136 F. 196 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts | 1905
This case now comes before the court upon a rule to show cause on a petition for attachment for contempt, brought by the complainant against the defendant. This court, in 132 Fed. 20, had before it the question of the validity of the patents in suit and of their infringement. The court ordered a decree to be entered for the complainant, for an injunction, and for an accounting. A preliminary injunction had already been decreed by the court. Defendant is charged with violating both the preliminary and the final injunctions. The affidavits brought before us show that since the issuance of the injunction the defendant has designed, manufactured, and offered for sale a certain machine, which is referred to for convenience as the “New Wilson Machine.” The evidence offered in the affidavits tends to show that this machine is designed for use on telephone switch boards. It consists of a case, having a rotating clock movement, an annular die within a stationary dial die. The annular die is provided with two-graduations, spaced apart a distance equal to the initial period allowed by the telephone companies for the minimum charge, usually three minutes. The machine shows a pointer in juxtaposition with the zero or initial graduation, the pointer being curved around to connect with the last graduation, the two graduations and the ptjinter thus forming a U-shaped or horseshoe figure. The annular die rotates once an hour. Within the annular die is a disk carrying an hour hand. A single-platen serves to press a card against the dies. The card is held in a definite position by the base of the bracket which forms the guide for a. plunger stem, and by another guide secured upon the frame of the-
The defendant urges that his machine is merely an adaptation of the time stamp of the Emerson patent, and that it involves nothing new when compared with that patent. We have already discussed the Emerson patent in our former opinion, and have stated the material elements in the time stamps which -were brought before us in considering the prior art. The Emerson machine was not intended automatically to record elapsed time Upon a careful examination and study of the new machine, we are satisfied that the defendant has added new elements to the Emerson patent, and has brought his device within the range of infringement. In coming to this conclusion we have given full weight to the very elaborate, ingenious, and able argument of the learned counsel for the defendant. The Emerson patent was not an anticipation of the patents at issue in this case. His machine was not a device for automatically recording elapsed time. The defendant appears to have taken the Emerson stamp as his basis, but he has added elements to it which have made it a device for automatically recording elapsed time. He has made use of the transverse end of the pointer or arrow, which appears, as it seems to us, to be by chance in the form of a horseshoe. This he has modified and applied in such a way as to make it capable of showing at a glance a three-minutes interval of time. He has thus made two graduations out of the two ends of the horseshoe device, and made these two graduations to show at a glance whether the initial period has been exceeded. It will be noted, also, that the time in minutes within the grasp of the horseshoe, or outside of it, can be deter
Comparing the defendant’s construction now brought before us with the first claim of the Hamilton patent, we are of the opinion that this device is not, in practice, different from the minutes dies of the timometer. The evident purpose of the series of two graduations which the horseshoe'device presents is to enable the operator to ascertain automatically the interval of elapsed time. As such, we think it is an equivalent of the series of progressive numerals in the Hamilton patent. We come to this conclusion after giving the doctrine of equivalents the same scope that we applied in discussing the timometer in our former opinion. Comparing the device now brought before us with the first claim of the Abbott patent, we think that the new Wilson machine is an offending device within the terms of this claim. This machine is especially adapted for measuring a space of three minutes elapsed time. To do this it has two graduations, which take the place of the more numerous graduations of the timometer. But this machine, as well as the timometer, is a device for printing a record of intervals and for printing the time of day. The clockwork which drives the shaft in this machine is a “single motor for driving the dies.” This machine, as well as the timometei*, has a lever adapted by alternate movements to cause impressions to be made from the dies. The machine before us appears to be the. equivalent of a combination found in the timometer to infringe the first claim of the Abbott patent. The defendant lays great stress on the fact that infringement of the Abbott patent by the timometer was found by the court becahse of the additional secpnds dial having the two-part platen, whereas this seconds dial and its platen are wholly lacking in the device now brought before the court. Defendant-argues from this fact that he has escaped infringement of the first claim of the Abbott patent; but the modification of the seconds elapsed time dies of the timometer, by incorporating into them features of the minutes dies of the timometer, does not in any way eliminate the principles of the inventive thought which forms the subject of this claim of the Abbott patent. It makes no difference in principle whether the seconds dies are taken as the method of printing the record of intervals or whether the minutes dies are so taken. The two sets of dies must be held to be equivalents. It does not avoid infringement to substitute one equivalent for the other, with a corresponding change of the operating lever.
It is not necessary in passing upon the matter of contempt to go into the details of infringement. We are satisfied that the new machine is not in principle different from the timometer in its relation to the first claim
Defendant adjudged to be in contempt of both the preliminary and the final injunction in this case.