155 F. Supp. 727 | Ct. Cl. | 1957
delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellant Indian tribe asks this court to review and reverse a determination of the Indian Claims Commission partially adverse to appellant’s assertion of ownership, use or occupancy of lands in northwestern Louisiana and southwestern Arkansas which appellant tribe purported to cede to the United States by treaty in 1835. Treaty of July ls
Appellant tribe founded its claim on section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, authorizing determination of “(3) claims which would result if the treaties, contracts, and agreements between the claimant and the United States were revised on the ground of * * * unconscionable consideration * * * or any other ground cognizable by a court of equity.” Appellant claimed to have ceded to the United States approximately 1,000,000 acres of land by the 1835 treaty, but to have received therefor a consideration so grossly less than the value of the lands conveyed that it was unconscionable. Cf. Osage Nation v. United States, 119 C. Cls. 592, cert. den. 342 U. S. 896.
On December 15, 1954, the Indian Claims Commission issued an order in this case providing in part as follows:
That the initial hearing in the above-entitled case shall be confined to the question of title or ownership of the territory claimed by plaintiff, or owned and occupied by it, and the area thereof, and all other issues of law or fact in said cause shall be postponed until the determination of said question.
A hearing was held and on March 8, 1956, the Corn mission entered what it designated an “Interlocutory Order” which was stated therein to be “on the issues of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to prosecute the claims asserted and whether or not the plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest had original title or recognized Indian title to the land, or any part of same, for which they claim to have received from the defendant for the cession of same unconscionable or inadequate consideration.”
On that same date the Commission entered findings of fact and an opinion (Docket No. 226), 4 Ind. Cl. Com. 201, 214, determining that appellant tribe had established its
The order of March 8, 1958 described the area which the Commission found to have been owned by aboriginal use and occupany, i. e., Indian title, by appellant. On January 2, 1951, the Commission issued an order amending Finding No. 12 of its findings of fact of March 8,1956, clarifying the description of the area found to have been owned by the appellant, and on the same date the Commission issued an order amending the interlocutory order of March 8,1956.
The amended interlocutory order of January 2,1957, which is the subject matter of the present appeal, provided in pertinent part as follows:
The parties filed proposed findings of fact and briefs and said issues were submitted_ to the Commission for determination; and the Commission, now being fully advised, -finds that claimants have satisfactorily established their right to assert the claims herein and that their predecessors in interest held original Indian title at the time of the cession of the land involved to the defendant through exclusive use and occupancy on said date, and long prior thereto, to the following described tract of land, to wit:
This Commission further finds that the predecessors in interest of plaintiffs ceded said land to the defendant on July 1, 1835; and that plaintiffs are entitled to an award for the value of said land as of July 1, 1835, less such part thereof as was granted to parties other than the defendant by the treaty of July 1,1835 with the predecessors in interest of plaintiffs, and less the amount of any credits or offsets to which the defendant may be entitled.
In keeping with the opinion herein rendered, the findings of fact previously made, and the amendment to Finding No. 12 this day made, all of which are made a part of this order, IT IS OEDEKED AND DIEECTED by this Commission that this case proceed for the determination of the acreage of the above-described tract of land and the value thereof on July. 1, 1835, less such part thereof as was granted to parties other than the United States by treaty of July 1, 1835 with the predecessors in interest of plaintiffs, or any land which may have been acquired subsequently by said predecessors in interest, if any, and the amount of con*67 sideration heretofore received by the plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest for said land, and the amount of any offsets under the provisions of the Indian Claims Commission Act to which the defendant may be entitled, and * * *. [Italics supplied.]
The appellant Tribe has appealed from the above quoted order insofar as that order finds that appellant owned only the land described in the order, on the ground that the record submitted to the Commission fully established the fact that plaintiff exclusively used, occupied and controlled the much larger area claimed in its petition. Appellant urges that the order is a final determination within the meaning of the Indian Claims Commission Act because it apparently finally forecloses appellant’s rights asserted in its claim as to the land which the Commission found appellant did not own. The Government appellee took no appeal from the order of the Commission but has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is not a “final determination” within the meaning of the statute from which an appeal lies. Accordingly, there is before us at this time only the question whether in a claim for unconscionable consideration, a determination by the Indian Claims Commission is final whereby it is concluded by the Commission that the tribal plaintiff had no title, hence no basis for asserting a claim of unconscionable consideration, as to a substantial part of the land included in its claim.
