delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought to recover the amount of a bill single, dated the 14th of December, 1857, and due the 1st day of March thereafter, for $278.24, made
Hpon these facts, the jury were instructed, by the Circuit Judge, in substance as follows : A man may be bound to pay a note without having signed his name to it, with his own hand. If he expressly, or by implication, authorize another to sign his name to such paper, he will be bound to pay it. If John S. Cain frequently signed George W. Cain’s name to notes executed to various persons, and if when informed of the fact, he made no objection, but said it was all right this is evidence of a general authority to affix his name to such paper. If John S. Cain had been accustomed to sign George’s name to promissory notes, and it appears that George acquiesced in it, it would be a fraud upon the plaintiff to permit defendant, now to deny it, and relieve himself from responsibility, unless before the signing of the note produced in this cause,
These instructions are erroneous. The distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments is entirely ignored.
To authorize the execution of a deed in the name of another, the authority must be by deed ; and no previous parol assent or subsequent adoption, will bind the party unless the instrument be acknowledged and re-delivered. The principles of law applicable to this case will be found in Turbeville & Darden vs. Ryan, 1 Hump., 113, and numerous other cases in our own Reports, and we need not repeat them: Smith et. ah. vs. Dickinson, 6 Hum., 261; Mosly vs. The State of Arkansas, 4 Sneed, 324; McNutt vs. McMahon, 1 Hood, 98.
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
