*1 negative, thereby question dispensing in the question. second with the need to answer the Clyde CAIN, Sr., Appellant, Ura Clyde prison Cain is a inmate in the Texas serving a Department of Corrections life sen- HEARST CORPORATION d/b/a tence for He sued the Hearst Cor- murder. Houston Chronicle poration, the Houston Chronicle Pub- d/b/a Company, Appellee. lishing Company, claiming newspaper that a No. D-4171. placing article his him invaded article, appeared in which Supreme Court of Texas. the Chronicle on June referred to Argued May 1994. thief, burglar, pimp, Cain as a and killer. article, recounting criminal record the Cain’s Decided June summary, that: states many Cain is believed to have killed as as eight people; Cain killed one of his law- yers lawyer’s in 1973 and married the wid- later; ow a few months Cain killed a 67 1977; year “bought” old man in in 1983 he prostitute help from a friend to finance activities; persuaded prosti- his Cain marry park tute to a trader named owner Anderson, so that Cain could kill Anderson prostitute’s and share the inheritance Anderson; balked, prostitute when the year Cain threatened to kill her 5 old daughter daughter’s and “deliver her head basket”; wastepaper prostitute in a later, days married Anderson 3 and on January 1985 Cain killed Anderson. print- complaint Cain’s sole is that the article Cain, Sr., Clyde pro Ura se. ed false information that he was a member of Chumlea, Dallas, Joseph G. amicus curiae. the “Dixie Mafia” and that he had killed as Ogden Stacy Beasley, William W. eight people. Cain asserted Houston, appellee. put these statements him in a false public. was filed in state court one Suit opinion Justice GONZALEZ delivered the years pub- and one-half after the article was Court, in which Chief Justice lished. PHILLIPS, HECHT, Justice Justice Hearst removed case the United join. CORNYN and Justice ENOCH District Court for the Southern Dis States ques- granted This case comes to us on certified trict of Texas. The court Hearst’s Ap- grounds that tions from the United States Court of motion for dismissal on the libel, peals for the Fifth are asked to and held that the Circuit. We Cain’s action lies 1) recog- one-year period expired decide two issues: whether Texas limitations before priva- brought Determining nizes the tort of false the suit. that the Cain 2) tort, cy, recognizes questions if Texas which above are unsettled under Texas governs precedent, Fifth these statute of limitations that action.1 Circuit certified light substantially duplicates questions Corp., to us. v. Hearst Because Cain (5th Cir.1993), lacking many question the tort of defamation while F.3d 345 certified (Feb. limitations, 9, 1994). procedural accepted, Tex.Sup.CtJ. its we answer the first Mendez, (Tex.1992). confronts with the issue reserved 1. This case us Co. v. Mktg. by this court in Diamond Shamrock &Ref. *2 578 (Seoond) Invasion of The Restatement Torts,
Genesis of
Sec-
of
pri-
tion 652E defines false
invasion of
cataloged
Professor William L. Prosser
vacy as follows:
injuries
inva-
four distinct
under the
of
gives publicity
One who
to a matter con-
privacy (1)
upon person’s
intrusion
—
cerning
places
another
the other be-
to be left alone
his or her own
subject
public
fore
in a false
affairs,
publicity given
private
informa-
liability to the other for invasion of his
person,
appropriation
tion about a
of
privacy, if
person’s personality
some element of the
(a)
light in
which the other was
use,
commercial
WilliaM
placed
highly
would
offensive to a
PROSSER,
L.
Handbook of
Law of Torts
person, and
reasonable
1955).
These four variations of
(b)
knowledge
the actor had
of or acted in
adopted by
the tort were
the Second Re-
disregard
falsity
reckless
as to the
(Sec-
statement of Torts. See Restatement
publicized
light in
matter and the false
ond)
652A
of Torts
placed.
which the other would be
recognize any
Texas did not
of the four
652E
types
of
until our
of invasion
decision
recognized by
The tort has been
(Tex.
Atkinson,
Billings
v.
