8650 | Ohio Ct. App. | Dec 30, 1977
This appeal presents the problem of how broadly the word "school" should be construed under R. C.
The Attorney General of Ohio, appellant, undertook to revoke a license previously granted Cadet-ettes Corporation, appellee, on the grounds that Cadet-ettes did not qualify for the license as an educational institution. The Attorney General so found at its administrative hearing and revoked the license. The Common Pleas Court reversed that decision on Cadet-ettes' appeal, after finding that the Attorney General's decision was arbitrary and unreasonable. Upon the Attorney General's appeal to this court, we reverse the Common Pleas Court's decision and reinstate the judgment and decision of the Attorney General.
The Attorney General raised two assignments of error, which we will consider together:
"1. The Common Pleas Court of Summit County erred in finding that the Attorney General's revocation of the Cadet-ettes Corporation bingo license was arbitrary and unreasonable.
"2. The Common Pleas Court of Summit County erred in finding that Cadet-ettes Corporation was an educational organization within the meaning of Section
Under R. C.
"`Charitable organization' means any tax exempt religious, educational, veteran's, fraternal, service, nonprofit medical, volunteer rescue service, volunteer firemen's, or senior citizen's organization. An organization is tax exempt if it is exempt from federal taxation under subsection 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), 501(c)(8), 501(c)(10), or 501(c)(19) of the Internal Revenue Code. To qualify as a charitable organization, an organization, * * * shall have been in continuous existence as such in this state for a period of two years immediately preceding the making of an application for a bingo license under section
There is no dispute here that Cadet-ettes is exempt from federal taxation under the Internal Revenue Code, Section *189 501(c)(3), Title 26, U.S. Code, and that it has been continuously in existence as required by the statute. It, thus, satisfies the latter two of the three requirements. The parties disagree, however, as to whether Cadet-ettes satisfies the first requirement, that of being one of the named organizations. Cadet-ettes specifically argues it is and, therefore, operates a "school," a categorization with which the Attorney General disagrees.
What comprises an "educational" organization for purposes of R. C. Chapter 2915 is defined by R. C.
"`Educational organization' means any organization within this state that is not organized for profit, the primary purpose of which is to educate and develop the capabilities of individuals through instruction, and that operates or contributes to the support of a school, academy, college, or university."
Cadet-ettes is a 19 year old nonprofit organization which arguably develops certain capabilities of individuals through instruction. It instructs young girls in the arts of baton twirling, percussion instrument playing, and drill formation marching. It undertakes both to teach its approximately one hundred "members" morals and to build their characters.
All members of the group meet together once a week in a hall reserved for their use. They use the hall at other times in smaller groups, and occasionally individual members meet for private instruction with one of the six "qualified" instructors.
In State, ex rel. Church of the Nazarene, v. Fogo (1948),
"Words of a statute will be construed in their ordinary acceptation and significance and with the meaning commonly attributed to them. * * * [Citations omitted].
"In the ordinary acceptation, the term `school,' standing alone, is a place where general education is imparted to young people. The meaning commonly attributed to the term is an institution conducting a course of general education and mental training similar to that offered to children by a public educational system. * * *"
Cadet-ettes argues this construction should not control here, because Fogo, supra, involved an interpretation of a *190 statutory provision exempting "school" property from taxation, and that such statutes must be narrowly construed. Id., at 47. Here, it is argued, the statute's words should be broadly construed as exemptions from criminal prosecutions.
Appellee's line of reasoning is generally proper. The Supreme Court, however, construed the word "school" in its ordinary acceptation and significance, and with a meaning ordinarily attributed to it. Therefore, while the word "school" in its broadest sense suggests any place of institution where instruction takes place or where knowledge is imparted, we believe the scope of the word is limited for statutory purposes by Fogo, supra. Other jurisdictions have similarly construed the words "school" or "schools."
In a case involving the interpretation of a contract, it was stated:
"* * * [t]he word `school' by common usage, is considered local school corporations and does not generally include higher seats of learning which are usually referred to as colleges or universities.
"`The word "school" is a generic term, denoting an institution or place for instruction or education, or the collective body of instructors and pupils in any such place or institution. In the ordinary acceptation of its meaning, a school is a place where instruction is imparted to the young. It is an institution of learning of a lower grade, below a college or a university; a place of primary instruction.' 11 I.L.E.,Education, § 1 p. 74." Lawrence v. Cain (1969),
See also, Pike v. State Board of Land Commrs. (1911),
While the word "school" in R. C.
The fact that Cadet-ettes is an educational organization under Section 501(c)(3) does not determine its status in Ohio. The Ohio definition is more limited than the federal definition. Compare, 26 Code Fed. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii) with R. C.
While Cadet-ettes Corporation fills a community need and provides certain types of training and instruction, it does not operate a "school" as that term is contemplated by R. C.
The appellant's assignments of error are well-taken. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Common Pleas Court and reinstate the judgment and decision of the Attorney General.
Judgment reversed.
MAHONEY, P. J., and HUNSICKER, J., concur.
HUNSICKER, J., retired, was assigned to active duty under authority of Section 6(C), Article IV, Constitution. *192