ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs filed this putative class action against defendants Ford Motor Company, General Motors LLC (“GM”), Toyota Motor Corporation and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc, (the latter two collectively as “Toyota”), alleging that defendants have equipped their vehicles with computer technology that is susceptible to being hacked by third parties. They also assert that defendants improperly collect and transmit information about vehicle performance and the geographical location of the cars they sell in violation of plaintiffs’ right to privacy.
Plaintiffs have not established specific or general jurisdiction against Ford. Additionally, given the lack of injury flowing from the asserted potential hacking issue, they lack standing to sue the defendants. Their privacy' claims are conclusorily pleaded and need more specificity. For these reasons, I GRANT defendants’ motions to dismiss with leave to amend.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) identifies three classes of plaintiffs: (1) the “California Class,” consisting of plaintiffs who bring California state law and California constitutional law claims against GM and Toyota in connection with vehicles purchased in California; (2) the “Oregon Class,” consisting of plaintiffs who bring Oregon state law claims against Ford in connection with vehicles purchased in Oregon; and (3) the ‘Washington Class,” consisting of plaintiffs who bring Washington state law claims against Ford in connection with vehicles purchased in Washington. FAC [Dkt, No. 37]. The central problem alleged is that because the cars’ computer systems lack security, basic vehicle functions can be controlled by individuals outside the car, endangering the safety of véhicle occupants. FAC ¶ 2. For example, hacking can result in the loss of driver control over the throttle, brakes, and steering whéel. FAC ¶ 1.
Defendants’ vehicles utilize dozens of electronic control units (“ECUs”), which are small computers that control various vehicle operations. FAC ¶ 3. Vehicle safety depends on “near real time” communication between the ECUs. FAG ¶28. The ECUs communicate through a controller area network,- or “CAN bus,” by sending each other digital messages called “CAN packets.” FAC ¶¶ 3-4. Because “there is no ECU source or authentication, nor any encryption, built into CAN packets,” anyone with physical access to a vehicle -can utilize the CAN bus to send malicious CAN packets to the ECUs. FAC ¶30. Additionally, - defendants’ vehicles are equipped with wireless Bluetooth and cell
Plaintiffs assert that defendants have known for a long time that their vehicles can be hacked, and cite numerous research studies and media articles dating back to 2011 that document the electronic security vulnerabilities of defendants’ vehicles. FAC ¶¶ 36-40. In one article, for example, a journalist wrote,
“As I drove to the top of the parking lot ramp, the car’s engine suddenly shut off, and I started to roll backward____This wasn’t some glitch triggered by a defective ignition switch, but rather an orchestrated attack performed wirelessly, from the other side of the parking lot, by a security researcher.”
FAC ¶ 35.
Plaintiffs also allege that despite defendants’ knowledge of significant security vulnerabilities, they market their vehicles as safe. FAC ¶¶ 41-48. Toyota’s promotional materials claim, for example, that “Toyota’s Integrated Safety Management Concept sets the direction for safety technology development and vehicle development,' and covers all aspects of driving by integrating individual vehicle safety technologies and systems rather than viewing them as independently functioning units.” FAC ¶ 42. Toyota also claims to be developing “advanced driving support systems where the driver maintains control and the fun-to-drive aspect of controlling a vehicle is not compromised.” FAC ¶ 44. Ford makes similar safety claims, such as, “When you look over the impressive list of collision avoidance and occupant protection features, you’ll know how well-equipped Fusion is when it comes to you and your passengers’ safety.” FAC ¶ 46. Ford makes the same claim about the Focus, stating, ‘You don’t have to pick and choose when it comes to safety. Focus is well equipped with an impressive list of safety features.” Id. GM says “Quality and safety are at the top of the agenda at GM, as we work on technology improvements in crash avoidance and crashworthiness to augment the post-event benefits of OnS-tar, like advanced automatic crash notification.” FAC ¶ 47. GM also touts the “vast test capabilities” of its new “Active Safety Testing Area,” which will “increase GM’s ability to bring the best new safety technologies to the customer.” FAC ¶ 48.
Plaintiffs further contend that defendants collect owner data, specifically geographic location, diving history, and vehicle performance, from the vehicle computers and then share that data with third parties without securing the transmission. FAC ¶¶ 49-50, 135. Defendants disclose their data collection practices in owners’ manuals, online privacy statements, and the terms and conditions of specific feature activations, but. drivers cannot opt-out of data collection without disabling the relevant feature. FAC ¶ 50.