S.W.2d
appeals.
of
several Texas courts
See Reeves
1973),
category
which involved the first
of
Am.,
385,
v. Western Co. N.
867 S.W.2d
developed by
Prosser
1993,
(Tex.App.
396-97
Antonio
no
— San
recognized by
the Restatement: an in
Mall,
writ);
v. La Plaza
Mitre
S.W.2d
In
trusion into the
seclusion.
Bill
752,
1993,
(Tex.App. Corpus Christi
—
defendant,
ings,
telephone company
denied);
v. Brooks Fashion
writ
Mitre
employee,
placed
tap
plain
had
a wire
on the
Stores, Inc.,
612,
(Tex.App.—
S.W.2d
telephone
ap
tiffs residential
line and had
1992,
denied);
Corpus Christi
writ
Wilhite v.
parently
plaintiffs personal tele
listened to
Co.,
1,
(Tex.App.—
H.E.
Butt
812 S.W.2d
phone
affording
plain
conversations.
1991,
writ);
Corpus
v.
Christi
no
Wavell
relief,
majority
tiff
we noted that
Publishing
Caller-Times
809 S.W.2d
jurisdictions
in the United States
(Tex.App. Corpus
Christi
—
independent
cause of action for the inva
denied);
writ
Diamond Shamrock
&Ref.
privacy,
that “the
sion
held
Mendez,
Mktg. Co. v.
809 S.W.2d
injury
legal
constitutes a
for which a
1991), rev’d,
(Tex.App.
Antonio
— San
remedy
granted.”
will be
Id. at 860. We
Kerr,
(Tex.1992); Boyles v.
S.W.2d
expressly recognized the
have also
second
(Tex.App
806 S.W.2d
258-59
. —Texar
type
privacy right,
right to “freedom
1991)
(Tex.1993);
kana
rev’d 855 S.W.2d
embarrassing pri
disclosure
Clarke v. Denton
Found,
vate facts.” Industrial
South
(Tex.App.
writ
Worth
— Fort
Bd.,
Post,
Indus. Accident
denied);
Texas
S.W.2d
Covington v. Houston
(Tex.1976),
(Tex.App.
346-47
S.W.2d
—Houston
(1977).2
writ);
Floyd
Park
no
[14th Dist.]
Although
acknowledged
the Prosser cate
People,
we
97-98
Cities
S.W.2d
Foundation,
writ);
gorization in Industrial
we have
no
National
(Tex.App.—Dallas
Demeson,
Bonding Agency
never embraced nor
the fourth
1983, writ);
type
(Tex.App.
no
and final
of invasion of
—Dallas
(Tex.
Snow,
222, 224
today.
light”
“false
tort. We decline to do so
Gill
predicting
widespread
type
privacy right, protecting
future
ac-
York cases and
2. The third
likeness,
against appropriation
tort).
only reported
of a name or
ceptance
Texas
of this
jurisprudence
well established in the
Kimbrough
involving
case
this tort is
v. Coca-
Treece,
Exploi-
states. See James M.
Commercial
Cola/USA,
(Tex.Civ.
Names, Likenesses, and
tation
Personal Histo-
n.r.e.).
App.
See also
writ ref'd
Busch, Inc.,
—Eastland
ries,
Pavesich
TexX.Rev.
v. Anheuser
Benavidez
Ins.,
England
122 Ga.
50 S.E.
v. New
law).
Life
(5th Cir.1989) (applying
Texas
(1905) (discussing Michigan and New
writ);
pattern
pres
on a fact
no
Moore v.
based
App.
Worth
— Fort
claim);
Enterprises,
nothing
B. Pierce Film
than a defamation
Charles
ents
more
(Tex.Civ.App
55 N.Y.2d
Arrington
v. New York Times
. —Texar
n.r.e.)
In all of these
kana
writ refd
434 N.E.2d
N.Y.S.2d
cert.,
eases,
application
for writ of error
(1982),
either
*3
Court,
rejected
was filed in this
or the Court
787,
(noting
L.Ed.2d 994
“ser
S.Ct.
