*1 CROCKETT, J., its Procedure, C. WADE Utah Rules of Civil relating McDONOUGPI, JJ., and ALDON feature three limitations month J. ANDERSON, Judge, District concur. relief because entertaining motions mistake, newly discovered evidence CALLISTER, participate. J., does not appar- makes A rule reading like. on based relief
ent that a motion for is ineffective therein
grounds enumerated decision after if made months P.2d 94 three proceed- sought. relief is from which CAHOON, Howard B. Plaintiff and “petition,” captioned a here, although ing Respondent, ac- original motion made fact a allega- on an PELTON, tion, primarily P. based Robert Defendant and Appellant. believe upon court.” We of “fraud tion No. 8976. court” upon the “fraud and hold that where pro- proceeding, gravamen of the is the Supreme Utah. Court of independent an pursued in ceeding must be July 15, 1959. suit, paying separate by filing action (which was statutory therefor filing fee is- statutory requiring here),
done process.
suance and service of being based attack here level upon court, having been
fraud de adoption after the some months
ed inde
cree, pursued in an have been must action, by way of motion and not
pendent Otherwise, rule action. original
in the much sense. make
would not (3), (4), proce- (1), (2), than more court. The for fraud order, judgment, obtaining any judg- dure relief from a 3 months * * * prescribed proceeding was entered or taken. ment shall be motion as power independent does not limit the of a those rules or an This rule action.” independent (Italics ours.) court to entertain * * * aside a tion set *3 McCarthy, & VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall Lewis, Ashton, Salt L. Leonard Clifford J. appellant. City, Lake City, for Hanni, McBroom Lake & Salt respondent.
WADE,' Justice. Pelton, appeals
Defendant, P. Robert in favor of jury judgment verdict from Cahoon, respondent plaintiff, Howard B. first for aliena- here, on two counts: Dorothy’s Dorothy affec- Plaintiff tion of his former wife married tions, City, 28, 1947, Salt Lake they second for criminal con- where June lived for years, versation two trials: about with her. There were two then their made home jury alienation of until in the first the found no Nevada she obtained a non- con- contested hut criminal divorce from him affections that there was there on De- versation, $20,000 compensatory assessing year cember about before this $5,000 punitive the tion damages. After was commenced on October mo- Two children granted trial the court defendant’s were born from this mar- first plaintiff riage. Dorothy refused tion for a new trial after married Gerald F. Shaw $19,000. December, 1957, remit Vegas, its order to Nevada. Las Dorothy Prior marriage plaintiff to her jury trial found in On the second Williams; they was married H. to Mark $25,000 plaintiff gen- favor and awarded had two obtained an inter- children. She damages $12,000punitive damages eral locutory divorce decree Williams $2,- on the criminal count and conversation 18, 1946,ordering that a March 500 on the count for alienation of affec- expiration decree be entered tions, spent plaintiff would have year. her On June support that amount to for- more than his marriage plaintiff, she filed affidavit her, away. Pelton mer wife had not led a final divorce from Williams The trial court cancelled and offset the ver- and such final entered nunc decree was against on the first of action dict cause 1, 1947, tunc as June June jury’s finding plain- that it would have cost Defendant Pelton contends that supported tiff more than to have his the final since in the Wil him, wife had she remained but re- plain liams case was not entered until after fused allow offset such ver- marriage Dorothy, tiff’s marriage holding count, dict on second that his is void because had an she undivorced liv jury’s actions were in accordance with the ing California, husband at that time.1 $12,- The court also held the intentions. Utah, states, same as and all other holds excessive, punitive damages reducing marriage void at the a second *4 $1,000, judgment them entered parties of the had an time one undivorced $26,000 Generally, living. for costs. husband or wife the laws 30-1-2, (2) 100, Commission, 697; subdivisions 65 Utah 234 P. 1. See Section Jenkins, 30-3-8, 239, (7), and Section all of Utah 107 Utah. v. 153 Jenkins Estate, 262; Annotated 1953. Also Sanders v. In re Dalton’s 109 Code 372, Commission, 64 Industrial Utah 230 P.2d 690. 167 1026; Utah Fuel Co. Industrial P. 228 take, inadvertence the negligence or consum marriage is where
of the state
signed,
and en-
has
filed
not been
validity.2 The Utah
its
mated determine
tered,
appeal
if
taken
been
interlocutory divorce
provide for an
laws
interlocutory judgment
motion
the
upon
ex
or
the
final
becomes
formerly
annul or set
made
trial to
period,
a new
piration
prescribed
of the
any
judgment
under
aside the
or for relief
months, without
now three
six and
Chapter
un
Title
Code
6 of Part
the court
order of
further decree
Procedure,
court,
of Civil
proceedings
appeal or other
an
less
upon
party
within motion
either
thereto or
court
or the
pending
are
review
motion, may
judg-
own
cause a
its
Califor
orders.3
that time otherwise
signed,
and en-
dated,
ment to be
longer
expiration
aof
law, requiring the
nia
filed
decree,
tered
granting
therein
divorce
even
separate final
period
also
tunc,
when
date
the same could have been
pro
nunc
though may
entered
be
given
applied
or made
the court
policy.
