CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.
L.A. No. 31283
Supreme Court of California
Jan. 19, 1981.
692 | 28 Cal. 3d 692
Laurence D. Steinsapir, Robert M. Dohrmann, Howard M. Knee and Schwartz, Steinsapir, Dohrmann & Krepack for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., Chief Deputy County Counsel, Greer D. Knopf, Deputy County Counsel, Larry J. Frierson and Paterson & Taggart for Defendants and Appellants.
OPINION
THE COURT.—California Teachers Association (CTA) sought a peremptory writ of mandate from the superior court directing the San Diego Community College District and its chancellor (district) to reclassify and reemploy certain part-time teachers (part-timers) as contract or regular employees for the 1976-1977 school year and to award the part-timers back pay, with interest, equal to the difference between their salaries as temporary employees and the salaries to which they would have been entitled as permanent employees.
The superior court granted the writ on the issue of reclassification but denied it as to back pay. The district appealed from the former ruling, and CTA appealed from the latter. Most of the issues presented in these appeals were resolved by our decision in Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 369 [155 Cal.Rptr. 679, 595 P.2d 113]. The principal question remaining, which we now must decide, is the appropriate method of computing the back pay to which those part-timers who will be reclassified are entitled.
CTA brought this action on behalf of its members who were part-time instructors in the district during the 1976 spring semester and who were classified as temporary employees because they worked less than
The district employs three classes of instructors: regular (permanent or tenured), contract (probationary) and temporary. Some regular and contract teachers are employed part-time and are paid a salary prorated to the salary of a full-time teacher. Temporary teachers are paid a flat hourly rate which is less than the amount paid a salaried employee. Temporary employees do not receive certain fringe benefits associated with contract or regular employment, and they may be dismissed without notice or hearing. They are not, however, expected to hold office hours, serve on professional committees or supervise student activities, all of which are required of full-time teachers.
In Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist., supra, 24 Cal.3d 369, we clarified the meaning of
Since the rights of part-timers who were initially employed before November 8, 1967, are clearly encompassed in CTA‘s description in its petition of those on whose behalf the action was brought,3 we turn now to the principal issue in this case. What is the proper method of determining pro rata pay under
The key question is the meaning of the phrase “time actually served.” CTA asserts that it refers to classroom hours only. The district, on the other hand, asserts that the phrase “time actually served” refers to time spent working on the job, including time spent both inside and outside of the classroom.
The language of
“This legislation would provide that part-time employees shall be paid on the basis that the proportion of the time actually served bares [sic] to the minimum schoolday as provided in law, thereby proportional to the amount of state income received.
“Inasmuch as every school district may determine the amount of time required of full-time employees, there is a lack of consistency as to the basis upon which part-time employees may be paid. Under current law, it is possible for a school district to receive the equivalent state income generated by a full-time teacher while paying that teacher on a part-time basis.
“The effect of this bill would be to make the proportional ratio of salary payments to part-time employees based upon and consistent with the amount of state income they generate by their teaching activities; it would make such application consistent throughout the state.”
The district objects to use of Senator Rodda‘s statement in determining the Legislature‘s intent. CTA, however, asserts that we must not consider this point because no objection to the use of the material was made in the trial court. The interpretation of a statute, however, is a question of law, and we are not bound by evidence presented on the question in the trial court. (See Rich v. State Board of Optometry, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d, at p. 604; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 258 [104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049].) The propriety of the use of extrinsic materials in determining legislative intent is a question which may properly be considered on appeal regardless of whether the issue was raised in the trial court.
The district contends that the use of Senator Rodda‘s statement would violate well-settled principles of statutory construction. We agree. “In construing a statute we do not consider the motives or under-
The foregoing language in Bouquet, in our view, refers to the admissibility of the evidence rather than its weight, as suggested by the concurring opinion.4 In Bouquet the legislator‘s letter was determined to be a proper subject of consideration because it alluded to arguments the legislator had presented in arguing for passage of the bill and because it had been printed on motion of the Legislature as a “letter of legislative intent.” (In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 590-591.) This conclusion was followed by a discussion of the weight to be accorded the letter. (Ibid.) The latter discussion would have been unnecessary if the previous discussion regarding the propriety of considering such evidence had been referring to the weight to be accorded it rather than its admissibility.