74
application
the
with the notation “writ de
recognition
concern” that
of false
ious
nied,”
posture
or the
of the case was such
cases);
safeguards
sidestep
would
for libel
issue,
necessary
that it was not
to reach the
Teamsters,
Yeager v. Local
Int’l Bhd. of
given
any
approval
so that our
was never
to
669-
Ohio St.3d
453 N.E.2d
Also,
holdings.
federal
of these
several
(“Under
the facts of the instant
interpreting
permitted
courts
Texas law have
case,
compels us
we find no rationale which
light.
of action for false
Moore
cause
light’ theory
recovery in
adopt
the ‘false
(5th
Co.,
Big
Picture
time.”);
Ohio at this
Falwell v. Penthouse
Cir.1987);
Magazine,
v.Wood Hustler
(W.D.Va.
Int’l, Ltd.,
F.Supp.
(5th Cir.1984),
F.2d
cert.
de
1981) (“[t]he
Virginia simply
courts of
do not
nied,
recognize
common
of ac
such a
law cause
Flynt,
Braun v.
House, Inc.,
tion”); Mitchell v. Random
245,252
Cir.),
F.2d
cert.
(5th Cir.1989) (“[we]
according
F.2d
ly
adopt Mississippi
decline to
for
Mitchell’s
Nevertheless,
false
remains
leasts
the
Lab.,
light theory”)3;
false
Elm Medical
Inc.
recognized
aspect
and most controversial
Gen., Inc.,
v. RKO
403 Mass.
532 N.E.2d
privacy.
Sanford,
invasion of
See Bruce (1989) (“The
only
11.4.1 at 567
Libel
‘putting plaintiff[s] in a
the
assert is
1991) (“Of
pri
types
Dean Prosser’s four
light’.
recognized
This court
not
false
has
torts,
vacy
light’
gener
the ‘false
school has
now.”);
that tort
not
and does
choose to do so
elusive,
ated the most criticism because of its
Hoppe
Corp., Wash.App.
v. Hearst
nature.”);
amorphous
Zim
Diane Leenheer
(Wash.Ct.App.1989)
n. 5
P.2d
merman,
Privacy:
Invasion of
(‘We note that
the trial court could have
Failed,
N.Y.U.L.Rev.
properly
light claim
Hoppe’s
dismissed
(1989) (“the
may
wiser course
for
far, Washington
on the basis that
thus
has
light altogether”).
states to eliminate false
tort.”);
recognized
not
the
Zinda v. Louisi
join
Today,
jurisdictions
we
those
that do
Corp., 149
ana Pac.
Wis.2d
440 N.W.2d
recognize
priva
the false
invasion
pri
that Wisconsin’s
cy action. Renwick v. News & Observer
vacy
provide
statute “does not
a cause of
310 N.C.
312 S.E.2d
placing person
action for
eye”).4
public
(1984) (“We
expand
83 L.Ed.2d
will not
privacy recognized
reject
priva-
the tort of invasion of
We
1)
jurisdiction
light’
cy
largely dupli-
to include ‘false
inva
tort for two reasons:
it
privacy.”);
rights
recovery, particularly
sions of
Sullivan
Pulitzer
cates other
2)
defamation;
Broadcasting
it lacks
(Mo.1986) (refusing
recognize
procedural
accompany
the tort of
limitations that
ac-
Jackson,
(“It
Young
recognize
cites
at 80
is not
The Dissent
572 So.2d
the tort. 497 So.2d
(Miss.1990),
Bay
and Prescott v.
St.
position regard-
important for us to delineate our
(Miss.
Newspapers,
Louis
497 So.2d
...”).
ing recognition of false
here
1986)
proposition
Mississippi
for the
has
light.
the tort of false
878 S.W.
Waring
4. See also
v. William Morrow &
However,
Young,
585 n. 2.
