1 Duer 233 | The Superior Court of New York City | 1852
It was said in Myers v. Malcocol/m, which was an action to recover damages for injury to the person, that evidence of the wealth of the defendant was inadmissible, because the plaintiff was entitled in that case to recover the actual damages he had sustained without regard to the ability of the defendant to pay them, and such is the general rule in cases free from malice or wilful negligence. But, in relation to the plaintiff, the case is widely different. As to him, it is often necessary to inquire into his condition in life, his habits, pursuits, and necessities, in order that the jury may determine what actual damage he has sustained. The loss of a limb might produce equal pain to two men, but the actual damage which that loss would occasion, when we are called upon to estimate that damage in dollars and cents, would depend very materially upon the pursuits and condition in life of the party claiming to recover such damage. In Foot v. Tracy, 1 John 53, Kent, J., says, “The jury have, and must inevitably have, a very large and liberal discretion in apportioning the damages to the rank, condition, and character of the plaintiff, and they must have evidence touching that condition and character, so as to have some guide to that discretion.” (See Lincoln v. Saratoga & S. R. R. Co., 23 Wend. 425). In estimating that damage also, it is very manifest that a most important inquiry must be, whether the injury which the plaintiff has sustained is
At the present period, when the lives of so many hundreds of people are intrusted to the carriers of passengers by steamboats j and railroads, and when accidents and disasters are so lament- / ably frequent, it is no time to relax a rule so salutary and so f necessary for the public safety.
There was no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was
The judgment for the plaintiff is therefore affirmed with costs.