There has been confusion in recent years regarding the propriety of considering statements and letters by individual legislators on the question of legislative intent. Indeed, the concurring opinion is correct in noting that recent opinions of this court have referred to such evidence without mention of the limitations on its use. In none of these opinions, however, was the subject of the propriety of the practice discussed or addressed. Such a departure from past rules of statutory construction, we believe, should be effected only after full discussion and exposure of the issue.
There are sound reasons underlying the rule against admitting statements of personal belief or intent by individual legislators on the issue of legislative intent. In addition to the lack of assurance that anyone shared the legislator‘s view, as noted in Bouquet, there is the concern that letters such as those sent to the Governor on the question of signing the bill may never have been exposed to public view so that those with differing opinions as to the bill‘s meaning and scope had an opportunity to present their views also. To consider or to allow the admission of such evidence in the face of its admitted irrelevance (see conc. opn., p. 706) seems senseless. Accordingly, we believe that the wiser course is to adhere to the rules set forth in In re Marriage of Bouquet regarding the admissibility of evidence of statements by individual legislators on legislative intent.
The statement in the present case does not allude to “argument that he had presented in securing the passage of the amendment.” (Id., 16 Cal.3d at p. 590.) Nor does it reiterate the discussion and events which transpired in the Legislature. The statement reveals only the author‘s personal opinion and understanding and accordingly, is not a proper subject for consideration in determining the Legislature‘s intent in amending
Even if we were to consider Senator Rodda‘s statement, it provides little guidance. Its reference to the asserted relationship of part-time teaching to school income provides no basis for concluding that “time actually served” means only classroom hours.
As previously mentioned, the issue of reclassification was resolved by our decision in Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist., supra, 24 Cal.3d 369. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment for further proceedings to permit the trial court to determine which part-timers, if any, are entitled to reclassification and to determine the amount of pro rata back pay to be awarded.
The judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each side shall bear its own costs on these appeals.
NEWMAN, J., Concurring.—The majority conclude that the statement submitted by Senator Rodda to the Governor is “not a proper subject for consideration in determining the Legislature‘s intent...” (ante, p. 701).
To decide that collateral issue we do not, of course, rely on the Evidence Code or the common law of evidence. Instead we look to precedents that concern statutes and the use of extrinsic aids when courts construe statutes. Also, we consider federal as well as state precedents because California courts often interpret federal as well as state laws.1
Regarding legislators’ comments, the judicial opinions of earlier decades sometimes referred to admissibility rules. Illustrative is this dictum from Bagg v. Wickizer (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 753, 757 [50 P.2d 1047]: “Where no ambiguity exists, the intention of the lawmakers must be determined by the language of the statute. In Ex parte Goodrich [1911], 160 Cal. 410 [117 Pac. 451, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 56], it is said: ‘...[I]t still remains true that even legislative debates are not appropriate
No longer do those ideas frame our approach to interpretive issues. No longer do judges risk distorting their analyses of statutes by insulating themselves from extrinsic aids. No longer does the discredited plain meaning rule, or any comparable admissibility rule, command that courts shield themselves from what legislators may have said relevantly.
“It would be anomalous to close our minds to persuasive evidence of intention on the ground that reasonable men could not differ as to the meaning of the words. Legislative materials may be without probative value, or contradictory, or ambiguous, it is true, and in such cases [they] will not be permitted to control the customary meaning of words or overcome rules of syntax or construction found by experience to be workable; they can scarcely be deemed to be incompetent or irrelevant. ... The meaning to be ascribed to an Act ... can only be derived from the considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction.” (United States v. Dickerson (1940) 310 U.S. 554, 562 [84 L.Ed. 1356, 1362, 60 S.Ct. 1034]; italics added. See also comments of Frankfurter, J. in United States v. Monia (1943) 317 U.S. 424, 431 [87 L.Ed. 376, 381-382, 63 S.Ct. 409], Traynor, J. in People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182, Linde, J. in Chapman Bros., etc. v. Miles-Hiatt Inv., Inc. (1978) 282 Ore. 643 [580 P.2d 540, 542, fn. 2].)
The problems that continue to perplex us should not be treated as problems of admissibility. They are problems of weight, problems of persuasiveness. Courts usually are not persuaded, for example, by the testimony or affidavit or other statement of a legislator when it appears to have been articulated for use in a pending lawsuit.
