497 U.S. 1010 | SCOTUS | 1990
Lead Opinion
Sup. Ct. Tenn.;
C. A. 4th Cir.;
Sup. Ct. Cal.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
C. A. 11th Cir.;
C. A. 10th Cir.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Sup. Ct. Ark.;
Sup. Ct. Va.;
Sup. Ct. Ill.; and
Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 88-7318, 297 S. C. 497, 377 S. E. 2d 556; No. 88-7432, 767 S. W. 2d 387; No. 89-516, 881 F. 2d 117; No. 89-6062, 48 Cal. 3d 1001, 773 P. 2d 172; No. 89-6091, 789 S. W. 2d 572; No. 89-6324, 885 F. 2d 1497; No. 89-6509, 866 F. 2d 1185 and 888 F. 2d 1286; No. 89-7007, 784 S. W. 2d 38; No. 89-7307, 780 S. W. 2d 176; No. 89-7308, 301 Ark. 244, 783 S. W. 2d 341; No. 89-7380, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 549 N. E. 2d 240; No. 89-7442, 543 N. E. 2d 360.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.