156 S.E. 55 | W. Va. | 1930
In this chancery suit for the specific performance of a contract for the sale and exchange of real estate, the chancellor sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's bill of complaint and dismissed the bill. Plaintiff appeals.
According to the allegations contained in the bill, W. D. Cline, residing at Valls Creek, McDowell County, West Virginia, owner of a tract of land on Indian Creek, McDowell County, addressed a letter, dated January 29, 1929, to W. H. Caldwell, at Peterstown, Monroe County, West Virginia in which Cline proposed to pay to Caldwell the sum of $6,000.00 cash and to deed to Caldwell his land on Indian Creek in exchange for Caldwell's land known as the McKinsey farm. The letter further provided that Cline "will give you (Caldwell) eight days in which" to accept or reject the offer. Caldwell received the letter at Peterstown on February 2, 1929. On February 8, 1929, the offeree wired Cline as follows: "Land deal is made. Prepare deed to me. See letter." The telegram reached Cline on February 9, 1929. Upon Cline's refusal to carry out the terms of the alleged agreement, plaintiff instituted this suit for specific performance, the titles to the farms remaining unchanged.
The first ground relied upon by defendant to sustain his demurrer to the bill is that the offer and acceptance are too vague and uncertain. These qualities can certainly not be attributed to defendant's offer. The uncertainty in the offer, if any, relates to the question as to when an offer becomes completed, and not to the duration of the offer. The letter provides for acceptance within eight days, which is indeed a mathematical certainty. If there is any vagueness in the acceptance telegram, it is as to the intendment of the offeree in the use *555 of the words "See letter," for it is not clear whether the words refer to defendant's offering letter, or to one confirming offeree's telegraphic acceptance. A letter purporting to accept an offer, which, in reality, varied the terms thereof, would constitute a defense; but, in the instant case, the record contains only the bill and the demurrer, and the bill relates to but one letter, which is the offering letter of defendant. Without more, the telegram of acceptance appears sufficient to constitute an unconditional acceptance.
Defendant's main contention is that the offer was not accepted within the time limit specified in the offer, and counsel for defendant, in his brief, states the law to be as "the time for acceptance runs from the date of the offer and not from the date of its delivery." The subject of contract by mail began with the English case of Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv., and was followed a few years later by Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B.
Ald. 681 (1818), and courts have had no hesitation in recognizing the validity of simple contracts thus made. Page, Law of Contracts, sec. 198; Campbell v. Beard,
As in other contracts, to consummate a contract for the sale of land, there must be mutual assent (27 Rawle C. L. 323) and where the proposal to sell stipulates a limited time for acceptance, it is essential, to constitute a valid contract, that the acceptance be communicated to the proposer within the time limited. Dyer v. Duffy,
The letter, proposing that Cline "will give you eight days" to accept or reject the offer, is, without more, conclusive of the offeror's intention; and, the unconditional acceptance having been received by Cline within the specified time limit, the result was a concurrence of the minds of the contracting parties upon the subject matter of their negotiations; in other words, a consummated contract, (Iron Works v. Construction Co., *557
The contention of defendant, relied upon as a third ground in his demurrer, that acceptance could be made only by letter is without merit, since the offer did not provide the means of communication. Lucas v. Telegraph Co., 109 N.W. (Iowa) 191.
Being of the opinion that the allegations contained in the bill were sufficient, we reverse the decree of the lower court and re-instate plaintiff's bill of complaint.
Reversed; bill re-instated; cause remanded.