Why post-dispute statements often lack weight and are not persuasive was discussed in Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 311, fn. 8 [118 Cal.Rptr. 473, 530 P.2d 161], as follows: “[I]t seems clear that the proferred declaration ... can be given little credence. There is absolutely no showing that the present ‘interpretive’ declaration was before the rulemaking body of the agency when section 3316 was promulgated. [¶] Moreover, the facts of the instant case illustrate the great potential for abuse that would arise if the proferred declaration were given significant weight. The declaration at issue was prepared by an employee of one of the parties to this litigation subsequent to the filing of judicial proceedings. The self-interest inherent in such a process removes from the declaration the appearance of impartiality necessary to justify any reliance by the court.”
See too Bauman v. Islay Investments (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 752, 756 [106 Cal.Rptr. 889]: “Despite the declaration of State Assemblyman Brown, we must determine for ourselves, on the basis of ordinary standards of construction, whether the ‘nonrefundable’ provision hereinafter discussed is valid in this case. While official committee reports can be utilized to aid in statutory interpretation, the views of individual legislators are of little help in determining the intent of the Legislature as a whole [citing Friends of Mammoth, infra].”
(The Bauman court‘s fn. 4, 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 756, reads: “Respondents have attached to their brief filed in this court a declaration by Assemblyman Willie Brown, Jr., one of the coauthors of the bill which resulted in the enactment of section 1951. We set forth that declaration in Appendix ‘C’ to this opinion.” Cf. Boie-Hansen v. Sisters of Charity (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 845, 848 [314 P.2d 189] (city councilman) and Larcher v. Wanless (1976) 18 Cal.3d 646, 654, fn. 10 [135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 557 P.2d 507] (“legislative affidavits do not address [the] crucial issue, except in ... an implication refuted by the statute itself“). Note, though, the conclusion implied in Rosenthal v. Cory (1977) 69 Cal.
WELL-SETTLED PRINCIPLES?
Citing In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 589-590, the majority here endorse the contention that “use of Senator Rodda‘s statement would violate well-settled principles of statutory construction.” (Ante, p. 699.) Also cited, for the proposition that “[a] legislator‘s statement is entitled to consideration, however, when it is a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed amendments rather than merely an expression of personal opinion,” are Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 603, and the dissenting opinion in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 284. (Cf. Smith, Legislative intent: In search of the Holy Grail (1978) 53 State Bar J. 294, 298.) Further, “[t]he statement of an individual legislator has also been accepted when it gave some indication of arguments made to the Legislature and was printed upon motion of the Legislature as a ‘letter of legislative intent.’ (In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d, at pp. 590-591.)” (Ante, p. 700.)
My colleagues therefore disapprove Campbell v. Board of Dental Examiners (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 283 and, implicitly, the majority opinion in Friends of Mammoth, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pages 257-258. Surprisingly, innumerable other precedents have been ignored. One is Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 369. Here the court‘s opinion states (ante, p. 697): “Present arguments ... urging reexamination of [Peralta] are essentially the same as those ably articulated in the dissent ..., and we are not persuaded to overrule that case.” Yet, in effect, the conclusion in Peralta that “a letter dated June 26,
Also, the majority cast doubt on the propriety of justices’ having used legislators’ comments in these recent opinions: Lugosi v. Universal Pictures (1979) 25 Cal.3d 813, 842, footnote 23 [160 Cal.Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425] (Bird, C. J.; Vasconcellos letter to Governor); In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 534 [159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549] (Clark, J.; letter from Sen. Sieroty); California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 847 [157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836] (Richardson, J.; Governor‘s reliance on PUC legal staff opinion); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880, 887, footnote 5 [153 Cal.Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 329] (Mosk, J.; no intimation that letters to Governor are inadmissible); People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 520, footnote 4 [156 Cal.Rptr. 450] (Clark, J.; ACLU letter to Governor; cf. p. 543, fn. 3: Newman, J. responds; p. 545: Newman, J. cites A.G. letter to Governor); In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 447, footnote 6 [143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41] (Bird, C. J.; Willson letter to Governor); People v. Peters (1978) 21 Cal.3d 749, 762 [147 Cal.Rptr. 646, 581 P.2d 651] (dis. opn. of Bird, C. J.; Sen. Song letter to Governor).
