WILLIAM L. CALDWELL v. SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC.; SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC. v. WILLIAM L. CALDWELL
Record No. 870481; Record No. 870490
Supreme Court of Virginia
June 9, 1989
Present: All the Justices
William T. Prince; Samuel J. Webster (Leonard C. Heath, Jr.; Williams, Worrell, Kelly & Greer, P.C., on brief), for appellee. (Record No. 870481)
William T. Prince; Samuel J. Webster (Leonard C. Heath, Jr.; Williams, Worrell, Kelly & Greer, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. (Record No. 870490)
Eddie W. Wilson; George Rutherlgen (John W. Hall, on brief), for appellee. (Record No. 870490)
Amicus Curiae: Norfolk and Western Railway Company (William B. Poff; Terri Faye Dial; Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, on brief), for appellant. (Record No. 870490)
Justice Whiting delivered the opinion of the Court.
In one of these two appeals (Record No. 870490), we decide the constitutionality of that pаrt of the forum non conveniens statute,
On April 4, 1984, William L. Caldwell, a North Carolina resident and employee of Seaboard System Railroad, Inc. (Seaboard), was alighting from a Seaboard locomotive to throw a switch in its Charlotte, North Carolina, rail yard when the locоmotive‘s horn was sounded near his ear, causing a hearing loss and other disabilities. On February 12, 1986, Caldwell filed this personal injury action against Seaboard in the court below pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
Because Seaboard regularly and systematically conducted business activity in the City of Portsmouth, Portsmouth was a permissible venue under
Denial of Motion to Dismiss (Record No. 870490)
Seaboard concedes that the Commonwealth is not constitutionally required to give any defendant the right to seek to have a case transferred to a more convenient forum,2 but argues that if the legislature adopts a statute giving such a right to defendants sued on Virginia causes of action, it must extend that right to defen-
We consider Seaboard‘s constitutional attack against the background of our previous decisions. Every statute “carries a strong presumption of validity,” and unless it “clearly violates a provision of the United States or Virginia Constitutions, we will not invalidate it.” City Council v. Newsome, 226 Va. 518, 523, 311 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1984).
[T]he party assailing the legislation has the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional, and if a reasonable doubt exists as to a statute‘s constitutionality, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its validity. Indeed, because “[a] judgment as to the wisdom and propriety of a statute is within the legislative prerogative,” courts will declare legislation invalid only when it is “plainly repugnant to some provision of the state or federal constitution.”
Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 94, 376 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1989) (citations omitted).
“The necessity for and the reasonableness of [a] classification are primarily questions for the legislature . . . . The presumption is that the classification is reasonable and appropriate and that the act is constitutional unless illegality appears on its facе.”
Mandell v. Haddon, 202 Va. 979, 989, 121 S.E.2d 516, 524 (1961). Because this statute does not affect fundamental rights, it is not subject to strict scrutiny to determine if it is necessary to promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest; instead, we review it to see that it is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and that it bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose. Etheridge, 237 Va. at 97, 376 S.E.2d at 530.
With those principles in mind, we consider the statute and its purposes.3 Are there rational reasons for different treatment of
First, there is a significant distinction between the transfer of an action and its dismissal. Dismissal involves a risk that a plaintiff may not be able to assert his right of action in another court because of the bar of the statute of limitations or some other reason. There is no such risk in the transfer of cases within the state. Seaboard suggests several wаys to minimize those risks. But these arguments are more appropriately addressed to the legislature. See Heublein, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Dept., 237 Va. 192, 201, 376 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1989).
Second, in the adoption of
Finding a rational basis for the statute, we conclude that it violates neither the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), nor the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Etheridge, 237 Va. at 97, 376 S.E.2d at 530. For the same reason, we find no violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Next, Seaboard contends that the statute impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. Again, we review general principles before considering the specific issue.
[I]n the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstatе commerce . . . . When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in character and effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not seriously interfere with its operation . . . such regulation has been generally held to be within state authority.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (citations omitted).
