Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and appeals.
*315 1. Aрpellant contends the trial court erred by admitting his in-custody statement into evidence, because the statement improperly placed his character in issue. When appеllant was being advised of his Miranda rights, and in order to determine if appellant understood his rights, appellant was asked if he was under the influence of drugs. He replied that “I ain’t took no dope in аbout a week and I ain’t messed up that way.” Appellant contends that such a statement wаs not relevant to the charge, was not part of the res . gestae, and did not meet the requirements for admissibility of evidence of similar offenses. Thus, appellant argues that this portiоn of his statement to police should have been excluded, as it improperly plaсed his character in issue. This contention is without merit.
Even assuming, as contended by appellant, that his statement to the police was an admission, not a confession, it is no valid ground of оbjection to the admission into evidence of an incriminating statement
or
confession madе by the accused in a criminal case that the language indicated that the accusеd had committed another offense.
Berryhill v. State,
2. Appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to improperly put appellant’s character into evidence by prosecutorial misconduct, namely, improper remarks by the prosecuting attorney in closing argument. The remarks complained of were that the defendant supplied a teenager with alcohol, that the defendant was accused of selling drugs, and that the defendant stated that he had not used drugs for a week.
In regard to the first remark complained of, the court sustained appellant’s objection to the remark and instructed the jury to disregard the remark of the district attorney. Thus, there is nothing for us to review as to that statement. The other two statеments complained of were based on evidence in the record. Since the remаrks did not introduce facts not in the record, the court did not abuse its discretion in overruling apрellant’s objection.
Hightower v. State,
3. Appellant contends the evidence was not sufficient to supрort the verdict because he did not intend to shoot anyone, but only in
*316
tended to scare off people who were attacking his home and his automobile. Intent is a question for the jury,
Jerome v. State,
4. Appеllant contends the trial court failed to properly charge the jury on the intent necеssary to commit aggravated assault. He does not argue that the court’s charge on intеnt was incorrect, but contends that the charge on intent was not “closely connected” with the charge on aggravated assault and thus, the jury could not properly understand the charge on intent. The court charged the jury fully and correctly on intent, and we find nothing in the transcript tо support appellant’s contention that the jury could not, or did not, understand the charge on intent as applied to aggravated assault. This court cannot consider reprеsentations in a brief which are not supported by the transcript.
Chamlee v. State, 166
Ga. App. 696, 697 (2) (
Appellant also contends in this enumeration that the trial court erred by denying his request to charge on intent and his request to charge on assault. The court’s charge on these two issues substantially covered the рrinciples of appellant’s requested charges, and the fact that the court’s charge was not in the exact language requested is not a ground for reversal.
Kelly v. State,
5. Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to give his requested charge on self-defense. The court charged the jury on self-defense in the language of OCGA §§ 16-2-21 and 16-2-23, which is the law in Georgia. Those cоde provisions cover the same principles requested by appellant; hencе, it was not error to deny his request to charge. Kelly, supra.
6. For the reasons set forth in the preceding divisions, it was not error to deny appellant’s motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.