572 S.W.2d at
(S.D.Tex.1993) ("The
F.Supp.
failure
facts,
public
private
dealt with the
disclosure of
recognize
of the Texas
Court to
type
the second
of invasion of
action
same.”);
leads this court to do the
Maxwell v.
catalogued by
Young
Prosser. The Court in
cites
(S.D.Tex.1993)
Henry,
F.Supp.
having recognized
Prescott as
tort of false
(“Texas
However,
law does not
the tort of ‘false
specifically
the court in Prescott
Mall,
Mississippi
light.’”);
issue
La
tions for thus Practice & Remedies Code as follows: already exists be- Civil creasing the tension that guarantees constitutional tween expressed in A libel is a defamation writ- and tort law. graphic or other form that tends to ten memory blacken the of the dead or that
Duplication of Causes of Action Other injure living person’s reputation tends to public thereby expose person action, as it has been de The false hatred, ridicule, contempt or or financial Restatement, recovery permits fined injury impeach any person’s honesty, toor injuries by publicity that unrea caused virtue, integrity, reputation pub- or to in a sonably places anyone defects of lish the natural (Seoond) public. before thereby expose person ha- *4 Although explicitly § not re 652A. Torts ridicule, tred, injury. or financial definition, quired by most the Restatement jurisdictions, including (1986). the lower Texas § 73.001 & Rem.Code Tex.Civ.PraC. action, recognized the re Slander, defamation, courts that have spoken form of is quire statute, false if it is to be recog that a statement be by but has been not codified light cognizable under the false doctrine. defamatory “a at common law to be nized (false Clarke, light e.g., at 331 793 S.W.2d orally published party a third statement untrue statements about a action “concerns justification or excuse.” See Shear without (“evidence Gill, Hutton, Tucker, at 224 party”); 644 S.W.2d son Lehman support not a cause of action for false (Tex.App. Corpus will Christi S.W.2d — light we believe no false statements w.o.j.); because see also Restate writ dism’d (1977). Thus, publicized”); of fact were ever Machleder v. (Seoond) of Torts ment (2d Cir.1986), Diaz, cert. 801 F.2d defamatory must light, like false statements denied, S.Ct. The false be false in order to be actionable. (1987) (in Jersey, truth New L.Ed.2d overlaps some tort also action). See, defense to the false other, absolute recognized, privacy torts. better sensible, falsity requirement Jr., consider Kalven, Privacy Harry in Tort e.g., private facts” inva Wrong?, that the “revelation Brandéis Law —Were and Warren Contemp. purports grant relief tort Law & Probs. for the disclosure of true statements overlap of false (noting potential adversely plaintiff. Flynt affect the v. Dis appropriation); and Lerman Cir.1984) (2d trib. 745 F.2d recognize a false If we were to specifically alleged (asserting that “while not Texas, largely duplicate ex it would several libel, complaint, [plaintiffs] action [for in her action, particularly defama isting causes of statutory right for violation of Billings, 489 S.W.2d tion. As we observed a common appropriation law privacy interests at “some of the presents a classic false privacy] protection under such have been afforded cert, denied, 1054, 105 claim”), U.S. slander, theories as libel and traditional 85 L.Ed.2d seizure, eavesdropping wrongful search Furthermore, damages the elements invasions wiretapping, and other similar light ac recognized in false personal affairs that have been private into business and to those awarded for defa Recovery tions are similar individual.” for defamation of an principal element of actual mation. The requires of a false statement. the communication typically damages light claims is Rayzor, for false Corp H. 644 S.W.2d A. Belo writ, (Seoond) anguish, see Restatement ref d mental (Tex.App. Worth — Ft. n.r.e.) v. Hustler (“The 652H Wood recovery for qua non of sine falsehood”) Magazine, 736 F.2d ... is the existence of Cir.1984), cert. No. (quoting Dominion Branch Old Austin, Braun v. L.Ed.2d 777 Letter 418 S.Ct. Nat'l Assoc. Carriers (5th Cir.), 2770, 2781, Flynt, L.Ed.2d (1974)). Libel, defama which is written (1984), physical but illness Clarke Denton S.W.2d (Tex.App. harm to the commercial interests Worth — Fort recognized. denied) been L. have also See William (holding proceed writ could Prosser, Privacy, 48 statute of limitations under false when Cal.L.Rev. Donaldson, Annotation, Russell G. run); Covington for libel had v. Houston Post, (Tex.App.— —Defenses Remedies, 57 A.L.R. 4th writ) (holding Houston no [14th Dist.] essentially types These are of plaintiff proceed under when could damages sought in defamation actions. See run); statute of limitations for libel had §§ of ToRts Floyd People, v. Park Cities (1977); BRUCE Libel and PRIVA (because SanfoRD, photograph true and accurate 1991); § CY 11.4.1 at 431-54 Shearson interest, account of a matter of all Hutton, Lehman 922. Thus fail); liability Bonding theories of National all, many, injuries if redressed Demeson, Agency tort are also redressed (suit writ) (Tex.App. no — Dallas defamation. libel, brought under addition to false Snow,
The false
light);
cases considered
Texas
Gill v.
