{1} California Casualty Company (“insurance company”) filed this declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that it was not liable to Defendants under the uninsured/underinsured provisions of its automobile insurance policy. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in the policy, Defendants moved to have the case sent to arbitration, and the court granted the motion. Insurance company appeals, arguing that the language of the arbitration clause does not allow for arbitration of coverage issues. Insurance company contends that arbitration is available only for issues of liability and damages, and that coverage issues present questions of law that can be determined only by a court. Both sides rely heavily on Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Valdez,
BACKGROUND
{2} Erik Sanchez was murdered when he was thrown off the Taos Gorge bridge during the course of a car theft. The crime began when two men, Luis Acosta, the driver, and David Sandoval, the passenger, tricked Sanchez into pulling over and stopping his car. Sandoval then fоrced Sanchez at gunpoint to relinquish control of his car, and Sandoval
{3} The personal representative of Sanchez’s estate and Sanchez’s stepfather, Robert Price, (hereafter “Defendants”) began pursuing a claim against insurance company under the uninsured/underinsured provisions of Price’s automobile insurance policy with insurance company. Defendants based their claim on a theory that Sanchez’s death arose out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of Acosta’s vehicle, which was uninsured, and Sanchez’s vehicle, which was driven or controlled by Sandoval, an uninsured and unauthorized driver, during the course of the crime.
{4} Insurance company filed this declaratory judgment action against Defendants seeking to establish that it is not hable under the policy. In response, Defendants moved to compel arbitration, relying on policy language allowing either party to select arbitration “[i]f an insured and we do not agree ... [wjhether thаt person is legally entitled to recover damages ... or [as] to the amount of damages____” Insurance company rejected arbitration, arguing that the core dispute required the trial court to determine, in the first instance, whether there was coverage— a question of law — before Defendants had any right to rely on the arbitration clause in the policy. The insurance company’s position relied on Valdez.
{5} The trial court disagreed with insurance company. It read Valdez to require it to analyze the specific language of the policy to determine the scope of the arbitration clause. The court did so, and concluded that the phrase “legally entitled to recover damages” was broad enough to include questions of coverage. The court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration from which insurance company appeals. See Britt v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Cо.,
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
{6} The scope of the arbitration clause is a question of law which we review de novo. Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
Scope of the Arbitration Provision
{7} The arbitration clause аllows either party to select arbitration “[i]f an insured and we do not agree ... [wjhether that person is legally entitled to recover damages ... or [as] to the amount of damages____” If the language “legally entitled to recover” includes coverage issues, Defendants have a right to compel arbitrаtion. If it does not, then insurance company is correct that the arbitration clause does not apply to the issues raised in this action for declaratory judgment.
{8} Insurance company’s complaint for declaratory judgment provides numerous reasons why it contends that the policy does not сover damages caused by the actions of Sandoval and Acosta. Among other things, it argues that Sanchez’s death was not an “accident”; that the criminal conduct was an independent, intervening cause of the death; that Sanchez did not reside with the owner of the policy and was not listed a driver on thе policy; that Sanchez’s death did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured vehicle; and that Defendants did not give prompt notice of the accident.
{9} The insurer characterizes these as coverage issues, and therefore as questions of law that must be decided by a court and not by arbitrators. While some of these claims may be properly characterized as questions of law, others appear to involve factual issues. However, for purposes of this opinion, it is unnecessary to determine whether they
The Trial Court’s Duty Under Valdez
{10} Insurance company relies on Valdez for its proposition that coverage issues should not be decided in arbitration. See Valdez,
We do not hold that arbitration is unavailable to parties seeking to resolve a disputed question of law. But where a question of law is in dispute, and where one of the parties to an arbitration agreement resists arbitration and seeks a determination of that legal question by the court, then that party must be heard — as to that issue — by the court.
Id. at 766,
{11} In reviewing Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, the trial court read Valdez differently from insurance company. The court interpreted Valdez to require it to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the arbitration clause applies to coverage issues. The court noted that the problem in Valdez was that the district court did not engage in that threshold analysis, and simply sent the case to arbitration without determining whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate cоverage issues. Here, in contrast, the court did make a threshold analysis, and concluded that by using the broad language “legally entitled to recover,” the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes over coverage.
{12} We agree with the trial court’s reading of Valdez. That opinion does not hold that coverage issues, or legal issues, may not be arbitrated. Id. (“We do not hold that arbitration is unavailable to parties seeking to resolve a disputed question of law.”). Valdez states that the “trial court may not abdicate its jurisdiction [over a declaratory judgment] without deciding whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the issues raised in the complaint.” Id. Valdez further provides: “Should the trial court find that the parties agreed to arbitrate the issues raised in the complaint, the court may then of course still require the parties to submit to arbitration as they have contracted.” Id. at 767,
{13} Here, the trial court did exactly what Valdez said it should do. The court interpreted the arbitration clause, something the trial сourt in Valdez did not do, and concluded that the language of the arbitration clause was broad enough to include issues of coverage. The court then ruled that the parties had agreed to arbitrate the very issues insurance company raises in its complaint for declaratory judgment. Consequently, Valdez is grounds for affirming, not reversing, the actions of the court below.
{14} In addition to Valdez, insurance company relies on Washington state case law holding that coverage issues are not subject to arbitration. See Price v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
The Arbitration Clause
{16} Insurance company next argues that the trial court misinterpreted the arbitration clause when it determined that the language “legally entitled to recover” includes coverage issues. Insurance company asserts that this same languаge has already been determined to include only issues of liability and damages, and not coverage. See Wood v. Millers Nat’l Ins. Co.,
{17} Insurance company also points out that the language from the arbitration clause in this case is identical to that considered in Valdez, and it argues that we must reach the same result as Valdez. Again, we are not persuaded. The Supreme Court in Valdez never interpreted the language “legally entitled to recover” in the arbitration clause. To the contrary, the Court remanded with instructions for the district court tо make that determination and decide whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate coverage issues. In the case before us, of course, the trial court has already made that determination below.
{18} In our view, the trial court correctly construed the arbitration clause to include coverage issues. The clause is broadly framed. It does not discuss or distinguish between “liability” and “coverage.” It contains no specific limitations on the types of issues that cannot be arbitrated. At best, its plain meaning establishes that whether a person can recover at all is arbitrable. At worst, it is ambiguous, because it is susceptible of different meanings. See Rummel,
{19} Insurance company next argues that because arbitration greatly restricts its right to appeal any error allegedly occurring during arbitration, any doubt should be resolved in fаvor of its right to have the legal question of coverage determined in court. See Valdez,
{20} However, we disagree that limited judicial review should tip the balance in the insurer’s favor. An insurance contract is an adhesion contract, in which the insured has no bargaining power. See Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
{21} Policy considerations favor the insured. Arbitration is designed to be a speedy and relatively inexpensive process. Jaycox v. Ekeson,
{22} We will not impose the additional obstacles urged by insurance company on the insured without clearer policy language stating that coverage issues are not subject to arbitration. Insurance company drafted the broad language in the arbitration clause, and any ambiguity is construed against it. See Rummel,
CONCLUSION
{23} We affirm the order of the district court compelling arbitration.
{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.