contrary
public
to our
may
The court
cause such final
for.
provide for
statutes
California
signed, dated,
judgment to be
filed and
interlocutory judgment
entry
aforesaid,
pro
entered nunc
tunc
divorce
that a
the court's determination
even though
may
a final
have
a final
entry of
granted and the
should
previously
whereby
entered
mis-
year
expiration
one
judgment upon
take, negligence or inadvertence the
ttpon
133,6providing
thereafter.5 Section
same has
signed,
not been
filed
en-
ex
at
final decree
enter the
failure to
as soon as it
tered
could
been en-
have
entry of
year for the
piration of tered under
law if applied
for.
which,
slight
judgment nunc
tunc
Upon
filing
judgment,
such final
here,
immaterial
which are
amendments
the parties to such action shall be
provides:
deemed to have been restored to the
parties in
single persons
either
status
“Whenever
the date
law,
is, under the
en-
judgment,
action
any
mar-
affixed
judgment,
a final
but mis-
riage
parties
either
titled
sitch
subse-
McTeigh,
Or.
4. See
Huard
West’s
Annotated Civil California
528; Shippee
Ship
Codes,
39 A.L.R..
P.
Section 131.
pee,
A.2d 77.
N.H.
See West’s Annotated Civil Codes,
and 30-3-7
30-3-6
Section 132.
3. See
1957 amendments thereto which
6. See West’s
Annotated Civil California
Codes,
time from six months
reduces
Section 133.
for the divorce decree
months
three
also
absolute.
Johnson v.
become
Johnson, 116 Utah
229
quent
similar to these
granting
year
the
recognized
has been
of
after
the interlocutory judgment
number of times.9 We have found no con-
by
as shown
trary
court,
the
the
minutes
the
and
Hampshire
decisions. The New
of
Maryland
could
entered
have been
cases cited in
note 9 involved
final
pro
nunc
applied for,
imder the
be
law
shall
tunc California final
un-
decrees
der
valid
purposes
date
this statute
the
as
Oregon
in-
the
case
af-
volved a
judgment, upon
such
the
pro
nunc
tunc final decree entered
fixed
(Emphasis ours.)
in Washington
filing
copied
state under a statute
thereof.”
from the California
All
statute.
these cases
enactment,
exception,
Without
since that
hold that the
pro
adjudi-
nunc
tunc decree
validity
recognized
the
cated that
parties
the
were restored to
remarriage
the
party
a divorce de
their status
single persons upon
as
the nunc
although
actually
cree
final decree
the
was
pro tunc date of the final
and were
entered
remarriage
after the
where the
capable of contracting
marriage
a valid
remarriage
pro
nunc
tunc
occurred after the
thereafter. Such
holding
is our
in this case.
date of
final decree.7 California ex
pro
pressly
nunc
recognizes
under
Defendant argues that Utah law
does
parties
thereto
tunc decision
permit an action for criminal conversation.
persons
of-single
restored
their
status
We
judicial
have no statute or
decision au-
final de
pro tunc
on the nunc
date
thorizing or approving such an action.
thereupon
for mar
eligible
cree and
became
Some
states have
statute abolished such
person.8
riage to a third
actions. Defendant
that such
contends
actions are in disfavor and
not now
should
marriage
validity
aof
second
approved.
nunc
He further
after a California
contends
in
state
another
facts
under
68-3-1, U.C.A.1953,10
divorce decree
tunc final
adopted
Section
we
Cal.App.2d
Macedo,
68-3-1,
provides:
29
v.
Macedo
10.Section
See
England
Superior
Ringel
552;
“The
common Lato
v.