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted). State statutes which “burden interstate transactions only incidentally . . . violate the Commerce Clause only if the burdens they impose on interstate trade are ‘clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits.‘” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). Neither party cites a case in which Commerce Clause considerations were discussed in relation to choice of a forum for litigation.
In our opinion, the attenuating effects, if any, upon interstate commerce inherent in the application of this statute are
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the action of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.
Requirement of Remittitur (Record No. 870481)
Because we have sustained the trial court‘s action in denying the motion to dismiss, we decide whether it abused its discretion in requiring Caldwell to remit $500,000 of the $1,500,000 verdict.
Caldwell has recovered a jury verdict. Therefore, in accord with familiar appellate principles, we viеw the facts in the light most favorable to him.
Caldwell testified that, just after the horn was sounded, he felt lightheaded and dizzy and, later, his ears started ringing and popping, and he had a bad headache. The train master took him to a clinic in Charlotte where Doctor Beard gave him a pain reliever, told him to stay away from loud noises until the ringing and popping stopped, and referred him to Doctor Coconus, described by Caldwell as an “ear doctor.” Although Caldwell saw Dr. Cоconus twice in a three-month period following his injury, he has been treated since by a Charlotte otolaryngologist of his choice.
Caldwell complains that his ears wake him at night. He testified that “they pop on me.” “They still give me headaches [and] make me lightheaded at times.” He cannot stay in a room or place with many people. Because the service at his church becomes “really loud at times,” he has to attend his wife‘s church instead. At hоme he has problems with his family because: (1) in order to hear the television, he must increase its volume to a level too high for other members of the family; and (2) he does not answer the telephone in the next room because he cannot hear it. Because he gets lightheaded at times, he has difficulty in taking steps. Fur-
Expert witnesses indicatеd that the horn blast was at a noise level substantially in excess of maximum noise levels an ear can tolerate without injury to hearing and balance. This resulted in a permanent hearing loss in high frequency ranges of 22½ percent in Caldwell‘s right ear, and 7½ percent in his left ear, and significantly reduced his ability to understand what is being said in the presence of the background noise associated with a church or social function. This loss will increase in the normal aging process, and further exposure to excessive noise will cause more damage to Caldwell‘s hearing.
An expert also testified that when Caldwell is quiet, in reading or trying to sleep, he has tinnitus, or a constant ringing in his ears. The hearing loss also causes recruitment, which is an abnormal increase in loudness or adverse reaction to loud sounds. Thus, when sounds are made loud enough for Caldwell to hear, they seem too loud to him, and will also be distorted. His sense of balance has also been affected. Caldwell‘s disabilities render him unemployable by Seaboard.
Caldwell will have to be fitted with a hearing aid in each ear, at a cost of $500 to $700 each, and undergo annual audiological examinations at a cost of $40 to $60 each. In the last full year Caldwell worked, he earned $28,481.74, and was entitled to fringe benefits of $9,670.80 per year. He lost $37,687 in wages up to the date of trial.
Before the trial court ruled, it indicated that it considered: (1) the highest estimated percentage of Caldwell‘s hearing loss in the high frequency ranges, and his consequent disqualification from railroad work; (2) the estimate of an overall hearing disability of slightly less than two percent; (3) the fact that he could no longer work around loud noises; (4) evidence of tinnitus and of popping in Caldwell‘s ears; (5) the fact that Caldwell appeared to have no difficulty in hearing while he was testifying; and (6) its review of reported cases involving remittitur of verdicts awarding damages for hearing losses. Recognizing: (1) the difficulty in fixing damages for pain and suffering; (2) the fact that it is “basically a jury question“; (3) that it is “fundamental” that a court should not impose its judgment unless the verdict “is just so outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court“; but also (4) its duty to set aside a verdict or impose a remittitur upon the plaintiff in an ap-
In sustaining a trial court‘s remittal order in Bassett Furniture, 216 Va. at 912, 224 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting Hoffman v. Shartle, 113 Va. 262, 264, 74 S.E. 171, 172 (1912)), we said that “the record must show the grounds relied on in support of such action, otherwise it cannot be upheld.” Although Caldwell argues that Bassett Furniture requires a trial court to go down “a laundry list” of the grounds assigned by the Bassett Furniture trial court to support its order of remittal, we have not made those grounds talismanic. The trial court‘s conclusion that the damages are excessive does not have to be supported by express statements that the damages are so excessive as to shock the consсience, or that the size of the verdict created an impression that the jury had been influenced by passion or prejudice, or that the jury had misconceived or misinterpreted the facts or the law, if one or more of those factors may be fairly inferred from the reasons given for its action.