This class action has five" named plaintiffs. Helene Cahen resides in Berkeley, California. She purchased a Lexus RX 400 H in September 2008 from a Lexus dealer in San Rafael, California, FAC ¶ 12. Lexus vehicles are manufactured and sold by Toyota. FAC ¶ 8. Merrill Nisam lives in Mill Valley, California, and purchased a Chevrolet Volt in March 2013 from a Chevrolet dealer in Novato, California. FAC ¶ 14. Chevrolet vehicles are manufactured and sold by GM. FAC ¶8, Kerry Tompulis lives in Beaverton, Oregon, and
Plaintiffs bring multiple causes of action which'differ for each sub-class. The “California Class,” led by plaintiffs Cahen and Nisam, brings eight causes of action against GM and Toyota: (1) violation of the California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; (2) violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Cod § 1250, et seq.; (3) violation of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17500, et seq.; (4) breach of California’s Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Cal. Com. Code § 2314; (5) breach of contract at California common law; (6) fraud by concealment at California common law; (7) violation' of California’s Song-Beverly Consurhér Warranty Act, Cal.'Civ. Code §§ 1791.1 & 1792; and (8) invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, Cal. Const, art. I, § 1. FAC ¶¶ 62-138.
The “Oregon Class,” led by plaintiff Tompulis, brings three causes of action against Ford: (1) violation of Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605, et seq.; (2) breach of Oregon’s Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Or. Rev. Stat. § 72.3140; and (3) fraudulent concealment at Oregon common law. FAC ¶¶ 139-167.
Finally, the “Washington Class,” led by plaintiffs Gibbs and Langdon, brings four causes of action against Ford: (1) violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act, Rev. Code'Wash. Ann. § 19.86.010, et seq.; (2) breach of Washington’s Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Rev.. Code Wash. § 62A.2-614; (3) breach of contract at Washington common law; and (4) fraudulent concealment at Washington common law. FAC ¶¶ 168-200.
Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of an injunction that enjoins defendants from continuing to market their cars as safe and requires them to establish a recall program and provide free repairs, such as the addition of Trusted Platform Modules. FAC at p. 34-35. They also request costs, fees, and damages, including punitive damages and disgorgement. Id. After the parties briefed defendants’ motions to dismiss, I heard argument on November 3, 2015.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ, P. 8(a)(2),. in, order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block,
In considering whether a claim satisfies this standard, the court must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the. pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
DISCUSSION
Defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds, including: (1) lack of personal jurisdiction against Ford; (2) failure to establish Article III standing; (3) failure to state a claim under the applicable state laws and the California constitution; and (4) preemption of plaintiffs’ claims by state and federal law. Because I find that personal jurisdiction against Ford is lacking and that the plaintiffs have failed to establish standing for their claims, I do not discuss the other arguments.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a' defendant to seek dismissal of an action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). When a defendant challenges a courts personal jurisdiction over it, ‘the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper. Ranza v. Nike, Inc.,
When no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, a district • court applies the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits. Id, California’s long-arm statute permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction consistent with constitutional due process. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 410.10. Due process requires that a non-resident defendant have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
The “minimum contacts” requirement can be satisfied in two ways: general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction applies where a nonresident defendant’s “affiliations with the State are so ’continuous and systematic’ as to- render it essentially at home in the forum state.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. -,
Ford moves to dismiss the claims brought by Tompulis, Gibbs, and Langdon (the “Ford plaintiffs”) on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction over Ford in California. Ford makes two primary arguments: (1) because none of the Ford plaintiffs’ claims arise out of Ford’s California related activities, there is no specific jurisdiction; and (2) general jurisdiction is lacking because Ford it is neither headquartered nor incorporated in California and does not have the sufficient “minimum contacts" with California in order for general jurisdiction to be appropriate. Ford Mot. at 3-9 [Dkt. No, 47], Ford is correct on both counts.
A. Specific Jurisdiction
The Ford plaintiffs do not address or oppose Ford’s contention that specific jurisdiction does not lie here. This is apt.