387,
P.2d
84
so
far
repugnant to,
Cal.App.2d
County,
as if is
or in
54
Alameda
conflict
Court
Estate,
Hughes’
with,
558;
the Constitution or
34,
In re
Laws
P.2d
128
States,
253;
or the
Cal.App.2d
United
Constitution or
Hamrick
82 P.2d
80
state,
Cal.App.2d
Hamrick,
laios
this
260 P.
119
and so far
v.
Cal.App.2d
Nicolai,
adapted
188;
96
v.
with
it is consistent
Nicolai
2d
physical
natural
conditions of this
Nicolai,
people
last
cited
case
and the necessities of
Nicolai
state
thereof,
8. hereby adopted,
shall he
in note 7.
Shippee,
rule
decision in all
Shippee
courts
N.H.
9. See
Bannister,
77;
(Emphasis ours.)
They
state."
181 Md.
Bannister
A.2d
indi-
Kelley’s Estate,
287;
adopted
1898;
In re
A.2d
cate the statute
provision
appears
P.2d 328.
first
210 Or.
Revised Statutes of Utah for 1933.
equity
prevails
in this
generally
with
together
England,
law of
common
country,’ yet
did
extend or trans-
1898, when
not so
statutes
plant
points
England,
He
law
common
enacted.
originally
statute
harshness,
only much
rigor
Act of all its
so
Causes
Matrimonial
out that
time,
recog-
of it
generally
and had
England at
1857 was in effect
*6
as
country,
and
England
and
in this
nized
enforced
of
by which
law
the common
abol-
is and
conditions.”
was
suitable to our
criminal conversation
tion for
quoted.)
(Emphasis
person
opinion
aby
by author of
damages
ished and
claim for
clearly
glance
A
shows
claimant’s
decisions
with
at our
intercourse
who had sexual
England
in a
common law
that
follow the
of
by the husband
we
be claimed
wife could
developed
expounded by
de-
the courts
and
this statute
Under
action.11
only
country,
for of last
that
action
resort
law
this
claims the common
fendant
rely
or
on rare
do
refer to
exist.
occasions
we
did not
criminal conversation
constantly re-
English
the
decisions but
adopts
com
the
only
Section 68-3-1
ly on the decisions
our
of
sister states.
con
it
“as
is
far
England so
law
mon
of
by
we
Thus
this statute
is clear
and
the natural
adapted to
with and
sistent
only
adopted
England
the
law of
common
the
and
State
of this
physical conditions
conditions,
where it
suitable to our
is
and
people thereof”
of the
necessities
morals,
gen-
history
background, that
and
Con
with the
to or in conflict
repugnant
erally
law
system
to the
of common
we look
or
States
the United
or laws
stitution
prevails
has been
equity
in and
and
which
quotation
Although the above
this State.
by
developed
being
is now
the deci-
and
Re
by the
our statute
to
was added
rej
country
the
we
sions of this
ect
stat
this
construing
vision,
prior thereto
England which
not suita-
is
common law
“that
Hatch,12
held
we
Hatch v.
ute in
needs,
or
adapted to our
morals
ble
Ter
the
extending
by
over
Congress,
while
ideals.
laws
the Constitution
ritory of Utah
force, in the
put in
United States
the
right of
The Hatch case involved the
Unit
of the
Supreme Court
of the
of a married woman to inherit
language
heirs
law and
property
against
her
common
heirs of
system of
her
States,13 ‘the
ed
Crites,
controlling
dictum,
features
Buchanan
cites
11.Counsel
100, 103,
428,
154 A.L.R.
based on Utah
statutes.
that case
Hatch,
116,
common law of
46 Utah
12.
Hatch
by
adopted
“in
1100.
England
this statute
148 P.
States,
England
in effect in
Church
United
statutes
13. Mormon
cluded
adoption.”
Syl
1, 62, 10 S.Ct.
