Opinion
Appellant California Casualty Indemnity Exchange brought this action against its insured, Irene P. Steven, and her son, David, praying for a declaratory judgment determining that uninsured motorist coverage in the automobile liability policy issued to Mrs. Steven had been waived as to David. The appeal is from a judgment determining that there was no such waiver.
*306 The facts are not in dispute. On October 16, 1966, California Casualty issued an automobile liability policy to Mrs. Steven. The policy was to run for a period of one year, and provided for uninsured motorist covеrage 1 of up to $10,000 per person, with a maximum of $20,000 per accident. On November 1, Mrs. Steven consented to the following endorsement of her policy:
“Exclusion of Named Driver.
“Effective on and aftеr 10-16-66 it is hereby understood and agreed that the insurance afforded by this policy shall not aрply with respect to any claim arising from accidents which occur while any automоbile or highway vehicle is operated by, or entrusted to the care, custody and control of David Henry — son ...”
This was apparently done because David’s driving record would otherwise have resulted in appellant’s refusal to insure Mrs. Steven.
On January 22, 1967, David suffered injuries when hе was struck by an uninsured vehicle. At that time, David was operating a vehicle covered by an unrelated insurance policy which specifically excluded uninsured motorist coverage. David will be entitled to compensation, under his mother’s policy, unless the endorsement of November 1 is effective as to the uninsured motorist coverage.
Appellant argues that its intent, and that of Mrs. Steven, as evidenced by the endorsement, was that the policy was to afford no coverage of any sort for accidents occurring while David was driving. Accordingly, appellant urges that the endorsement should be construed acсording to its plain meaning. Appellant cites authorities, dealing with the interpretation of written instruments, to the effect that the “language used in an insurance contract must be given its рlain and ordinary meaning, and when it is unambiguous it must be given effect.”
(Travelers Indem. Co.
v.
Kowalski
(1965)
The Legislature has declared it to be the public policy of this state that no automobile liability insurance poliсy shall fail to include uninsured motorist coverage unless the insurer and the named insured “by agreement in writing, delete the provision covering damage caused by an uninsured motor vehiclе.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (a).) Because the pro
*307
vision of such coverage is a matter of public policy, a claim of waiver thereof is not to be determined simply by referencе to the rules which courts otherwise apply to determine the intent of contracting parties. Deletion of the coverage required by the statute can be effectеd only by an express “agreement in writing, deleting] the provision covering damage causеd by an uninsured motor vehicle.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (a).) A general exclusion of coverage for all drivers under age 25 has been held not to be an effective waiver of uninsured motorist cоverage
(Hendricks
v.
Meritplan Ins. Co.
(1962)
The present case is also governed by the reasoning of the Supremе Court in
Mission Ins. Co.
v.
Brown
(1965)
The judgment is affirmed.
Devine, P. J., and Rattigan, J., concurred.
Notes
“Uninsured Motorists (Damages for Bodily Injury): To pay all sums which the insured or his legal reprеsentative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or оperator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called ‘bodily injury,’ sustained by the insured, caused by the accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured highway vehicle; . . .”