A three-prong test is used to determine whether specific jurisdiction exists:
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
Schwarzenegger,
The Ford plaintiffs purchased or leased their vehicles in Oregon and Washington. FAC ¶¶ 13, 15. Their claims arise from the allegedly defective CAN bus units in their vehicles and deficiencies in Ford’s disclosures to consumers in Oregon and'Washington regarding the sale, marketing, and warranties of those cars. However, none of those claims is tied to Ford’s activities in California. The 2014 Ford Escape Tompulis leased was manufactured in Louisville, Kentucky and then sold to her in Oregon. Dwyer Dec. ¶ 4 [Dkt. No. 47-1]; FAC ¶ 13. The 2013 Ford Fusion Gibbs and Langdon purchased was manufactured in Sonora, Mexico and sold in Washington. Dwyer Dec. ¶ 5; FAC ¶ 15. The CAN bus systems in both cars were neither manufactured nor designed in California. Pap-pas Decl. ¶¶ 4-5 [Dkt. No. 47-2], The warranties at issue were disseminated with the new vehicles at the point of sale and are also available on the website (which is administered from Michigan). Ford Mot. at 8. Notably, the Ford plaintiffs, who at the time of the filing of the FAC were all non-California residents, bring no causes of action against the other defendants, Toyota and GM. See FAC ¶¶ 139-200.
In short, the Ford plaintiffs bring solely Oregon and Washington causes of action stemming from transactions that occurred in those states. They have failed to demonstrate that specific jurisdiction over Ford is appropriate in California.
B. General Jurisdiction
The Ford plaintiffs argue that general jurisdiction exists over Ford because
Plaintiffs’ argument rests on the notion that a company’s “continuous and systematic” contacts can confer general jurisdiction, See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
The Court in Daimler held that Daimler AG, the German manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz automobiles, was not subject to general jurisdiction in California “despite its multiple offices, continuous operations, and billions of dollars’ worth of sales there.” Id. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). “[0]nly a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.” Daimler,
Ford is not incorporated in California, nor does it have its principal1 place of business here. FAC ¶ 22 (noting that Ford is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan). These facts, alone, are strong evidence that Ford is not at home in California. Daimler,
The Ford plaintiffs’ reliance on pre-Da-imler cases that use a “continuous and systematic” analysis must be reconsidered in light of this relatively recent precedent. Even if Ford’s business contacts with'California are continuous and systematic, approving the exercise of general jurisdiction in every state in which a corporation does business would be “unacceptably grasping'.” Id. at 761; see also Google Inc. v. Rockstar Consortium U.S. LP., No. 13-cv-5933-CW,
In Daimler, the Court denied the exercise of general jurisdiction even though Daimler’s subsidiary, whose contacts were imputed for the purposes of the Court’s analysis,. “ha[d] multiple California-based facilities,” was the “largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the California market,” and its “California sales accounted] for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales.”
The Court noted that in an “exceptional case,” “a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Daimler,
II. STANDING
Defendants assert that plaintiffs lack standing for all of their claims. “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum . • of standing contains three elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
Plaintiffs claim that they have been injured as a result of defendants’ alleged misrepresentation. They assert that “they would not have purchased then' [vehicles] or would not have paid as much as they did to purchase them.” FAC ¶ 66. Similarly, they contend that “they paid an inflated purchase or lease price for the [vehicles].” FAC ¶ 78.
A. Whether Injury In Fact Exists Based On The Risk Of Future Hacking.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot assert injury in fact based on the risk of future harm from the alleged product defect (that defendants’ cars are susceptible to hacking by third parties). The crux of defendants’ contention is that the risk of future injury caused by insecure software is not an injury in fact under Article III because such a scenario is too speculative to constitute a “certainly impending” injury. Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, — U.S. -,
The Court recently discussed injury in fact in Clapper, where the plaintiffs sought to invalidate a federal law that “allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing the surveillance of individuals who are not ‘United States persons’ and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.”
(1) the Government will decide- to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its authority under § 1881a rather than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will' conclude that the Government’s proposed surveillance procedures satisfy § 188-la’s many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the Government will succeed in intercepting the communications of respondents’ contacts; and (5) respondents will be parties to the particular communications that the Government intercepts.
Id. at 1148.
Defendants place great weight on U.S. Hotel and Resort Management, Inc. v.
Plaintiffs respond that Onity is inappo-site because the susceptibility to hacking in Onity merely posed the threat of break-in, whereas the potential hacking of plaintiffs vehicles poses the more substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death. - GM Opp. at 12 [Dkt. No. 53]; Toyota Opp. at 13 [Dkt. No. 52]; Ford Opp. at 17-18. But plaintiffs conflate the nature of the future risk at stake with the plausibility of the future risk for standing purposes — that a greater risk may be at stake in this case does,not speak to whether the risk is any more plausible.