Against that array of recent opinions2 and against Friends of Mammoth and Peralta, supra, the majority rely on Rich v. State Board of Optometry, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d 591 at page 603 and In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pages 589-590. In Bouquet this court did not, I submit, rule that Assemblyman Hayes‘s “personal views” were inadmissible. They were characterized instead as “irrelevant” (id., p. 589; and see also p. 590: “The understandings of Assemblyman Hayes ... do not per se expose the Legislature‘s intent.“).
What about the cases that were cited in Bouquet? In re Lavine (1935) 2 Cal.2d 324 [41 P.2d 161, 42 P.2d 311] was decided the same
California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 213 [187 P.2d 702], cited in Bouquet, 16 Cal.3d at page 589, does not discuss individual legislators’ statements. Sato v. Hall (1923) 191 Cal. 510 [217 P. 520] concerns “a speech in Congress” and “discussions preceding the enactment of the [federal] act,” which indisputably are admissible.
The Bouquet opinion mentions neither Friends of Mammoth, supra, 8 Cal.3d 247, 257, which implies that legislators’ statements are admissible whether or not they are “persuasive,” nor Ballard v. Anderson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 873, 881 [95 Cal.Rptr. 1, 484 P.2d 1345, 42 A.L.R.3d 1392] (accord); and see Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841, 846 [48 Cal.Rptr. 609, 409 P.2d 689]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety, supra, 13 Cal.3d 303, 311, footnote 8.
Also ignored were Campbell v. Board of Dental Examiners (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 283, 285 (which, as noted above, the majority here now disapprove) and Tillie Lewis Foods Inc. v. City of Pittsburg (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 983, 1006.
Epstein v. Resor (N.D.Cal. 1969) 296 F.Supp. 214, 216, cited on Bouquet‘s page 589, 16 Cal.3d, does not correctly summarize the federal precedents. Note too that “the affidavit [was] prepared and submitted by the Honorable John E. Moss solely for purposes of this lawsuit. ...”
“The declaration is substantively and procedurally inacceptable. The statement of an individual legislator as to his intention, motive or opinion regarding a particular piece of legislation is inadmissible. (In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 327; Rich v. State Board of Optometry, 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 603.) Mr. Mills’ declaration was neither offered nor received as evidence in the trial court. Its contents were ineligible for judicial notice. (See
Ignored in the Bragg case, apparently, was this second paragraph of the Law Revision Commission‘s comment on
So, is it true that “well-settled principles” support the rule the majority now propound? I think not. This court and Courts of Appeal, for at least 10 years and with considerable consistency,3 have not held extrinsic aids inadmissible and, rather, have observed a “Learned Hand rule” described as follows: “... Judge Hand‘s opinions, while they make full use of legislative guides, nevertheless subordinate them, like the words of an act, to the principal task of deriving the specific intent of Congress from a full and sympathetic understanding of its purpose. [Fn. omitted.] [¶] Thus subordinated, the legislative history may reliably explain a choice of words which on their face seem meaningless or inconsistent with the general purpose. It may reveal, for example, a deliberate truncation of the purpose, in which event the words must govern; or it may show that the choice of words resulted from some decision quite unrelated to the point at hand and so permit taking otherwise objectionable liberties with the normal meaning of the words.” (Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes (1947) 60 Harv.L.Rev. 370, 381-382. See also 2A Sands, Sutherland‘s Statutes and Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973) p. 217: “Insofar as legislative intention is taken as the standard of decision on a question of statutory construction, [fn. omitted] it can reasonably be argued that any legislator‘s remarks which would throw light on the meaning of those words should be admitted, regardless of whether they are statements as to their meaning or statements as to the problems before the legislature. Although generally entitled to little probative weight, the value of such remarks could be left to depend upon how well informed their author appeared to be and how well he seemed to represent the views of his colleagues.” Cf. Wasby, Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation: A Caveat (1963) 12 J. Pub. L. 262; Newman, A Legal Look at Congress and the State Legislatures, in Legal Institutions Today and Tomorrow (Paulsen edit. 1959) pp. 75-76 (“The art of deliberate ambiguity” and “The manufacture of legislative intent“).)
I concur in the reversal of the judgment here, and I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that Senator Rodda‘s statement “provides little guidance” (ante, p. 701).