Section 20 of the Indian Claims Commission Act provides that the Court of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside “final” determinations of the Indian Claims Commission. Section 19 of the Act contains a definition of a “final determination” of the Commission as follows:
The final determination of the Commission shall be in writing, shall be filed with its clerk, and shall include (1) its findings of fact upon which its conclusions are based; (2) a statement (a) whether there are any just grounds for relief of the claimant and, if so, the amount thereof; (b) whether there are any allowable offsets, counterclaims, or other deductions, and, if so, the amount thereof; and (3) a statement of its reasons for its findings and conclusions.
The two-step determination of claims typified by the order appealed from is not new. This court at one time adopted a rule requiring the initial determination in Indian cases originating in this court to be addressed to the question of liability, reserving the question of amount of recovery, if any, until the scope of the right is first established.
It was apparently the above old Eule 39 (a) of this court which prompted the Indian Claims Commission to issue its Eule 22 (f) quoted in the margin below.
In our opinion, the basic fallacy inherent in appellant’s position is that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to review decisions of the Indian Claims Commission is strictly and expressly limited by the Indian Claims Commission Act to review on appeal “final determinations” of the Commission, whereas the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Court of Claims is by writ of cer-tiorari
Although section 19 of the Indian Claims Commission Act contains a definition of a “final determination” to be rendered by the Commission, the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress at no time specifically considered the problem of the possibility of a “final” determination short of a money judgment or a dismissal of the petition.
Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in part as follows:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States * * * except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
The jurisdiction of the circuit courts of appeals set forth in the above provision of law has been uniformly held to be purely statutory and in no sense discretionary. Cohen v. Globe Indemnity Co., 120 F. 2d 791. The consent of the parties that the court entertain an appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction if jurisdiction is otherwise lacking. Raytheon Mfg. Co. v. Radio Corporation of America, 76 F. 2d 943, aff’d 296 U. S. 459.
The only jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review on appeal interlocutory orders of the district courts is specifically provided for in 28 U. S. C. § 1292 which confers upon such courts jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the district courts (1) granting, continuing, modifying or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions; (2) appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property; (3) determining the rights and liabilities of the parties in admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed; and (4) judgments in civil actions
One phase of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review decisions of lower courts is also similarly limited in connection with “final” judgments or decrees rendered by the highest courts of the States, 28 U. S. C. § 1257.
The jurisdiction of the circuit courts of appeals to review orders of the various quasi-judicial and administrative agencies of the Government are carefully limited by statute.
Within the framework of the various statutes referred to above limiting the right of appeal to an appeal from a final decision, the courts have held that a decision may be sufficiently final to support an appeal even though that decision is not the ultimate judgment or decree completely closing up a proceeding. But such cases are few in view of the well recognized congressional policy against permitting cases to be litigated in a piecemeal manner and appealed in fragments.
Inasmuch as the subject matter of most of the claims being litigated before the Indian Claims Commission is land, and the issue of ownership or title is always present where the land in question is alleged to be held by so-called original Indian title, as distinguished from reservation title, the cases which have problems most closely analogous to those with which the Commission must deal are Federal district court and State court cases in which the issue of title to land is a matter for decision.
The Supreme Court has held that in condemnation cases appellate review may be had only upon an order or judgment disposing of the whole case and adjudicating all rights, including ownership and the amount of just compensation, as well as the right to take the property.
In the Catlin case, supra, a proceeding was instituted by the United States in the district court for the condemnation
A “final decision” generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U. S. 24, 28. Hence, ordinarily in condemnation proceedings appellate review may be had only upon an order or judgment disposing of the whole case, and adjudicating all rights, including ownership and just compensation, as well as the right to take the property. This has been the repeated holding of decisions here. * * * The foundation of this policy is not merely technical conceptions of “finality.” It is one against piecemeal litigation. “The case is not to be sent up in fragments * * *.” Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337, 341. Reasons other than conservation of judicial energy sustain the limitation. One is elimination of delays caused by interlocutory appeals.
