101 Ky. 412 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1897
belivered ttie opinion of the court.
This action was brought in the Warren Circuit Court by the appellee, Cooke, on a policy of fire insurance.
In his petition is alleged the issual of the policy, and that the property covered was destroyed by fire, within the limit of the policy, giving dates; that it was a total loss; that after the fire he notified the agent of the company in writing of the loss; that the defendant company investigated the circumstances of the fire and admitted its liability, and averred that this admission was a waiver of the necessary proofs required by the policy, and that, therefore, no formal proofs were rendered. There is also filed the original policy of insurance, which is the usual standard policy, and is for $700,
There was a general demurrer filed to the petition on
The answer pleads further that, on the 25th day of February, 1895, the plaintiff agreed with aix agent of the defendant, in writing, to submit to arbitrators then selected the value of the property at the date of the fire, and in that agreement, which is filed, it is stipulated that the rule to be used by the arbitrators in estimating the value of the house was to be, fix*st, they would estimate what it would cost to rebuild one identical with this, and then to estimate the deterioration by age and wear, and deduct this amount from the cost of the new building, but it is. not contended that the amount so fixed by the arbitrators was to be the amount the company was to pay the insured by no means, for it is specially plead that the company was not, and did not, agree to pay this sum so fixed by the arbitrators. The arbitrators fixed the value of new house at $864.38, and that by that time it had depreciated $190.16, and that, therefore, the house when burned was worth $674.22. Defendant denied a waiver to demand
To this answer there was a motion to strike out all that part, designating it, that plead that defendant was only bound to pay three-fourths of the actual cash value of the property at the time of the fire, because the same presented no* defense, which motion the court sustained, and then plaintiff filed a general demurrer to the answer as it remained, which the court also sustained. Defendant refusing to plead further, the court rendered judgment for the full face of the policy, $700, and defendant superseded that judgment, and has appealed to this court.
Counsel for appellant in his brief does not complain of any ruling of the court on his demurrer to the petition, and the record fails to show any action by the court below, and so that must be considered as waived.
The real questions in the case are whether there was a waiver of proofs by the company, and as to the extent of the liability, i. e., whether it is bound to pay the face of the policy, $700, or only three-fourths of the actual cash value of the house at the time of the loss, for if the latter, on demurrer
This court has held, in the case of Kenton Ins. Co. v. Wigginton, 89 Ky., 330, that “the preliminary proof of loss will be excused on the ground of waiver by the insurers if their conduct is such as to induce delay, or to render its production useless or unavailing, or as to induce in the mind of the insured a belief that no proof will be required,” quoting May on Insurance, -168. Following that doctrine this court has repeatedly held that a denial of liability is a waiver of proof of loss, if made on any other grounds than to furnish such proof. In this case the insurer (appellant) by its answer admits its liability as to some amount and pleads an arbitration as to value, which it pleads to be absolute and binding on the question of valuation. !If a denial of liability will waive proof of loss, it certainly seems to us that an admission of some liability and an arbitration as to value will waive j>roof of loss, for a much stronger reason. So> we conclude that, after sustaining the motion to strike out, the answer then' presented no defense. So the question vital to the decision of this case is whether under the law an insurance company, writing a policy for a certain sum and .collecting premiums on that sum, and also inserting a clause agreeing to pay only three-fourths of the value in case of loiss, can, in ease of total loss, rely on the three-fourths clause, or will it be compelled to pay the full sum for which it. issued its policy, and on which it received premiums? The circuit court evidently took the view that it must pay the face of the policy. If that is correct, this judgment must be affirmed; if error, then a reversal necessarily follows.
'Counsel for appellant insists that this has always been the law, and simply means that when the parties absolutely agree on the amount to be paid in case of loss, or, in other words, when a valued policy is written that then there is no question of value or amount to be paid by the insurer, and quotes at some length definitions given by writers of what a valued policy is.
The history of this legislation is that, at the time this act was passed by the legislature, there was another bill before it, providing, among other things, “that insurance companies that take fire or storm risks on real property in this Commonwealth, in settling their liability on policies issued after this act takes effect (in case of total loss thereof by fire or storm), shall, when the cash value of the property insured is adjusted
Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is in all things affirmed, and appellee is awarded damages by reason of the supersedeas.