BIRD, C. J.—I respectfully dissent.
Only three short months ago this court bottomed its interpretation of a section of the California Constitution on the written declaration of 1 member of an 80-member commission some 14 years after the event! (See Stanton v. Panish (1980) 28 Cal.3d 107 [167 Cal.Rptr. 584, 615 P.2d 1372].) Today, this court holds that a declaration by the author of legislation sent to the Governor, which outlines the intent of the legislation and urges the Governor to sign it, is “not a proper subject for consideration in determining the Legislature‘s intent. ...” (Maj. opn., at p. 710.) Ah, “consistency thou art a jewel.”
I agree with my colleague, Justice Newman, that the rule promulgated today will only “lead us to the kinds of vagaries and absurdities that the discredited rule helped effect.” (Conc. opn., above.)
The issue before the court is the proper method of computing the retroactive compensation due instructors ordered reclassified and reemployed as permanent employees.
As the unanimous opinion of Justice Howard Wiener of the Court of Appeal recognized, “[t]he statute, in furnishing the answer to the method of compensating part-time employees also creates the problem for the phrase ‘time actually served’ is wonderfully ambiguous.” As a re-
The Court of Appeal opinion goes on to point out that “[t]he income of the community college system is based on a set sum of dollars per pupil in average daily attendance (
This court‘s holding is contrary to the Legislature‘s intent in amending the statute. The majority opinion includes in the “time actually served” concept, the hours spent in counseling, in supervising student activities, etc. These are included because they are duties full-time teachers must fulfill. However, the Legislature specifically amended the statute to eliminate “time required” and replace it with a formula more reflective of revenue-generating hours worked.
The district does not claim that the phrase, “time actually served,” can be interpreted as anything other than classroom time for part-time teachers. The time these teachers spend counseling their students, explaining grades, reviewing papers or other incidental activities tied to their teaching functions has never been included by the district. Yet, when the court has the task of defining the very same term as applied to full-time teachers, it arrives at a totally different meaning for no apparent reason.
The majority opinion recognizes that “time actually served” must mean the same thing for part-time and full-time teachers. Thus, the majority requires the district to consider the “total amount of time spent by part and full-time teachers in connection with their teaching.” (Ante, at p. 702.) It is unclear, however, what is included for part-timers.
The district asserts that part-time teachers do not have any duties outside the classroom. When a part-time teacher spends time reviewing an examination or paper with a student after class, is that time to be considered by the district or not? The majority opinion implies that it is. However, this ignores the fact that the district may have contracted only for the part-time teacher‘s class time. If the term “time actually served” is to fairly reflect (1) the hours spent in connection with teaching responsibilities for both part- and full-time teachers, and (2) the revenue-generating proportion intended by the Legislature, the only logical interpretation of the term is limited to classroom responsibilities.1
Notes
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Education Code of 1959, as it read just before its recodification effective April 30, 1977.
“Such employment may be pursuant to contract fixing a salary for the entire semester or quarter.
“No person shall be so employed by any one district for more than two semesters or quarters within any period of three consecutive years.
“Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, any person who is employed to teach adult or community college classes for not more than 60 percent of the hours per week considered a full-time assignment for permanent employees having comparable duties shall be classified as a temporary employee, and shall not become a probationary employee under the provisions of
The district and several amici suggest that the Court of Appeal‘s resolution of this issue would necessarily affect the full-time teacher‘s contract which includes nonclassroom hours. The sole issue before the court is how to calculate the part-time teacher‘s compensation under
Additionally, the court‘s holding today will not affect the application of
See too, e.g., Stewart v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 172, 182-183 [143 Cal.Rptr. 641]; Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 150, 155 [141 Cal.Rptr. 474]; hearing denied December 15, 1977.
The majority opinion reads, “see also Stanton v. Panish (1980) 28 Cal.3d 107, 114...” (ante, p. 700). By no means, I submit, does Stanton stand for the proposition that Chairman Bruce Sumner‘s declaration was “considered [only] insofar as it chronicled events leading to [the] proposed amendment...” (ibid.). The per curiam opinion cites both Friends of Mammoth, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pages 257-258 and Tillie Lewis Foods, infra, 52 Cal.App.3d at pages 1006-1007. (Cf. post, dis. opn. at p. 710.)