A motion is made by the defendant to set aside the verdict, on the ground, that one of the witnesses; who had testified to material facts on the part of the plaintiffs, was not sworn. It appears, that notice of this fact was communicated to the defendant and his counsel, before the cause went to the jury. The defendant states, in his affidavit in support of the motion, that he and his counsel had notice of this fact, whilst his counsel was engaged in his argument, and
cited Keen v. Sprague, 3 Greenl. 77; Walker v. Green, 3 Greenl. 215 ;
These considerations, of course, apply to matters of form and exceptions, which a party has a right to waive ; and it is obvious, that the exception insisted on, is of that kind. It is competent to parties, and indeed it is not uncommon in practice, by consent, to receive the statement of a person as evidence, who is not sworn.
In the present case, if notice had been seasonably given and the exception taken, the witness might probably have been recalled ; if not, the jury should have been discharged, to avoid giving an erroneous and useless verdict. Had the witness been recalled, and confirmed bis testimony on re-exammation, the defect would have been cured ; had he refused to do so, the cause might have been withdrawn from the jury, or other proper course adopted. But a verdict having been taken, with knowledge of the omission of the witness to be sworn, through inadvertence of all parties, the objection comes too late, and cannot affect the validity of the verdict.
