3 Wash. 188 | Wash. | 1891
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The respondent moves the court to strike the statement of facts from the record for the alleged
Counsel for respondent claim that the judge had no
The learned counsel for appellants seem to have been in doubt as to the sufficiency of their first notice, for they subsequently made a new notice in writing, addressed to plaintiff’s attorneys, or rather to persons designated as such, reciting in substance, that the notice theretofore given of the time and place of settlement of the statement of facts having by inadvertence named Sunday as the day of such settlement, the said judge has named Monday, the 19th of January, as the day for settling the same, at the court house in the city of Ellensburgh, at which time and place they would present the same to him for settlement, but if counsel objected to the same being then settled, on account of the want of sufficient notice, they were thereby notified that tire same wrould be submitted to him for settlement on the 26th day of January, 1891. The latter notice, if served at all (and there is some dispute as to the fact), was not served until January 15, only four days before the
Respondent also moves the court to dismiss the appeal for various reasons, among which are, that no statement of facts appears in the record, duly certified and authenticated, as required by law, and that notice of appeal has not been served upon all the parties to this action.
This being an action of equitable cognizance, comes here for trial de novo, and this court, in order to so try it, must be put fully in possession of the whole case. The decree of the court below was based on testimony, which, owing to the fault of appellants, has not been properly authenticated, and it is therefore impossible for this court to determine any question depending upon the facts upon which the court below acted. The case as presented to the lower court cannot therefore be re-tried here. On appeals from final judgments in equitable actions our statutes have always required all the testimony or facts on which the cause was tried below to be certified to the supreme court, in order that that tribunal might review the whole case and render such judgment as should have been rendered in the trial court. Code of Washington, §§ 451, 464; Laws 1889-90, p. 335, § 5; and Laws 1891, p. 347, § 22. Accordingly in such cases it was the practice of the late terri
Again, it does not appear that appellants served all the co-defendants who were affected by the judgment of the lower court with the notice of appeal, and for that reason, if for no other, this appeal should be dismissed. It has always been the policy of the law to permit any one of several aggrieved parties to appeal; but, in order to do so, it is neceesary to show to the appellate court that co-parties have been notified and given an opportunity to join in the appeal. Sec. 454 of the Code, which was in force when this appeal was taken, provides that a party of several co-parties may appeal or prosecute a writ of error; but in
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed at the cost of the appellants.
Hoyt, Dunbar and Scott, JP, concur.
Concurrence Opinion
I do not concur in ordering the statement stricken from the record, because I think, under the statute, the judge had authority to fix the time of settlement, and that the respondent had reasonable notice of the time fixed, which was all that was necessary, the statutes not requiring ten days’ notice of such an order. But upon the other grounds, the statement having been stricken, I concur in the result.