Plaintiffs also note that Onity did not arise in the Ninth Circuit, GM Opp. at 12; Toyota Opp. at 13; Ford Opp. at 17, That is true, but' Ninth Circuit precedent is in line with the Onity court’s interpretation of Clapper. For example, although Birdsong v. Apple, Inc.,
Onity and Birdsong are instructive. As in Onity, which involved a similar risk of future hacking, here plaintiffs allege only that their vehicles are susceptible to future hacking by third parties. FAC ¶¶ 1-2, 30, 34. Plaintiffs therefore fail1-to- allege that any harm is “certainly impending” because while it is possible that a potential hacker would in fact attempt to gain control of a vehicle, “allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Onity,
Judges in this District regularly deny standing in product liability- cases where
At the hearing on these motions, plaintiffs’ counsel encouraged me to rely on In re MyFord TouchConsumer Litigation to find standing in this case. MyFord Touch is not analogous. The contested defects in MyFord Touch were numerous, had already manifested, and had been experienced by the plaintiffs bringing the case.
All of this is not to say that a future risk of harm can never satisfy injury in fact analysis. Although a speculative future • risk will not suffice, “a credible threat of harm is sufficient to constitute actual injury for standing purposes.” Riva v. Pepsico, Inc.,
The requirement that a threat of harm be credible is not ah empty one, especially in light of Clapper’s requirement that the threat be “certainly impending.” Just as it was impossible for the Riva court to determine whether the Pepsi drinkers faced an increased risk of cancer, it is difficult for me to conclude whether plaintiffs’ vehicles might be hacked at some point in the future, especially in light of the fact that plaintiffs do not allege that anybody outside of a controlled environment has ever been hacked. Plaintiffs have alleged only that their cars are susceptible to hacking but have failed to plead that they consequently face a credible risk of hacking..
B. Whether Injury In Fact Exists Based On The Alleged Economic Loss Flowing From The Risk Of Future Hacking.
Plaintiffs argue that they have Article III standing because of the economic loss that flows from the risk of future injury. GM Opp. at 10; Toyota Opp. at 11; Ford Opp. at 15. They principally rely.on Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp.,
In Hinojos, plaintiffs alleged they were induced to purchase products that were falsely advertised as on sale but- had in reality been “marked down” from fictitiously high “original” prices. Hinojos,
In re Toyota I involved widespread and well-documented sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota' model cars.
While it was appropriate for that court to infer a market effect from widespread and' well-documented -acceleration problems, here the market effect is hypothetical. As Ford points out, all vehicles manufactured post-2008 are required to- be equipped with some form of the CAN bus
Additionally, in a later order from that very same case, the court found that “[wjhen economic loss is predicated solely on how a product functions, and the product has not malfunctioned, the Court agrees that something more is required than simply alleging an overpayment for a ’defective’ product.” In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Litig.,
Cases in this District hold that concluso-ry allegations of economic loss stemming from a speculative future risk of harm cannot establish Article. Ill standing unless plaintiffs plead “something more.” In Boysen, for example, the court found that economic injury could not establish injury in fact where “plaintiffs did not plead a distinct risk of harm from a defect in defendants’ products that would make such an economic injury cognizable.”
Similarly, in Contreras, the economic harm stemming from alleged but unmani-fested deficiencies in Toyota brakes failed to establish injury in fact. Contreras,
Here, the California Class plaintiffs allege that had they known about the lack of electronic security in their vehicles, “they would not have purchased their Class Vehicles or would not have paid as much as they did to purchase them.” FAC ¶¶ 66, 81. The California plaintiffs also contend that they “suffered injury in fact and actual damages resulting from [defendants’ material omissions and misrepresentations because they paid an inflated purchase or lease price for the Class Vehicles.” FAC ¶ 78. The plaintiffs in the Oregon and Washington classes similarly allege that they have been injured “[a]s a result of their reliance” upon defendants’ omissions because of “their lost benefit of the bargain and overpayment at the time of purchase or lease and/or the diminished value of their Class Vehicles.’-’ FAC ¶¶ 165, 198.
C. Whether Injury In Fact Exists Based On The Invasion Of Privacy Claims Asserted By The California Class Against GM And Toyota.
Finally, Toyota and GM dispute whether the California Class plaintiffs have established injury in fact to bring the invasion of privacy claim under the California Constitution. All of plaintiffs’ factual allegations with regard to the privacy claim are contained within just three paragraphs of the FAC, reproduced here in their entirety:
49. Without drivers ever knowing, Defendants also collect data from their vehicles and share the data with third parties. While Defendants agreed-to adopt voluntary privacy guidelines governing their collection and sharing of this data, the American Automobile Association and Senator Markey of Massachusetts stated that these measures are insufficient, as they do not provide drivers the right to control their own information and fail to allow drivers to withhold sensitive information from collection in the first instance.