appeals,
writ) (court
brought,
courts
were all
or could
(Tex.App.
Worth
— Fort
*5
brought,
legal
have been
under another
theo
light
held there was no relief for false
be
See,
ry.
Am.,
Reeves v.
false;
Western Co. N.
cause statement was not
there would
(because
867 S.W.2d
court limited
defamation);
likewise be no relief for
Moore
publication
action under false
Enter.,
B.
Charles
Pierce Film
statements,
brought
action could have been
(Tex.Civ.App.
— \Texarkana
slander);
Mall,
under
Mitre v. La Plaza
n.r.e.) (as
defamation,
writ ref d
actions for
(Tex.App. Corpus
S.W.2d
755 & n. 3
recovery
person
court limits
about whom
—
denied) (court
Christi
writ
allowed
published).
false information is
We see no
proceed in
its claim for false
reason to
a cause of action for false
because fact issues existed over whether de
privacy
recovery
when
defamatory
fendants statements were
substantially duplicated by
that tort is
torts
malice);
whether defendant acted with
Mitre
already established in this State.
Stores, Inc.,
v. Brooks Fashion
(Tex.App. Corpus
Christi
Speech
—
Freedom of
Considerations
denied) (holding
publi
writ
that defendant’s
above,
As
tort
discussed
cation was
actionable as both a false
bears
remarkable similarities
defamation.
defamation);
and a
Wil
However,
wholly
the torts are not
identical
hite v. H.E. Butt
S.W.2d
for two reasons:
defamation actions are
writ)
(Tex.App. Corpus
Christi
—
subject
require-
procedural
to a number of
(suit brought
as both false
and defama
ments to which invasion of
actions
tion);
Wavell v. Caller-Times
subject,
publications
are not
certain
Co., 809
(Tex.App. Corpus
S.W.2d 633
—
theory
not
a
actionable under
defamation
denied)
(holding
Christi
writ
that news
might
be actionable under false
Far
paper publications alleged to constitute false
persuading
us
these distinctions
subject
invasions of
are
to the
justify
tort,
separate
they
we believe
dem-
protections
publications alleged
same
as are
adopting
onstrate that
defamatory);
to be
Diamond Shamrock Ref.
unacceptably derogate con-
this State would
Mendez,
Mktg.
&
Co. v.
speech rights
stitutional
under both the
(Tex.App.
1991), (plaintiff
Antonio
did
— San
Texas and the United States Constitution.
claim) rev’d,
pursue
not
Kerr,
(Tex.1992); Boyles
S.W.2d
1. Procedural and Substantive Differences
1991)
(Tex.App.
These technical restrictions
useful
would
serve to safe- On the other
if
guard
speech. Every
by
separate
these re
freedom
defa-
be served
permits
imposed. As the court ob
mation action that the law
necessari-
strictions are
served in Renwick v. News & Observer Pub
ly
speech.
Supreme
inhibits free
As the
Co.,
lishing
political speech
respect
Court stated with
310 N.C.
312 S.E.2d
Sullivan,
York
cert.
New
Times v.
in
376 U.S.
469 U.S.
S.Ct.
(1984):
710, 722,
(1964),
upon
personality
of the individual.
*11
all,
Atkinson,
many,
wiretapping
Billings
if not
context.
