Lаte in April of this year California Packing Corporation (C.P.C.) brought a complaint before the Hawaii Employment Relations Board (H.E.R.B.) аlleging that International Longshoremen’s & Ware-housemen’s Union Local 142 (I.L.W.U.) was guilty of unfair labor practices in that the union caused a strike in violation of the “no strike pledge” of the collective bargaining agreement in force between those parties.
The H.E.R.B. conducted an investigation and, finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that the union had caused a strike in violation of its agreement with C.P.C. and in violation of Hawaii law pertaining to strikes, the H.E. R.B. petitioned the First Circuit Court of the State of Hawaii for а temporary restraining order and an order to show cause why an injunction should not be granted against the striking union. The Hawaii court grantеd a temporary restraining order and issued an order to show cause. Thereupon the union purported to remove the H.E.R.B.’s action to this Court, and in a separate action purported to remove to this Court C.P.C.’s complaint before the H.E.R.B. Having complеted the formalities of the removal process, the union then moved to dismiss both actions on the ground that this Court does not have jurisdictiоn to grant the relief sought by C.P.C. and the H.E. R.B.
C.P.C. and the H.EiR.B. move to remand, contending that the actions were improvidently removed, and that in any evеnt, this Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed.
This Court observes at the outset that the authorities uniformly emphasize that doubts must be resolved аgainst removal, and that the burden is on the party attempting removal to justify the grounds for it.
It is also very clear that the attempt to remоve C.P.C.’s action before the H.E.R.B. is wide of the mark. The entire series of code sections dealing with removal refer only to removal from state courts, and not to removal from administrative bodies. 28 U.S.C. § 1441, entitled
*599 “Actions Removable Generally,” refers only to “ * * * any civil aсtion brought in a State court * * ” 28 U.S.C. § 1446, entitled “Procedure for Removal,” provides:
“(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution from a State court * * *.”
28 U.S.C. § 1447 is replete with references to removal from a State court, аnd plainly does not contemplate procedures involving administrative bodies.
One district court case, Tool & Die Makers, etc. Association of Machinists v. General Electric Company X-Ray Department, (E.D.Wis.1959)
With regard to the removal of the H.E.R.B.’s Circuit Court action, although there is some division of authority, the great majority of the cases have decided, and this Court concurs, that to permit removal purely for the purpose of dismissing the aсtion so removed, is an exercise in futility. Further, a cause can be removed only if the district court would have had original jurisdiction of the matter, and it is abundantly clear that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the district courts of their jurisdiction over labor litigation in which an mjunc tion is sought.
The union’s position here is that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.Code § 185) gives this Court jurisdiction of the “subject matter” of thе labor dispute, but that the Norris-LaGuardia Act requires its dismissal. But as Judge Kalodner, speaking for the majority, said in American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, еtc. (3 Cir. 1964)
“To say then that a District Court has subject matter jurisdiction of a cause of action, so as to authorize it to take cognizance of it under the provisions of the Removal Statute, when it does not in the first place have jurisdiction to entertain and decide it upon its merits, is to give sanction to an exercise in futility.”
In the litigation involving Richman Brothers Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
*600
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,
“ * * * that § 301 was not intended to have any such partially repealing effeсt upon such a long-standing, carefully thought out and highly significant part of this country’s labor legislation as the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was deliberately phrased in such a way that the district courts were to be deprived of jurisdiction in cases of this type. Congress bеlieved that the district courts had previously managed to evade congressional policies through various feats of judicial rеasoning, and therefore the Congress took away completely the power of the district courts to entertain such litigation аt all.
See 1A Moore’s Federal Practice 1,004-1,005 Second Edition, § 0.167(7):
“The majority view, which we believe is sound, is that the federal district court must rеmand suits requesting injunctive relief that is beyond the federal court’s original jurisdiction, even when the action couples a prayer for damages, and even when the federal court believes that the state court lacks jurisdiction.”
Although time has not permitted this Court to make an exhaustive search of the authorities on this point, it has examined the following decisions which are illustrative, and which are in accord with the action taken here: Associated Telephone Co. v. Communication Workers of America, (S.D.Cal.1953)
Accordingly, the motion of the H.E. R.B. for remand is also hereby granted.