L.Ed.
of the
U.S.
the time
at
clearly
This statement
labus
We held
are one
by
who outlived her.
having, marriage
she
husband
lost
England wherein
right
her
along
law of
property
common
sue
with
her
identity
separate
rights
with her
general,
her
though
may'
lost
even
the act
wife
property
her
and be
right
sue
sued
committed with her
is
consent
inconsis-
not,
respect to tent with
rights
general
with
concept
did
our statutes and our
not',
rights
the the
rights
married women’s
become
of married
women and did
part
become a
law of this State.
laws
State..
right of the
common law
This
not mean
does
this:
person
for criminal
husband
sue another
recovery
State the
right
husband has no
wife,
conversation
was re
with his
adultery
criminal
conversation
pealed
by Matrimonial Causes
or altered
his wife
another
But
man.
it does mean
theory
Act
was based on
right
recovery
that such
is
based on the
trespass
to be
the wife which had
right
spouse
exclusive
of either
to inter
brought
husband
he and
because
person
course with
other. A
vio
who
one,
property
his wife were
all of her
lates this right, though with the consent or
rights manage
and sue in
guilty spouse,
even enticement of the
*7
belonged
hus
connection therewith
to her
in damages
liable
spouse.
to the innocent
contrary
right
band. Such a
is
to the law It
respects
is similar in some
right
to the
subject
developed
on that
in
this State against
of
alienation
affections but
is
most,
all,
and
in this
states
stronger
requires
in that it
the commission
country.
emancipated
completely
Utah adultery
in violation of the criminal
given
and
rights
a married woman the same
by
law.
states
Some
have
statute abolished
as she would have had were she not married liability for alienation of affections while
property
and
rights
separate
the same
to her
liability
retaining the
for criminal convers
husband,
as her
both
our decisions and
ation.15
right
statutes.14 The
of a
to
husband
sue
another man
criminal conversation with
excellent
for
There
an
statement
this
is
trespass
Wife,
against
wife as
her
the right
his
with
in 27
and
Husband
Am.Jur.
name,
theory being
they
suit
his
that
as follows:
Section
Taylor
Patten,
right
14. See
v.
Utah 2d
not abolish
of action
but does
“A which right fundamental plies to the law these As marriage, from to contentions. the relation of society re- this which State both contentions the well of these being inviolate, quires against decided Wilson should maintained defendant Oldroyd.18 case spouse that given have exclusive of one to reasons other, case, equally are even applicable marital intercourse with this to con- though adul- person is an criminal whenever a third commits this action for versation, Oldroyd case com- and the tery spouse, he she Wilson v. either rights was an action for of affection. alienation mits tortious invasion of a cause spouse, the other de previously We have also conversation action for criminal conten squarely against cided defendant’s
arises.” plaintiff’s is bar right tion to recover great majority decisions previous awarded red decree divorce country this agree with statement. this his misconduct grounds on of his wife emanci with our It is in accord statutes Knapton.19 we held in Sadleir There decisions pating women and our married res prior that the decree divorce be persons rights of manned on the judicata de plaintiff’s against as to claim come persons who them tween party not a fendant defendant was because spouses.17 we conclude So between further held to the We divorce action. an action authorizes the law of State 30-3-9, providing that Section conver damages criminal recover party guilty sation. acquired by marriage” rights “forfeits point In with this connection parties rights between the meant England law the common based rights marriage and not include did erred that the court contends
defendant party. a third adhere our We return a jury to verdict allowing the question. previous decision on receiving evidence damages punitive question. re- are a number of reasons which wealth on that There of defendant’s *8 law of contention that he was on the common fute defendant’s have said we What affections, Knap 10, v. Sadleir to of the wife’s 30-2-1 16. Sections See 26, 278, Patten, 1954, ton, 1956, Taylor 2 2d 5 2d 296 P.2d Utah also Oldroyd, 362, 696, 1 Utah 2d 698. Wilson v. P.2d 759. P.2d Patten, Taylor in note cited 17. See Oldroyd, many Wilson v. cited note in the stat- 18. cases cited the rec- 17. Utah has cited in that note. utes Knapton, right ognized cited in note to sue for alienation 19. See Sadleir v. 17. the expressly on out first cause dismissing the prejudiced by a trial granting the of new trial After a new action. the court ordered the first cause of action. plaintiff part the when refused remit to being and, plaintiff satisfied prepared original judgment, plaintiff $25,000 crim the amount verdict for of the approval, en- with the there was