The court’s conclusion that
(Tex.1973).
injuries
by
light
redressed
by
plainly
defamation is
tort are redressed
only explanation
why
The court’s
it will
logic.
light
wrong as a matter of
That false
overlap in
arena
tolerate no
this
is that free
injuries
by
covers some of the
covered
defa-
rights
implicated
pro-
speech
are
because the
way
that
attending
lacking.
mation in no
leads to the conclusion
cedures
defamation are
injuries
weigh
and
covers most of the
cov- Rather
than assess
the interests
right5
any proce-
in each
and add
at stake
ered
necessary to effectuate an even bal-
dures
Furthermore,
itself,
overlap, by
is no rea-
rights,
simply
ance of the
the court
concludes
reject
to
a cause of action for false
son
privacy
and
that false
invasion
Texas,
privacy.
example,
For
invasion of
speech cannot coexist.6
a citizen who feels cheated
a financial
questions
constitutional via
The court
variety
transaction has a
of choices for a
privacy in
bility
of false
invasion of
a
action,
fraud,
including
cause of
a claim for
cursory
unsatisfactory analysis.
For ex
Deceptive
violation of the
Trade Practices
ample,
court fails to address the United
Act,
warranty, or a
breach of
combination
acceptance
States
Court’s
of false
Moreover,
any and all of these claims.
al-
privacy
long
plain
invasion of
so
as the
though
such as actions
traditional
theories
proves
tiff
that
acted with
the defendant
protected
eavesdropping
wiretapping
for
is,
knowledge of
actual malice —that
with
private
into
individuals from invasions
their
falsity
disregard
or in
for the truth.
reckless
affairs,
personal
availability
Time,
Hill,
374, 387-90,
business and
Inc. v.
U.S.
(ex
(1967)
534, 541-43,
preclude
the court
of such actions did
S.Ct.
Explaining Justifying and A Limited Tort involved, tions of fact and the dam- assess Privacy, False Case of of ages recovery, in the of a whose event (1991)(noting that the W.Res.L.Rev. is, law, our verdict under in all eases sub- intentional or reckless falsehood test essen ject supervision scrutiny and the trial tially spectre the eliminates of unconstitu judge, legal within the limits of a discre- tionality); Bryan Lasswell, Comment, R. tion, there be no need more fear the Light: Why False Defense of right privacy of will of be the occasion Action, Must A Viable Remain Cause unjustifiable litigation, oppression, (1993) (stating S.Tex.L.Rev. wrong many than that the existence criticisms of false other rights bring in the law would about privacy Time); are not valid in such results. Welch, Inc., Gertz v. Robert Id. (1974) (explaining that the actual malice stan I respectfully dissent. powerful
dard administers antidote to the self-censorship
inducement to media and that
it correspondingly price exacts a high subjected injury who are but who standard).
will not be able surmount the abiding by
Instead of the decisions of the issue, federal courts on the first amendment K.D.F., Partnership, a Kansas General the court on relies a lone commentator in Employees Kansas Public Retirement implying United States System, Associates, Inc., and Pacholder Court analysis. failed in its constitutional Relators, That proper cannot role for this court. right right speak coexisted, have each must be REX, James L. Honorable respect enforced with due for the other. Respondent. Judge, England Pavesich v. New Ins. Life No. D-4340. Ga. recog- 50 S.E. That nizing right perplexing involves Supreme Court of Texas. questions to determine where it ends and the Argued Dec. 1993. rights begin others of the is a poor not recognizing right excuse for Decided June 1994. privacy. may Id. at Cases arise near marking border of another individual public, but this is true of other individ- out, correctly points proceeding).
7. The court and I whole that the malice I believe actual heartedly agree, guarantees comports that the Texas constitution has standard with these broad independent vitality providing damag remedy from the federal constitution in the context of simply reject speech. and that affords its Texas citizens broader free and false Rather than speech rights guaran than minimum federal I branch Davenport approach balancing tees of the First Amendment. See would favor of these each Garcia, (Tex. orig. important rights.