In our opinion, the reasons the trial court assigned for remittitur sufficiently indicate its grounds and demonstrate that it “considered factors in evidence relevant to а reasoned evaluation of the damages incurred and to be incurred [and its order] will not be disturbed on appeal if the recovery after remittitur bears a reasonable relation to the damages disclosed by the evidence.” Id. at 912, 224 S.E.2d at 332.
Caldwell argues that no such reasonable relation exists here. In our opinion, however, the jury could not have concluded that Caldwell had an economic loss greater than $291,427.59. It was comprised of: (1) $37,687.79 wages lost up to the date of trial; (2) the loss of an expected annual $9,670.80 in fringe benefits, for the balance of the 26 years he could have worked for the railroad until his mandatory retirement at age 70, for a total of $251,440.80 (not discounted to present value); and (3) what the parties apparently agreed were projected medical expenses of about $2,300. Therefore, the balance, exceeding $1,200,000, must have been for pain, suffering, and partial disability.
Even though Caldwell did not prove what his future wage losses would have been,5 he argues that the evidence of future economic
Caldwell‘s injury and disability have affected him, but the evidence does not indicate a substantial amount of pain, suffering, or embarrassment arising out of the hearing loss. Recognizing that Caldwell‘s employment and social activities will be somewhat limited by his hearing and balance impediments, the evidence does not indicate that he will not be able to find another job, or participate in most family and social activities not involving loud noises or requiring the ability to hear normally. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court‘s reduction of the jury‘s award was unreasonable. Accordingly, we will affirm its order of remittitur.
Record No. 870481—Affirmed.
Record No. 870490—Affirmed.
Justice Russell, with whom Justice Compton and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
The records of this Court indicаte that FELA plaintiffs have found a happy hunting ground in Portsmouth. Attorneys representing railroad employees claiming job-related injuries occurring all over the continental United States apparently think it worthwhile to bring actions against railroads in Portsmouth, or in neighboring Norfolk, rather than in the localities in which the accident occurred.* One may only speculate as to the reasons for this phenomenon.
The cases are numerous and constitute a substantial part of the local judicial workload. The amounts in controversy are large, generating frequent appeals. Our hospitality to this nationwide litigation imposes a significant burden upon Virginia taxpayers.
This state of affairs may lead to results as absurd as they are unfair. In a hypothetical case, a trainman suffers injury on a westbound train passing through Bristol, Virginia. If he seeks to recover for his injuries in Portsmouth, the defendant railroad may, for good cause shown, obtain a transfer of the case to Bristol, where the cause of action arose, pursuant to
There is, in my view, no conceivable rational basis for the statute under consideration. It makes a distinction between causes of action arising within and without the state which arbitrarily discriminates аgainst FELA defendants and serves no valid state interest.
It is unnecessary to look to foreign authority for the origins of forum non conveniens. That doctrine has been codified by statute in Virginia, in strong language.
The second “rational reason” given by the majority opinion to suppоrt the non-dismissal clause is that by adopting the long-arm statute, Virginia sought to extend its jurisdiction to the maximum limits permitted by the Due Process Clause, and that dismissals under forum non conveniens would contravene that policy. That reasoning is flawed in three respects. First, the General Assembly, by codifying forum non conveniens in the sweeping language of
Because the discrimination and unfairness resulting from the non-dismissal clause of