The Supreme Court noted the reasons cited by the other circuit courts of appeals for holding identical orders of the
In the Catlin case, the Supreme Court also held that the statute in question did not purport in terms to authorize such a “judgment” as was entered in that case, i. e., a judgment decreeing that title vested in the United States, nor did the statute make the entry of that judgment the event upon which title was changed, if so summary a procedure could be valid. In this connection, we note that the Indian Claims Commission Act does not appear to authorize any sort of interlocutory judgment or order such as the one issued in the case now before us, which would make the entry of that order or judgment finally binding on the parties, or make such entry the event upon which the petition of appellant could be dismissed pro tanto.
In Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma et al., 334 U. S. 62, the Supreme Court was asked to review upon appeal a decision of the highest court of the State of Oklahoma adjudicating the correlative rights of owners of natural gas drawn from a common source in that State. The decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Eepublic was taking more than its ratable share of gas from a portion of the gas field tapped by its wells and those belonging to Peerless, so that Eepublic was, in effect, taking property belonging to Peerless. The Oklahoma court affirmed the order of the State Corporation Commission ordering Eepublic to take gas ratably from Peerless’ well, to make the necessary connection as soon as Peerless had laid a connecting line, and to continue to do so until further order of the commission. The order left for further proceedings only the terms and conditions of the taking of natural gas by Eepublic from Peerless should no agreement on that matter be reached by Eepublic and Peerless. The United States Supreme Court noted that its jurisdiction to review state court decisions was
No self-enforcing formula defining when a judgment is “final” can be devised. * * * The requirement of finality has not been met merely because the major issues in a case have been decided and only a few loose ends remain to be tied up — for example, where liability has been determined and all that needs to be adjudicated is the amount of damages. Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18 * * *. On the other hand, if nothing more than a ministerial act remains to be done, such as the entry of a judgment upon a mandate, the decree is regarded as concluding the case and is immediately reviewable.
Turning to the order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the Supreme Court stated that the order, affirmed below, had terminated some but not all of the issues in the proceeding below, and that what remained to be done could not be characterized as merely ministerial. Noting that the party seeking the appeal might be subjected to inconvenience, expense and possible loss, by being required to await a truly final judgment before taking an appeal, the Supreme Court stated that such considerations did not warrant immediate review of an incomplete judgment by a state court. Holding that the rule of finality which applied in the condemnation cases was applicable to the case under consideration, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as premature. In discussing the condemnation cases, the Supreme Court pointed out that contests over valuation of the property involved therein were inherently provocative of constitutional claims as to what was just compensation.
In the instant case there remains for decision by the Indian Claims Commission not only the question of valuation of the lands involved, but the even more difficult determination of whether, in the light of that value, the consideration actually paid to appellant by the Government was unconscionable. By the present order only a small part of the case below has been disposed of, with much remaining for future disposition by the Commission.
There have been instances where the appellate court, whose jurisdiction to review has been limited by statute to a review of “final” decisions, has reviewed on appeal an interlocutory
In Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, Conrad, who was an assignee in bankruptcy, filed a bill against the bankrupt and against Forgay, among others, to set aside sundry deeds made by the bankrupt to Forgay for lands and slaves, on the ground that the deeds were fraudulent. The bill prayed for an account of the rents and profits of the property conveyed and for an account of the sums of money which the bankrupt had received or Forgay had received which belonged to the bankrupt’s estate at the time of his bankruptcy. Following a trial, the court issued a decree declaring certain deeds to lands and slaves to Forgay to be fraudulent and void, and directing that the lands and slaves be delivered by Forgay to Conrad who should have execution of the matters contained in the decree. The decree also directed the master to take an account of the profits of the lands and slaves ordered to be delivered up, from the time of the filing of Conrad’s bill until the property was delivered, and also an account of the money received in fraud of creditors. For-gay appealed from this decree and Conrad filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from was not a final decree within the meaning of the acts of Congress. The Supreme Court held that the decree was not a final decree in the sense that nothing further remained to be done in the litigation, but it held that the decree did possess sufficient finality to support an appeal because it not only decided the issue of title to the property in dispute and annulled the deeds under which appellant claimed, but it directed the property to be delivered to appellee and awarded execution thereon. The Court stated that if appellant should be required to wait until the accounts were reported by the master and confirmed by the court, appellant might be subject to irreparable injury since the lands and slaves would be taken out of his hands and sold and the proceeds distributed among the creditors of the bankrupt before appel
The holding in the Forgay case, supra, was followed in Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, in which case the decree appealed from ordered that a radio lease and license be set aside and the original position of the parties be restored as nearly as possible, with an accounting to follow.
