75 Cal. App. 2d 735 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1946
This case is similar to California Employment Stabilization Commission v. Wirta, this day decided {post, p. 739), and it is conceded by appellant that it “presents a question of law virtually identical” with that presented therein. The action was instituted under the provisions of sections 37, 38 and 44 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act [Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 8780d] for the collection of contributions for the period beginning April 1,1937, and ending March 31, 1939. The trial court found that during the period alleged Gusmeroli entered into contracts with certain persons as independent contractors for the manufacture of redwood products; that he was not an employer and that he did not make payments of wages with respect to employments subject to the Unemployment Insurance Act; that whatever moneys he paid as set forth in the complaint were paid by him to various persons who performed independent contracts and were independent contractors and were not his employees. Judgment was rendered for defendant and after denial of a motion for new trial this appeal was taken.
The evidence shows that Gusmeroli, who was in the business of selling redwood split products and maintained a yard at Redway, Humboldt County, owned some 320 acres of redwood timber. It was his custom to give to men known as “tie-makers” what is referred to as a “lay-out” consisting of a strip of timber containing from, 15 to 30 trees. These trees the tie-makers felled and made therefrom posts, ties, shakes, etc., which, if up to standard, were thereafter bought by Gusmeroli. The lay-outs would sometimes be assigned to one man and sometimes to two men. The only requirement of a man operating a lay-out was that the products he made must be up to the standards set in the split products industry or Gusmeroli would not buy them. No instructions were ever given by respondent as to how the standing timber should be felled. No tie-maker was required to work any specified time. He furnished his own tools and his transportation from his place of residence to the place where his work was done. He might take someone else to work with him
The only distinction between the facts in this case and those in the Wirta ease is that the evidence in this case does not show whether or not the tie-makers operating in Gusmeroli’s timber purchased the trees from which they made their products or whether, if Gusmeroli ever refused to take such products, they were free to sell them to others. There is no evidence that any were so sold, but Gusmeroli stated that when men were given lay-outs “the lay-out was theirs”; that all he wanted was the finished products. He also indicated that he considered the products as belonging to the tie-makers for he stated that he “bought” the finished products from them.
In Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employment Com., 28 Cal.2d 33, 43 [168 P.2d 686], the court stated the factors which distinguish an employee from an independent contractor. Of these the most important factor—the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the results desired—-is entirely lacking here. Gusmeroli testified in this connection ‘ ‘ I had good men working for me, they knew more about it than I did.” Also lacking is any evidence of the right to discharge at will without cause. It appears from the evidence in this ease, and that in the Wirta case, that the business of tie-making, or the making of split products, is a distinct occupation and a skilled one, and that in the locality the work is usually done by such specialists without supervision. Here also the tools necessary for the making of such split products were furnished by the operators, payment was not made by the time, and the parties apparently did not consider that they had created the relationship of employer-employee.
As was said in the Empire Star Mines, case, this evidence tends to prove that the tie-makers were carrying on their activities at their own risk, in their own way, for their own profit, and places the trial court’s findings beyond the reach of an appellate court.
The judgment is affirmed.
Peek, J., and Thompson, J., concurred.