50. As detailed in Sen. Markey’s report, Defendants collect large amounts of data on driving history and vehicle perform-anee, and they transmit the data to third-party data centers without effectively securing the data. Defendants only make drivers aware of such data collection in owners’ manuals, online “privacy statements,” and terms & conditions of specific feature activations— but drivers can’t comprehensively opt out of all collection of data by Defendants, and in the limited situations where opting out is permitted, the driver must turn off a feature or cancel á service subscription.
135. Plaintiffs maintain a legally protected privacy interest in their personal data collected and transmitted to third parties by Defendants, including but not limited to the geographic location of their vehicles at various times.
FAC ¶¶ 49, 50,135.
Despite the California Class plaintiffs’ assertion that they “maintain a legally protected privacy interest in their personal data,” FAC ¶ 135, “[plaintiffs have not identified a concrete harm from the alleged collection and tracking of their personal information sufficient to create injury in fact.” In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK,
Plaintiffs string cites to various Ninth Circuit and California district court' cases to argue that their allegations are sufficient to establish injury for their privacy claims. GM Opp. at 14; Toyota Opp. at 15. Their cases are inapposite ■ because they fail to establish a comparable credible risk of future harm that would constitute injury in fact. For example, Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,
Similarly in In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,
The California Class plaintiffs fail to establish a comparable credible risk of future identity theft that would establish an injury in fact. At worst, they allege that GM and Toyota “collect large amounts of data on driving history and vehicle performance, and transmit the data to third-party data centers without effectively securing the data.” FAC ¶ 50. Nowhere do plaintiffs allege the kind of theft, malicious breach, or widespread accidental publication of sensitive personally identifying information such as social security numbers or credit card information that the Krott-ner, In re Sony, and Doe I courts found so dangerous; Instead, the only data plaintiffs specifically identify is “the geographic location of their vehicles at various times.” FAC ¶ 135. It is not apparent how the purposeful disclosure of such data to third party data centers would establish any credible risk of future harm. See Low,
Furthermore, plaintiffs do not specifically allege that they themselves have been affected by these alleged behaviors. See LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., No. 10-cv-1256, 2011 WL. 1661532, at *4 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (finding that plaintiffs had not shown injury-in-fact in part because they had not alleged that they were personally affected by the complained of practices). Without any evidence of a breach or data compromise, speculative and generalized allegations of geographic tracking and data collection is insufficient to establish Article III standing.
Even if plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to establish standing, they would not demonstrate a violation of the right to privacy under the California Constitution. In order to establish an invasion of privacy claim under Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, a plaintiff must plead “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn.,
The California Class plaintiffs fail to adequately identify a protected' privacy interest: “Legally recognized privacy interests are generally of two classes: interests in precluding the dissemination or iqisuse- of sensitive and, confidential information (informational privacy), and interests in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference (autonomy privacy).” Id. at 35,
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Given the upcoming holidays, plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint, if any, by January 8, 2016.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. Plaintiffs request'judicial notice of Exhibit 7 ("copy of California Auto Outlook, Volume 11, Number 3'(August 2015)”) Dkt. No, and Exhibit 8 ("a copy of the opening page of a Google search result for ‘ford motor company california' done on September, 28, • 2015”)[ Dkt. fib. 55-8]. Dkt. No. 55. Defen- , dants oppose. Dkt. Nos. 63, 65, 66. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a court can take judicial notice of facts outside the docket only if they are "not subject to reasonable dispute” because it is either "generally known” or can be "accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Although this information is inappropriate for a request for judicial notice, it could have been suitably pleaded by affidavit. In determining personal jurisdiction, “[conflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.” Schwarzenegger,
. Plaintiffs also cite In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig.,
. At the hearing, plaintiffs attempted to distinguish Daimler because it was a case brought by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign defendant based on events occurring entirely outside the United States. Nothing in the Court’s opinion limits its holding regarding general jurisdiction to those facts, and the cases decided since Daimler treat it as precedent in determining whether general jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Ivy Bridge Univ., LLC v. Higher Learning Comm’n, No. 15-cv-02187-SC,
. Plaintiffs’ additional allegation that defendants collect and transmit the data “without effectively securing’1 it cannot save them. FAC ¶ 50. In Whitaker v. Health Net of California, Inc., No. 11-cv-0910,
. If plaintiffs choose to amend their com- . plaint to allege more concrete,-particularized allegations of information dissemination or