court’s a new inal move for conversation did not no expressly decreeing judgment a tered count trial the of affections on alienation Plain- cause of on the count. first action He jury against him. the found thereupon tiff moved for a trial new on only after sought on that issue a new trial judgment granted which the court he re trial when the court ordered a new Regard- argument September on the remit difference fused to the between procedure neces- less of whether this these $25,000 $6,000. award Under ordering sary, fully justified court in the ac causes of the circumstances since two a new trial on both counts. facts, and tion the set of arose out of complete A answer to defendant’s claimed on the evidence trial court found that error in a granting new trial on first jury presented both of action causes count judgment is was entered court question, plaintiff the fairness against that count on him. The trial court on both new trial granted should have jury’s and cancelled the offset verdict for counts. Whether this is $2,500 against on count him because is new trial original court’s order jury also found it would plain- have cost terms general uncertain. The order is more than amount support tiff his specify that expressly and does not had she remained wife with him. We are count, only one granted
new trial is on pass upon called propriety motion recite that defendant’s but does jury requiring determine such generally granted. It is for a new trial propriety costs, nor the such offset of the circumstances under these held that costs, against such amount we think both counts.20 granted on new trial is judgment appro- entered the amount priate clearly view circumstances. facts which additional There were Likewise, the refusal to enter judgment trial was that the show new justify and defendant original judg- count eliminates counts. granted on both defendant’s April 17, quoting while our consideration conten- entered ment counts, justify does that the evidence both entered tion findings on jury’s $25,000 the first cause of action with- submission of only for costs Error, 1228; Bock, 66 C.J.S New Trial Sec. Wash.2d Cramer 20. See p. 11, p. 726, Appeal 525; § 99 also § Am.Jur. *9 1; husband after the occurred divorced from No. jury because the acts
Nevada, year interlocutory period, but before abolished an and Nevada has decree, entry since actual a final she marries So of tion alienation of affections. 2; count the No. the latter discovers that judgment husband no was entered on and, had the decree been entered verdict has never is the fact, upon annul- relying of affec- obtains an granted the alienation on ment; the wife marries husband No. then tions cause of action. 3; final thereafter husband 1 has the No. Many points argued on behalf are question arises: decree entered. The plain- of of defendant and some on behalf subsequent is vali- marriages Which of the cross-appeal. tiff After careful under his entry decree dated? If the later of a final we arguments consideration all these of of purport the divorce as would to validate they merit conclude that are without a certain and set in motion a chain date will not them in detail. we discuss rectify everything reaction to respondent. Judgment affirmed. Costs on, point complications could exist further Judge, KELLER, con- F. District W. deaths, born, may where children have been curs. probates prop- personal or vesting upon the erty rights had occurred based McDONOUGH, in the Justice, concurs validity invalidity assumption of such or result. a decree. It is realized that children legitimate would be under law and be (concurring). CROCKETT, Chief Justice property rights, secure both status and com- make these desire to but I concur may spouses but so as not be to the difficul- circumstances some Under ments: may rights in- others whose become holding that involved may be ties volved. divorce has decree entry final only making the discussed, difficulty The above validating date, but also prior aof judg- argue against the affirmance of before contracted was marriage which ment, acknowledge the existence It might entered. in fact final decree ruling problem and to observe per- status of as to the confusion produce the facts should be restricted to herein validity relying subsequently sons If when situations this case. decree. invalidity such a arise, they would postulated above have upon the basis of law and example to be dealt might which occur Consider equity applicable thereto. A wife is statute: the California under defect, myself be too much con- of a later discovered technical bring I cannot his, escape case would precedent this no concern with the cerned responsibility facts regard establish in that because invaded the mar- having riage destroyed conscience existing justice good here it. jury ver- imperative seem to render .that *10 HENRIOD, (dissenting). Justice The Ca- judgment be affirmed.
