference to the case. But the very absence of such words in view of their relations, and the kindly treatment of the juror, may have exerted a far more insidious, and therefore dangerous influence than any words that
It is strongly urged in behalf of defendant that it knew nothing of the influences exerted upon these jurors, and it should not therefore be deprived of its verdict, which it claims the evidence is amply sufficient to sustain. Some authorities may support this contention. But pre-termitting the question of the knowledge of the claim agent of the conduct of Shaw and Pepperman, and admitting, without deciding, that he did not instigate such conduct, it is clear that the conduct of Shaw, at least, was exerted in the interest of this defendant; and the weight of authority and the better reason is that that is sufficient to condemn the verdict where the improper conduct is such that it' might have influenced it in favor of the party for whom it is returned. Welch v. Taverner, 78 Iowa, 207, 42 N. W. 650; Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 57 Iowa, 748, 11 N. W. 668; Johnson v. Root, 2 Cliff. 108, Fed. Cas. No. 7,409; McDaniels v. McDaniels, 40 Vt. 363; Bradbury v. Cony, 62 Me. 223, 16 Am. Rep. 449. Neither of the jurors would admit that he was influenced by anything that was done by either Shaw or Pepperman, atid it was hardly to be expected that they would; but they are not permitted to say this. They may testify to any facts showing attempts to influence them, and it is then for the court to determine whether or not what had been done was of such character that it might háve influenced the verdict. Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140-148, 149, 13 Sup. Ct. 50, 36 L. Ed. 917. Who can say that the poisonous suggestion of Shaw that “this is a hold-up case, it has been tried once and the jury hung; I know you are a juror, and can’t talk about it, but we will talk it over more fully after the trial,” may not have unconsciously influenced the juror Weimer to yield his convictions to those of Miller, the friend and fellow townsman of Pep-perman who had furnished entertainment to them both, and that prejudices thus resulted to the plaintiff?
In Johnson v. Root, above, Mr. Justice Clifford says:
“Any improper influence with jurors may afford sufficient ground for granting a new trial, and it is not necessary that the attempt to influence the jurors should be made by one of the parties nor even by his agent. It is sufficient that it clearly appears that it was done in his behalf, and it is never necessary .to show that misconduct controlled or determined the verdict, providing it was of a character that might have had undue influence.”
Jurors must be kept free from all possible 'influences. When exposed thereto it will not do to inquire into the probability of the extent of the influences, and their effect upon the verdict. There is no safety except in setting aside the verdict in a case where acts and conduct are such that could have influenced the verdict. Welch v. Taverner, 78 Iowa, 207, 42 N. W. 650.
In McDaniels v. McDaniels, 40 Vt. 363, it is said:
“The friends of the plaintiff who thus approached the jury were guilty of a flagrant violation of the law, and the jurors who suffered themselves to be*995 so approached, though they may not have meant any wrong, were also guilty. * * * The plaintiff was unaware of these transactions; * * * but it does not follow that he could hold a verdict which is the result of a trial corrupted, though without his fault, by a shameful disregard of familiar rules, which are necessary to a decent administration of the law.”
In Bradbury v. Cony, 62 Me. 223, 16 Am. Rep. 449, above, it is said.
“The effect on the jury is the same when the tampering is by the party or by his friends or relatives, whether with or without his knowledge.”
For other instances where the misconduct was held to vitiate the verdict, see Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 57 Iowa, 748, 11 N. W. 668-where one of the attorneys of the successful party participated in celebrating the anniversary of the birth of one of the jurors, though the case on trial was not mentioned; Veneman v. McCurtain, 33 Neb. 643, 50 N. W. 955-where a third party furnished cigars to the jury while deliberating, saying they were from defendant, but jury might consider them from either party; Poole v. C. B. & Q. R. Co. (C. C.) 6 Fed. 844-where some of the jurors used the room, of one of the counsel of the successful party at a hotel, in which to play cards evenings, counsel not present; Ensign v. Harney, 15 Neb. 330, 18 N. W. 73, 48 Am. Rep. 344-where two of the jurors used the team of one of the attorneys, with his permission, to go home during recess of court for Sunday. See, also, Morse v. Montana Purchasing Co. (C. C.) 105 Fed. 337. The rule deducible from these and other authorities is: That where an improper attempt is made to influence jurors in favor of one of the parties, which might have had that effect, a verdict in favor of such party will be set aside, though the attempt was made without his knowledge or authority.
That the improper influence exerted upon these jurors was in the interest of the defendant is not a matter of doubt; and the court will not stop to weigh with exactness the effect of such influence upon this verdict. It is sufficient to know that it was exerted, and that the verdict might have been influenced thereby. It must be understood that no verdict should be permitted to stand, against which, from established facts, the slightest inference rests that it bears the taint of improper influence exerted by or in behalf of the party in whose favor it is returned. Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140-149, 13 Sup. Ct. 50, 36 L. Ed. 917. To uphold this verdict would be, impliedly at least, to approve of the conduct of both Shaw and Pepperman with these jurors; and that would be to cast a most serious imputation upon the trial by jury in this district. Whether or not the evidence is sufficient beyond doubt to convict either of these parties of contempt, or that the evidence given by either could be used against him for that purpose, need not be determined, for that question does not now arise. It does not follow, however, if it is not, and could not be so used, that this verdict should be permitted to stand; and it will be set aside because of their misconduct. Other grounds of the motion are deemed to be untenable, and each thereof will be overruled.
It is not contended that any of the counsel for defendant are responsible for this misconduct, and there is no evidence that in any way
The verdict will be set aside for the reasons above stated, at defendant’s costs of the motion for a new trial, and a new trial granted. It is ordered accordingly.