Where an order issued prior to final determination of the whole litigation disposes of a matter that is collateral and separable from the main suit, such an order is final and appealable. An example of this type of order is found in the case of Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation v. Smith,
Because of the obvious advantages which might accrue to the parties if certain interlocutory orders of the Commission, such as the one now under consideration, were reviewable by this court on appeal, we have examined the cases decided under the All Writs statute, 28 U. S. C. 1651, providing that the Supreme Court and all courts established by act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. We note, however, that where a statute establishes the conditions of appellate review, as in the case of section 20 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, an appellate court cannot exercise its discretion to issue a writ whose only effect would be to avoid those conditions of appellate review and thwart the well established congressional policy against piecemeal appeals. U. S. Alkali Export Association v. United States, 325 U. S. 196; United States v. Bondy, 171 F. 2d 642; Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U. S. 21; United States ex rel Potts v. Rail, 147 F. 2d 225, cert. den. 324 U. S. 870.
We have also examined the cases arising under Buie 54 (b) of the Federal Buies of Civil Procedure dealing with the rendition of a final judgment and its entry in a multiple claims action. We note, however, that it has been held that the rule does not supersede any statute controlling appellate jurisdiction and that the courts have carefully recognized the statutory requirement of a “final decision” under section 1291 of Title 28 as a basic requirement for an appeal. Buie 54 (b) merely administers that requirement in a practical
In Blackfeet and Gros Ventre Tribes v. United States, 127 C. Cls. 807, cert den. 348 U. S. 835, tbis court entertained an appeal from an order of the Indian Claims Commission granting the Government’s motion to dismiss one of four separate claims brought by appellant in a single suit before the Commission. Each of the four claims sued on was entirely separate and independent of the other, and in its order dismissing the claim in question, the Commission included a determination that there was no just reason for delay and also an express direction for the entry of judgment dismissing the petition as to that claim. Although the issue was not discussed, it appears that the order represented an attempt to meet the requirements of Kule 54 (b)
With reference to the order which is the subject matter of the instant appeal, we are of the opinion that it does not possess such finality as will support an appeal to this court. It is true that it purports to decide the issue of title to the land which is the subject matter of the claim, but it is actually only a finding of fact on that issue. State Bank of Portland
It would doubtless be convenient to the parties for us to pass upon this affirmative defense in advance of the trial of the case, but it would establish a precedent which might be very harmful in the administration of justice. The rule of the statute forbidding fragmentary appeals is a wise and salutary one, not only from the standpoint of protecting the appellate courts from an unnecessary burden, but also from the standpoint of a proper administration of justice. The delays which have resulted from allowing interlocutory appeals, in the states which permit them, have been a source of criticism; and every judge knows that an appellate court can handle a case much more understandingly after final disposition, than by piecemeal decisions in interlocutory orders.
See also Western Contracting Corp. v. National Surety Corp., 163 F. 2d 456.
In a sense what the Indian Claims Commission has adjudicated, in the proceedings below, is the Government’s defense of “no title” in claimants. In another sense it has made a finding of fact on the claimant’s allegation of ownership, i. e., original Indian title, of the land for which it claims it received an unconscionable consideration. However we characterize the order below, it is not a final order which will support an appeal within the jurisdiction of this court under section 20 of the Indian Claims Commission Act nor within the precedents laid down by the federal courts and the Supreme Court under similar appellate statutes. We are of the opinion that if the order in question and others like it are to be reviewable on appeal to this court, that must be by congressional mandate. See 28 U. S. C. § 1292 providing for appellate review in the circuit courts of appeals of certain specified interlocutory orders of the district courts. McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 331 U. S. 96.
