Calhoun v. HargroveCalhoun v. Hargrove
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- DeMoss
Appellant, Edward James Calhoun, a Texas state prison inmate, filed suit
pro se
under
BACKGROUND
On October 28, 1999, Appellant Edward James Calhoun, Jr., Texas state prisoner, filed a
Calhoun alleged that on numerous occasions, Hargrove called him and his coworker, inmate Ronald Paul Williams, into his office and ordered them to pick up sunflower seeds and the shells that he had spit on the floor. Then, before they could leave the room, Hargrove would spit another handful of seeds on the floor and would order them to pick them up. Calhoun alleged that despite his reminding Hargrove of his work restrictions, Har-grove routinely made him work 10, 12, and 14-hour days. Calhoun alleged that if Hargrove was not around, Lieutenant Atkins would allow Mm to return to his cell after he completed his tasks. However, if Hargrove was there, Atkins would send him to Hargrove, who would make him work more. Calhoun alleged that Atkins knew that Hargrove was working him beyond his physical abilities and medical restrictions but failed to intervene or report the violations.
Calhoun alleged that one day after he and Williams had worked for 10 hours, Hargrove allowed them to have lunch only after they got on their knees and begged for it. Calhoun complained that Atkins did not report this incident. He alleged that he spent 12 hours stripping and waring the floors in June 1999, because Hargrove refused to call out the inmate who usually helped with the floors. Calhoun asserted that after he reported the abuses, someone informed Hargrove that he had done so. Consequently, when he returned to work, Hargrove called him into his office and threatened to make Ms life miserable. Calhoun alleged that on June 24, 1999, Hargrove then went into his porter’s supply closet and pulled all the towels and cleaning rags from the shelves and threw them on the floor. Calhoun refolded the towels and rags, and Hargrove again threw them onto the floor. Calhoun refolded them again and Hargrove again threw them onto the floor. When Calhoun
Calhoun then filed the present suit seeking injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. The Appellees filed an answer, and all of the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The Appellees then filed a motion for summary judgment, but because the motion for summary judgment did not contain any eviden-tiary support, such as affidavits or prison records, the magistrate judge construed it as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to
On August 8, 2001, Calhoun filed a motion for new trial and a notice of appeal. Relying on Calhoun’s assertion in his motion for new trial that he was never served with the motion for summary judgment and on the defendants’ failure to file a response, the magistrate judge granted Calhoun’s motion and vacated its memorandum opinion and judgment. The Ap-pellees filed a motion for reconsideration and motion to strike pleadings, alleging that they were not served with the motion for new trial. Attached to their motion were documents establishing that Calhoun was served with their motion for summary judgment. On September 21, 2001, the magistrate judge granted the defendants’ motion and (1) vacated its order granting Calhoun’s motion for new trial, (2) reinstated its memorandum opinion and judgment, and (3) ordered Calhoun to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for making a false representation to the court. Subsequently, on September 27, 2001, Calhoun filed a response to the defendants’ motion for reconsideration and to strike pleadings alleging,
inter alia,
that he did not receive a copy of their motion for summary judgment. On October 2, 2001, Calhoun filed a response to the court’s order reinstating its judgment. On October 30, 2001, the magistrate judge entered an order construing Calhoun’s response to its order as a motion for a new trial pursuant to
DISCUSSION
This Court reviews
de novo
a district court’s granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Blackburn v. City of Marshall,
42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir.1995). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
A claim for relief under
Calhoun essentially alleges that he was verbally abused, that he was once forced to beg for a meal (which he eventually received), and that he was forced to work beyond the medical limitations set for him causing him to have dangerously elevated blood pressure. Neither the verbal abuse, nor the begging for the meal allege a physical injury to Calhoun and, though troubling, do not overcome
Whether Calhoun’s claim that he was forced to work beyond his medical limitations which, in turn, led to his unusually high blood pressure alleges a physical injury is less clear. This inquiry is also of importance in analyzing Calhoun’s Eighth Amendment claims. The Supreme Court has held that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). “[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970. In other words, the prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind, which is one of “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. To find that an official is deliberately indifferent, it must be proven that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
Though the magistrate judge analyzed Calhoun’s claim as an excessive force claim and found the injury to be
de mini-mus
and not actionable, we believe that Calhoun’s complaint, at the very least, also alleges deliberate indifference on the part of Hargrove. Calhoun alleged that he had a medical condition, had a set limit of four hours of maximum work time, and that Hargrove knew of this limit and his medical condition but made him work in excess of these time limits. Calhoun also alleged that this ultimately led to his elevated blood pressure. Therefore, Calhoun has met the requirements needed to overcome
Calhoun also makes claims under the Fourteenth Amendment claiming that the Appellees denied him due process by failing to adhere to his medical and work restrictions. This is really a restatement of his Eighth Amendment claim, however, and claims that are covered by such specific constitutional provisions must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision and not under the rubric of substantive due process. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). As for Calhoun’s claims against officer Atkins, except for a conclusional statement in his reply brief, Calhoun has not re-urged his argument that Atkins is liable for his failure to intervene or report Hargrove’s actions, and as such, those claims are waived. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993) (holding claims raised for first time in reply brief to be waived).
CONCLUSION
The level of abuse alleged by Calhoun, which, if true, can only be described as malicious hazing on the part of Hargrove, is troubling. It is clear that Calhoun has at least alleged a deprivation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because he has alleged that Hargrove knew of his physical and medical limitations and forced him to work in excess of those limits, thus endangering Calhoun’s fife. However, Calhoun’s suit is not actionable unless there exists a showing of physical injury.
REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.
Notes
. Though the exact procedural history of this case is unorthodox, the only issue of concern to this panel is whether the original complaint should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim.