239 Conn. 1 | Conn. | 1996
Lead Opinion
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a motorcycle is a “passenger motor vehicle” within the meaning of General Statutes § 42-179 (a) (2),
The following facts and procedural histoiy are undisputed. Cagiva is the exclusive importer and wholesale distributor of Ducati motorcycles in the United States. On May 16, 1992, Schenk purchased a 1992 Ducati motorcycle from a dealer in Norwalk. Over the next several years, Schenk experienced repeated mechanical problems with his motorcycle. As a result, in 1995, Schenk initiated compulsory arbitration proceedings against Cagiva pursuant to General Statutes § 42-181,
Cagiva filed an application with the trial court for an order vacating, correcting or modifying the arbitration
The Lemon Law is a remedial statute that protects purchasers of new passenger motor vehicles. It was designed to compel manufacturers of passenger motor vehicles to fulfill all express warranties made to consumers, and to facilitate a consumer’s recovery against the manufacturer of a defective vehicle should a dispute arise.
Whether a motorcycle is a “passenger motor vehicle” for the purposes of § 42-179 (a) (2) and General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40) is a question of statutory interpretation.
The department
We conclude that the phrase “passenger motor vehicle” as originally defined in 1982, and retained until 1990; see General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40); refers only to automobiles and larger versions thereof and not motorcycles. Because the parties agree that motorcycles also do not satisfy the definition of passenger motor vehicle in effect in 1990,
We first note that the pre-1990 § 14-1 contains separate definitions for “motor vehicle”
Reading General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 as a whole strongly suggests that motorcycles are not “passenger motor vehicles.”
Indeed, other motor vehicle statutes indicate that the legislature uses the phrase “passenger motor vehicle” to refer specifically to automobiles, while it uses the separate term “motorcycle” when intending to refer to those vehicles. When construing a statute, we may look for guidance to other statutes relating to the same general subject matter, as the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law. Vecca v. State, 29 Conn. App. 559, 564, 616 A.2d 823 (1992). For example, General Statutes § 14-49 (a) governs fees for “passenger motor vehicles,” while § 14-49 (b) specifically governs fees for “motorcycles.” General Statutes § 14-100a (a), which governs safety belts, refers only to “passenger motor vehicles,” providing that “[n]o new passenger motor vehicle may be sold or registered in this state unless equipped with at least two sets of seat safety belts for the front and rear seats of the motor vehicle . . . “Passenger motor vehicle” logically must be read in context as referring only to automobiles, because motorcycles are not generally equipped, or required to be equipped, with seat belts. Thus, § 14-100á (a) exemplifies a situation in which the legislature intended to refer specifically and exclusively to automobiles, and used the phrase “passenger motor vehicle” to do so.
The legislative history of the Lemon Law also supports our conclusion that the phrase “passenger motor vehicles” covers only what are commonly thought of as automobiles, and larger versions thereof such as station wagons and vans, but not motorcycles. The definition of “passenger motor vehicle,” as incorporated by the Lemon Law, must be read in fight of the purpose of the incorporating legislation. The legislative history of the Lemon Law indicates that it was designed to protect consumers of new automobiles and that, despite
During the committee hearings on House Bill No. 5729, the bill that ultimately became the Lemon Law, Representative John J. Woodcock, the bill’s sponsor, described its purpose as follows: “The legislative proposal before you fills a major gap in our consumer law . . . [b]ecause it will give our new car buying public relief from defective new cars .... What the bill does is establish a standard for when a reasonable number of repair attempts have been undertaken by a new car warrantor.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, General Law, Pt. 2, 1982 Sess., p. 233. Indeed, all of the testimony before the committee regarding the proposed Lemon Law, including testimony from members of the general public, specifically involved defective cars. See generally id., pp. 232-311.
Woodcock later described the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. He explained that the law was intended to address the problem of “lemon cars”; (emphasis added) 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1982 Sess., p. 3117; and that the bill was designed “to strengthen the new car consumer’s hand.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 3118. He noted that, “[t]he rationale behind the lemon bill has been to improve and enhance the responsiveness an[d] accountability of automobile manufacturers to consumer complaints with defective new cars.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 3161. “The lemon bill . . . givejs the] consumer rights against . . . the party responsible for the defective car.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 3123.
Woodcock also read into the record a number of consumer letters supporting the bill, all of which specifically described problems the writers had experienced
It is true, as the department argues, that the Lemon Law is a remedial statute that ought to be read broadly in favor of those consumers whom the law is designed to protect. But a recitation of that general principle merely begs the question of which consumers the Lemon Law was, in fact, designed to protect. We agree that the law should be read broadly in favor of automobile consumers. Given the language, purpose, and legislative history of the Lemon Law, however, we are not persuaded that its remedial purpose is broad enough to include motorcycles.
We conclude, therefore, that motorcycles are not passenger motor vehicles within the meaning of § 42-179 (a) (2) and General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40). Accordingly, we agree with Cagiva that the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was improper.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to vacate the arbitration award.
In this opinion PETERS, C. J., and CALLAHAN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, Js., concurred.
General Statutes § 42-179 provides in relevant part: “New motor vehicle warranties. Leased vehicles. Resales. Transfers. Manufacturer buybacks, (a) As used in this chapter: (1) ‘Consumer’ means the purchaser, other than for purposes of resale, of a motor vehicle, a lessee of a motor vehicle, any person to whom such motor vehicle is transferred during the duration of an express warranty applicable to such motor vehicle, and any person entitled by the terms of such warranty to enforce the obligations of the warranty; and (2) ‘motor vehicle’ means a passenger motor vehicle or a passenger and commercial motor vehicle, as defined in section 14-1, which is sold or leased in this state.” (Emphasis added.)
In 1982, when § 42-179 was first enacted, § 14-1 was amended to define “passenger motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle having a capacity of carrying not more than ten passengers, designed and used for the purpose of transporting persons with their necessary personal belongings.” See General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 14-1 (35). This language was basically retained when § 14-1 underwent technical amendment and renumbering in 1984. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 14-1 (40).
In 1990, the legislature amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40), and changed the definition of “passenger motor vehicle” to its current form. General Statutes § 14-1 (59) now defines “passenger motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle used for the private transportation of persons and their personal belongings, designed to carry occupants in comfort and safety, with not less than fifty per cent of the total area enclosed by the outermost body contour lines, excluding the area enclosing the engine, as seen in a plan view, utilized for designated seating positions and necessary legroom with a capacity of carrying not more than ten passengers including the operator thereof.”
Cagiva appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
On appeal, Cagiva also challenges two other conclusions of the trial court: (1) that substantial evidence exists in the record to support the arbitration panel’s finding that the motorcycle was out of service for a time sufficient to trigger the Lemon Law; and (2) that substantial evidence exists in the record to justify the award of a full refund of the purchase price to Schenk without a deduction for his use of the vehicle. Because we conclude that a motorcycle is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Lemon Law, we need not reach these issues.
General Statutes § 42-181 provides in relevant part: “Department arbitration procedure. Records. Appeals, (a) The department of consumer protection, shall provide an independent arbitration procedure for the settlement of disputes between consumers and manufacturers of motor vehicles which do not conform to all applicable warranties under the terms of section 42-179. The commissioner shall establish one or more automobile dispute settlement panels which shall consist of three members appointed by the commissioner of consumer protection, only one of whom may be directly involved in the manufacture, distribution, sale or service of any product. Members shall be persons interested in consumer disputes and shall serve
“(b) If any motor vehicle purchased at any time on or after October 1, 1984, or leased at any time on or after June 17, 1987, fails to conform to such applicable warranties as defined in said section 42-179, a consumer may bring a grievance to an arbitration panel if the manufacturer of the vehicle has not established an informal dispute settlement procedure which the attorney general has certified as complying in all respects with the requirements of said section 42-179. . . .
“(c) The department of consumer protection shall investigate, gather and organize all information necessary for a fair and timely decision in each dispute. The commissioner may issue subpoenas on behalf of any arbitration panel to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, papers and records relevant to the dispute. ... An arbitration panel shall, as expeditiously as possible, but not later than sixty days after the time the consumer files the complaint form together with the filing fee, render a fair decision based on the information gathered and disclose its findings and the reasons therefor to the parties involved. The failure of the arbitrators to render a decision within sixty days shall not void any subsequent decision or otherwise limit the powers of the arbitrators. The arbitration panel shall base its determination of liability solely on whether the manufacturer has failed to comply with section 42-179. The arbitration decision shall be final and binding as to the rights of the parties pursuant to section 42-179, subject only to judicial review as set forth in this subsection. The decision shall provide appropriate remedies, including, but not limited to one or more of the following:
“(1) Replacement of the vehicle with an identical or comparable new vehicle acceptable to the consumer;
“(2) Refund of the full contract price, plus collateral charges as specified in subsection (d) of said section 42-179;
“(3) Reimbursement for expenses and compensation for incidental damages as specified in subsection (d) of said section 42-179;
“(4) Any other remedies available under the applicable warranties, section 42-179, this section and sections 42-182 to 42-184, inclusive, or the MagnusonMoss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975), 15 USC 2301 et seq., as in effect on October 1, 1982, other than repair of the vehicle. The decision shall specify a date for performance and completion of all awarded remedies. Notwithstanding any provision of the
On the merits of Schenk’s claim, the panel found that the motorcycle had been out of service for repair for ninety-one days during Schenk’s first two years of ownership, that the “use, value and safety of the subject motor vehicle were and are affected by the defects demonstrated by the consumer, ” and that while the vehicle was in his possession, Schenk “had virtually no use of the vehicle.” The panel awarded Schenk a full refund without a deduction for the mileage on the vehicle, as well as finance charges, attorney’s fees and his filing fee.
Practice Book § 99 provides: “[Addition or Substitution of Parties] — Additional Parties Summoned in by Court
“The court may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court may direct that they be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the court, on his motion, shall direct him to be made a party.”
General Statutes § 52-107 provides: “Additional parties may be summoned in. The court may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court may direct that such other parties be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the court, on his application, shall direct him to be made a party.”
See note, “The Connecticut Lemon Law,” 5 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 175, 191 (1983).
See footnote 1.
Moreover, the scope of our review is broader when the question of law arose in a mandatory arbitration proceeding, such as one under the Lemon Law, than if it. arose in consensual arbitration proceedings. See Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 218 Conn. 646, 659-60, 591 A.2d 101 (1991); Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Assn. v. O’Neill, 212 Conn. 83, 94-95, 561 A.2d 917 (1989).
As Cagiva points out in its brief, “[a] motorcycle does not fit into the [1990] definition of ‘passenger motor vehicle. ’ A motorcycle simply is not fifty percent or more enclosed by the outermost body contour lines, excluding the engine.”
This court has previously distinguished between a “motorcycle” and an “automobile.” “Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines ‘automobile’ as a ‘4-wheeled automotive vehicle designed for passenger transportation on streets and roadways and commonly propelled by an internal combustion engine using volatile fuel. . . .’ (Emphasis added.) By contrast, ‘motorcycle’ is defined as ‘a 2-wheeled tandem automotive vehicle having 1 or 2 riding saddles and sometimes having a 3d wheel for the support of a sidecar.’(Emphasis added.) . . . [T]he common understanding of‘automobile’does not encompass‘motorcycle’. . . Beloff v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 45, 59, 523 A.2d 477 (1987).
Schenk did not file a brief or present oral argument in this appeal, but relies on the arguments submitted by the department.
Henceforth, therefore, our references to the definition of “passenger motor vehicle" in § 14-1 are to the definition of that term in General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40).
Because Cagiva would prevail in either case, we need not consider which definition of “passenger motor vehicle” is properly incorporated into § 42-179 (a) (2), or whether the 1990 amendment to the definition of “passenger motor vehicle” in § 14-1 was meant to change or to clarify the meaning of that term.
It is undisputed that the motorcycle in the present case does not meet the statutory requirements for a “passenger and commercial motor vehicle.” Although the definition of “passenger and commercial motor vehicle” partially changed in 1990, the definition has always required that such a vehicle be used for both noncommercial and commercial purposes. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (39) and General Statutes § 14-1 (58). The department does not claim that the motorcycle at issue in this case is used for a commercial purpose.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (30) provides: “ ‘Motor vehicle’ means any vehicle propelled or drawn by any nonmuscular power, except aircraft, motor boats, road rollers, baggage trucks used about railroad stations or other mass transit facilities, electric battery-operated wheel chairs when operated by physically handicapped persons at speeds not exceeding fifteen miles per hour, golf carts operated on highways solely for the purpose of crossing from one part of the golf course to another, golf cart type vehicles operated on roads or highways on the grounds of state institutions by state employees, agricultural tractors, farm implements, such vehicles as run only on rails or tracks, self-propelled snow plows, snow blowers and lawn mowers, when used for the purposes for which they were designed and operated at speeds not exceeding four miles per hour, whether or not the operator rides on or walks behind such equipment, bicycles with helper motors as defined in section 14-286, special mobile equipment as defined in subsection (i) of section 14-165 and any other vehicle not suitable for operation on a highway . . . .”
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (40).
See Citrano v. Berkshire Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 171 Conn. 248 (motorcycle is “motor vehicle” for purposes of General Statutes [Rev. to 1975] § 38-175c [now § 38a-336]).
These statutory inferences remain the same presently under General Statutes § 14-1.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-1 (29) provides: “ ‘Motorcycle’ means a motor vehicle, with or without a side car, having not more than three wheels in contact with the ground and a saddle or seat on which the rider sits or a platform on which the rider stands and includes bicycles having a motor attached, except bicycles propelled by means of a helper motor as defined in section 14-286, but does not include a vehicle having a completely or partially enclosed driver’s seat and a motor which is not in the enclosed area . . .
“[W]e have over three million consumers in Connecticut and twenty-five to thirty automobile manufacturers selling cars in our state. Those consumers are looking for fairness, justice and equity under our present law. They have none of these. [The p]roblem with lemon cars is not unique to Connecticut. . . . Problems with the purchase and repair of automobiles represents the number one consumer complaint across the country . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 25 S. Proc., Pt. 9, 1982 Sess., pp. 2740-41, remarks of Senator Amelia P. Mustone.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I disagree with the majority’s narrow construction of Connecticut’s Lemon Law,
I begin my analysis by recognizing the remedial purpose of the Lemon Law. General Statutes § 42-179 (b) explicitly provides that the Lemon Law was enacted to provide effective remedies for consumers “[i]f a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable express warranties . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco, 209 Conn. 579, 594, 552 A.2d 1207 (1989) (Lemon Law was enacted “to provide for consumer purchasers of new motor vehicles an alternative to civil litigation”). The court’s analysis, however, fails to apply the long-standing canon of statutory construction: “[Rjemedial statutes . . . are to be liberally construed in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, 164 Conn. 497, 503, 325 A.2d 228 (1973). Accordingly, the Lemon Law should be liberally construed to protect consumers who have purchased new motor vehicles that do not conform to their express warranties.
The Lemon Law provides that “motor vehicle” shall be defined as “a passenger motor vehicle or a passenger and commercial motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1 . . . .” General Statutes § 42-179 (a) (2). Although the statutory definition of “passenger motor vehicle” has been amended,
“Passenger motor vehicle” is specifically defined in General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 14-1 (35) as “a motor vehicle having a capacity of carrying not more than ten passengers, designed and used for the purpose of transporting persons with their necessary personal belongings.” Undoubtedly, a motorcycle is a “motor vehicle.” Additionally, it is beyond dispute that a motor
Rather than apply the specific definition of “passenger motor vehicle” set forth in § 14-1, the majority fabricates an argument that was never advanced by the plaintiff and that was never briefed by the parties. In an effort to exclude motorcycles from the purview of “passenger motor vehicle,” the court searches § 14-1 for other definitions contained in that provision. In doing so, the majority concludes that a motorcycle is not a passenger motor vehicle within the meaning of the Lemon Law because motorcycles are separately defined within § 14-1.
More importantly, because the legislature has specifically defined “passenger motor vehicle” in § 14-1, this court is bound to accept and apply that literal definition. It is a fundamental tenet that “ ‘[w]hen legislation contains a specific definition, the courts are bound to accept that definition.’ ” Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 316, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S. Ct. 813, 88 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1986), quoting International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134, 355 A.2d 236 (1974); Toll Gate Farms, Inc. v. Milk Regulation Board, 148 Conn. 341, 347, 170 A.2d 883 (1961). If this court does otherwise, it exceeds its constitutional limitations by infringing on the legislative prerogative.
Indeed, I am sure that the legislature will be surprised to learn, as a result of today’s majority decision, that it never intended to protect under the Lemon Law consumers who purchased motorcycles. It defies reason to believe that the legislature, in adopting the Lemon Law, did not intend to protect all purchasers of consumer motor vehicles.
Accordingly, I dissent.
General Statutes §§ 42-179 through 42-186.
In 1990, § 14-1 was amended to define “passenger motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle used for private transportation of persons and their personal belongings, designed to carry occupants in comfort and safety, with not less than fifty per cent of the total area enclosed by the outermost body contour lines, excluding the area enclosing the engine, as seen in a plain view, utilized for designated seating positions and necessary legroom with a capacity of carrying not more than ten passengers including the operator thereof.” Public Acts 1990, No. 90-263, § 1.
The plaintiffs sole argument with respect to the inclusion of motorcycles within the protection of the Lemon Law focused on the statutory change to the definition enacted in 1990, which, as indicated, is contrary to our canons of construction.
In the June 12, 1995 trial brief in support of its application to vacate, correct or modify the arbitration award and for an order to show cause, the plaintiff stated: “Obviously, a motorcycle would easily fit into [the 1984] definition [of passenger motor vehicle].”
In its appellate brief, the plaintiff stated: “Arguably, a motorcycle could fit into [the 1984] definition [of passenger motor vehicle].”
I note that “truck” is also separately defined in § 14-1, which, given the majority’s analysis, raises the question of whether owners of pickup trucks are covered by the Lemon Law.
“In construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended.” Kron v. Thelen, 178 Conn. 189, 192, 423 A.2d 857 (1979); see also State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 153, 460 A.2d 26 (1983) (“ ‘there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean’ ”). In this case, common sense leads one to conclude that motorcycles were intended to be covered by the Lemon Law. There is no conceivable reason why the legislature would want to discriminate against purchasers of motorcycles.