We are aware of the problems which the parties face in connection with the matter of deciding whether or not to secure appraisals of all of the land involved in the claim or only of that part of the land which the Commission has found to have been held by appellant under Indian title in 1833 — a problem which would, of course, be solved if we had jurisdiction to review upon appeal the order of the Commission. However, we feel at liberty to express the opinion that despite the wording of the order and of finding 12 of the Commission, the parties may take an exception and at least make an offer of proof as to the value of all of the land covered by the claim, including that portion of the land excluded by finding 12, having in mind the problem of unit valuation. On the other hand, if the appellant should decide to limit its proof of value to that portion of the land which the Commission has found it held by original Indian title in 1835, and, subsequently, upon appeal from a final judgment in the case, this court should reverse the finding of partial ownership on the record and remand the case for further proceedings on the matter of the value of all or part of the land eliminated by the Commission in finding 12, proof of such value could be offered before the Commission at that time.
In conclusion, we hold that under the provisions of sections 19 and 20 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, and in view of the long line of precedents against appellate review of non-final decrees,
Rule 39 (a) of tile Rules of the united States Court of Claims, June 1, 1949 ed., provided in part as follows:
In every Indian case, unless otherwise ordered by the Court or stipulated by the parties, the hearing in the first instance shall be limited to the issues of fact and law relating to the right of the plaintiff to recover, and the court shall enter its judgment adjudicating that right. * * *
Eule 22 (f) of the Indian Claims Commission General Rules of Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 22. Hearings. * * *
(f) On merits. (1) In every case, unless otherwise ordered, the hearing before the Commission, a Commissioner, or an examiner in the first instance shall be limited to the issue of fact and law relating to the right of the plaintiff to recover.
28 U. S. C. § 1255 provides:
Cases In the Court of Claims may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted on petition of the united States or the claimant:
(2) By certification of any question of law by the Court of Claims in any case as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions on such question.
A “final” decision is not necessarily the ultimate judgment, or decree completely closing up a proceeding. In the course of a single proceeding there may be one or more “final” decisions on particular phases of the litigation, reserving other matters for future determination. Hubert Hermanos, Inc. v. People of Puerto Rico, 118 F. 2d 752.
Review by the Supreme Court on writs of certiorari in the case of decisions of the Court of Claims adjudicating the issues of taking and ownership in the plaintiff in so-called just compensation taking cases, leaving for further proceedings the matter of the amount of just compensation, is not based on the ground that such decisions are final. Such decisions are admittedly interlocutory, but review by the Supreme Court is not limited by statute to final decisions. On the contrary the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review such decisions by writ of certiorari is discretionary and, as noted above, extends to interlocutory as well as final decisions.
City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F. 2d 959 (9tn Cir.), cert. den. 316 U. S. 679; United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F. 2d 678 (2nd Cir.), cert. den. 317 U. S. 698; Puerto Rico Ry., Light Power Co. v. United States, 131 F. 2d 491 (1st Cir.).
Rule 54 (b) provides:
Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. Where more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims.
In Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U. S. 176, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from an order denying a stay pending arbitration in an action for an accounting noting that the order was merely a step in controlling the litigation before the trial court. In the course of the opinion
In passing, we call attention to a discrepancy, no doubt inadvertent, between the provisions of the order in question and the decision of the Commission on which It was based. The decision of March 8, 1956 finds that the appellant owned a certain described area of land set forth In finding 12 and the Commission concludes that the appellant is entitled to “an award for the value of the same, as of July 1, 1835, if the consideration paid by defendant was unconscionable or inadequate, * * Such a conclusion would, of course, be pertinent to the claim asserted by appellant in its petition. The order of the same date and as finally amended on January 2, 1957, omits the italicized portion quoted above and concludes merely that appellant is “entitled to an award for the value of said land as of July 1, 1835”. On the claim asserted, appellant will be entitled to an award, if any, representing the difference between the consideration received and the value of the land owned and ceded, if, in the opinion of the Commission, the difference is so great that it shocks the conscience and is therefore unconscionable. In view of our holding that the order appealed from is not a final order and the findings and conclusions reached by the Commission are subject to change during the further course of the proceedings, the Commission may wish to alter or even vacate the order in question.
what we have said in this opinion should not be construed as either criticism of or even comment on the manner in which the Commission and the parties have chosen to try the ease under consideration. If, as in this case, the Commission and the parties deem it desirable to hold a separate hearing and issue interlocutory findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of title prior to trying the issue of liability and the amount of recovery, if any, less allowable offsets, they are certainly at liberty to do so. We are merely passing upon the jurisdiction of this court to review on appeal such an interlocutory determination.