In May 1993, Bonnie Caldwell sued the City of Tallassee and Thomas Sides, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process and requesting damages. Caldwell amended his complaint to allege that the City and Sides had intentionally deprived him of his constitutional rights, so as to create liability pursuant to
Caldwell argues that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment for the City and Sides. A motion for summary judgment is to be granted when no genuine issue of a material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), A.R.Civ.P. Moreover,
Capital Alliance Insurance Co. v. Thorough-Clean, Inc.,"In determining whether the movant has carried that burden, the court is to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. To defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must present 'substantial evidence' creating a genuine issue of material fact — 'evidence of such weight and quality that fairminded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' "
Sides, the building inspector for the City of Tallassee, sent a letter to Caldwell informing him that the condition of his property constituted a nuisance and violated a city ordinance. Eventually, Sides swore out a warrant for Caldwell's arrest for violating the ordinance. The Tallassee Municipal Court held a trial and found Caldwell not guilty of violating the ordinance. Caldwell then brought the present action against the City and Sides, claiming that Sides had intentionally misled him about which piece of his property was in violation of the ordinance.
After reviewing the multi-volume record of exhibits and deposition testimony of several witnesses, we conclude that Caldwell failed to present substantial evidence to support either the abuse of process claim or the malicious prosecution claim. These claims have an element in common — malice; and Caldwell failed to produce substantial evidence that Sides acted with malice in issuing the citation against him and subsequently securing an arrest warrant against him. Therefore, the summary judgment was proper as to Sides's abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims.
Caldwell argues that Sides ordered him to clean up the wrong piece of property and that after he complied with that request, Sides caused an arrest warrant to be issued because other property, not the subject of the initial warning, was in violation of the zoning ordinance. The record reveals that Caldwell owns several lots in the City of Tallassee. The lots at issue in this case are separated by an alley, and Caldwell claims that he believed the first letter he received from Sides was only referring to one of those lots. Sides stated that his letter requesting Caldwell to clean up the property referred to both lots as a single piece of property, regardless of the fact that they were separated by the alley.
Caldwell testified that Sides misled him about which property he needed to clean up and he argues that his testimony about being misled is evidence that Sides acted with malice toward him. The police officer who arrested Caldwell testified that he knew of no problems between Sides and Caldwell. The officer further testified that he observed no anger on the part of Sides directed to Caldwell and no personal animosity between Sides and Caldwell. A former business associate of Caldwell testified that Caldwell seemed to be anticipating filing a lawsuit against the City before he received the notice from Sides. This witness also testified that Caldwell had stated that he had a better "case" against the City after his arrest. Caldwell's wife testified that she knew of no animosity between Sides and Caldwell. The record also reveals that city officers and residents experienced much confusion as to what the proper address for Caldwell's properties were, and that if Sides incorrectly identified the property to be cleaned up, it was merely a mistake and not the product of malice.
We conclude that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment for the City and for Sides. Therefore, we affirm that judgment.
AFFIRMED.
THIGPEN and YATES, JJ., concur.
MONROE, J., concurs in the result.
ROBERTSON, P.J., dissents. *1128
