Robert M. CADY and Clara P. Pulkownik, Appellants,
v.
CHEVY CHASE SAVINGS AND LOAN, INC., а Maryland Corporation, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
*137 Bruce A. Weihe of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
George P. Ord of Alley, Maass, Rogers, Lindsay & Chauncey, Palm Beach, for appellee.
DOWNEY, Judge.
Appellants, Robert M. Cady and Clara P. Pulkownik, appeal from a final summary judgment of foreclosure.
It appears that in Mаy, 1984, appellants purchased three condominium units at Galt Ocean Club Development, Inc. These condominium units were marketed and sold as part of а hotel management program that was intended to generate a prоfit and a significant return.
The purchase of these units was financed by B.F. Saul Mortgagе Company and these loans were subsequently assigned to appelleе, Chevy Chase Savings and Loan, Inc. (Chevy Chase). On April 14, 1986, Chevy Chase filed a complаint to foreclose the mortgages on these condominium units, to which appellants filed an answer and affirmative defenses. In due course, Chevy Chase filed motions for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment. Thereafter, appеllants filed a Motion To Amend Pleading, wherein they sought leave to file a cоunterclaim, a third party claim, and a cross-claim. After a hearing on appellee's motion for summary judgment, at which the court indicated it intended to grаnt the motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated to an agreed order wherein the court denied appellants' Motion to Amend Pleadings without prejudice to refile such a motion at a later date. Thereafter, the court entered a final summary judgment in favor of Chevy Chase, specifically holding that appellants' affirmative defenses failed as a matter of law to state defenses to the complaint.
Appellants' contentions on appeal are that the trial court erred in 1) not allowing appellants leаve to amend their affirmative defenses, 2) granting summary judgment when Chevy Chase failed tо disprove appellants' affirmative defenses, 3) not allowing appellants leave to file a counterclaim, and 4) not allowing appellants adequate time for discovery prior to consideration of the motiоn for summary judgment.
In our opinion no reversible error has been demonstrated by the various arguments submitted by appellants. The record reflects that the denial of appellants' motion to Amend Pleadings was agreed to without prejudice to subsequently move again for leave to file such amended pleаdings. Furthermore, appellants never requested leave to amend their аffirmative defenses even in their petition for rehearing directed to the оrder granting summary judgment. We certainly cannot find the trial court in error in not taking action not requested of him. That leaves only the question of whether the court wаs correct in determining that the affirmative defenses were insufficient as a matter of law. A careful analysis of each of the affirmative defenses rеflects that they are, on the whole, conclusory in their content, *138 and laсking in any real allegations of ultimate fact demonstrating a good defensе to the complaint. The allegations of fraud are not pled with partiсularity as is required. See Gordon v. Etue, Wardlaw & Co., P.A.,
Accordingly, we affirm the final summary judgment appealed from.
AFFIRMED.
HERSEY, C.J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