dict and belief good in faith in the hoons married dissent, I believing plaintiff to have had final. The that Cahoon’s divorce was Mrs. no cause Any of action. alleged marriage- they jury presupposes finding of the with one not husband,, divorced from her happily some living together. If 30-1-2, under Title void,— it marriage existed technical defect voidable, anything short void. —not that it have is reasonable to assume would The woman here had absolutely capac- no corrected, it The mere fact of as was. been ity to consummate a marriage here at .irregularity existence of some time it was undertaken. That should end matter, defendant no basis to and no should afford the extraterritorial statute act, ministerial pro nunc tunc or other- relationship. intrude into their wrongfully wise, should be allowed to control the status reasoning has Analagous to the which of one applying for marriage here. property rights: applied to Mr. Ca- been To determine other wise prin- marriage into the flouts the had entered hoon ciple that the law of the rights had in the forum acquired such as he mar- controls matters of marriage status good relationship in faith and the lack of riage at it. To conclude may otherwise under what be called a allows foreign least had them a state to determine the persons with “color of status right and title.” claim of applying marriage Utah, Any strips technical defect affected our legislature having of its spouses and absolute rights between the and inherent It prerogative determining the Cahoons. no adverse who shall or upon anyone capacity right confer assail- shall not have marry should no here, and,, decision, now, Mr. ing marriage from without. Thus after this makes judicial part. right the legislation permits Pelton had no assert on our It an in- and, fact, validity dividual, pleasure, had marriage at his to determine his Utah, by knowledge other than that it was valid. no status invoking own an extra- engaged wrongful nevertheless statute He territorial ministerial act simple Under device through filing conduct. those circumstances or fail- paper gross injustice seem to the writer a would elsewhere. ing to I am .file aware permit wrongdoer to take advantage of no instance where state so benignly Shippee powers. misapplied case is left a different has its One ceded coveted pro technique entirely “nunc tunc” court would done this have to an what wonder surplus- a bit of set of contained different facts. had statute Its conclusion our irrespective the statutes the California statute could in- saying that validate an age state, marriage nonethe- marriage, obviously valid York New any at authority arrived on the be void. of cases cited less would exception therein. With the of the Cali- competent opinion The main cites cases, concededly fornia which con- must “The authority to sustain its assertion there, trol not one the cases can cited another marriage in validity of a second apply to the situation All here. of them pro tunc nunc after a state say, rightly, that a sister must state facts similar divorce decree under judgments recognize rendered in other recognized a number states, though entered “nunc tunc.” cited, pur- cases Two of three times.” They presuppose assume, and the statement, Bannister porting to sustain such they clearly are with concerned facts Estate, do Kelley’s and In re Bannister show, actually had been cases support Both deal it at all. rendered, through error, prop- occur- marriages both first second perfected. *11 not erly had Such is not tunc” pro “nunc ring within here. case No rendered inac- state. The state, in another not one long here until after the second marriage, is apparent. It is curacy the statement and the “nunc tunc” judg- the law of those cases that in conceded designed perfect ment not judg- But marriages. both govern would forum already reason, ment rendered but for some by self-serving mean that does not that erroneously perfected. not Based on such an ex- can embark on a state legislation, misapplication entirely rule, of an different legislative an- domain of into the cursion indulgence with the court’s in an unwar- effectively latter tell and state other anachronism, ranted Shippee case is capable of be or cannot persons can what authority for the decision here. marriage there. The a valid consummating nullius is the of California pro tunc nunc here conclusion in- allows an es- attempts to it insofar as juris of dividual, pleasure, at his declare own his capacity and qualifications tablish by filing or not filing paper status in in the latter. status marital jurisdiction, govern another cannot Utah, cited the main has only case state of ramifications that dangerous support of its is that could result sapping conclusion opinion Shippee. strength. legislative It obvious that Shippee v. is Utah’s here, Knapton. It seems that such conclusions pertinent Although it not seem does opin- wrongdoings categorizing result the main challenge I the contention of and into good wrongdoings, com- into or bad emancipated women ion Utah has compensable wrong- noncompensable pletely by It statute and decision. Secs, doings. nothing in done neither. There is any suggests
30-2-1 to U.C.A.1953 I think the case should be reversed intend- legislature had thing. If the instructions to dismiss. emancipa- complete, partial rather ed than in- tion, one section have sufficed would CALLISTER, Justice,, participating. not Patten, Taylor cited As stead ten. contention, support it does support a dis- justice it at all. One disqualified judge replacing
trict court
justice, thought the case should stand it proposition, justices thought two shouldn’t, by dissenting, justice inter-
thought only during' it should WALLIS, Appellant, Sereta J. Plaintiff and
locutory period. That case can only proposition wife cited for the that a WALLIS, nd E. a Marvin Defendant might sue her husband for assault Respondent. during zvas committed the assault No. 8946. period (and I
interlocutory think even — far.) went too Supreme Court of Utah. July 31, 1959. difficult passing, to see the con-
In sistency of Chief CROCKETT’s Justice who that one alienates affections
conclusion to advantage be allowed him-
should technicality, while the by a Chief
self approves a recovery condones
justice who, judicial finding decree,
by one *12 guilty extreme held mental very one whose affec-
cruelty toward alienated, allegedly re-
tions —as CROCKETT’s Mr. Chief
fleeted Justice here, Sadleir
concurrence