CACERES v. WARDEN OF DELANEY HALL DETENTION FACILITYCACERES v. WARDEN OF DELANEY HALL DETENTION FACILITY
THIS MATTER is before the Court on petitioner Juan Lligui Caceres‘s second petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
1. Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador. (Id. ¶ 1.)
2. Petitioner was detained by ICE on July 6, 2026. (Id. ¶ 4.)
3. On July 7, 2026, petitioner challenged his detention in a habeas corpus petition (First Petition). Caceres v. Blanche, No. 26–cv–08332, 2026 WL 2110787 (D.N.J. July 22, 2026).
4. On July 22, 2026, I denied the First Petition after finding that petitioner was subject to a final order of removal and had not rebutted the presumption that his detention pending removal was reasonable. Id. at *2.
5. In his Second Petition, petitioner concedes that his detention is governed by
6. Section 1231 states in relevant part that after a noncitizen “is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the [noncitizen] from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period‘).”
8. ICE is not required to release the noncitizen once the removal period has expired, but “[d]ue process rights may be implicated where ... there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Cepeda v. I.N.S., 273 F. Supp. 2d 222, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)). The presumptively permissible timeframe for post-removal-period detention is six months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
9. However, “[a]lthough the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable detention, it did not preclude a detainee from challenging the reasonableness of [her] detention before such time.” Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395 (D.N.J. 2025); see also Ali v. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., 451 F. Supp. 3d 703, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“This six-month presumption is not a bright line, ... and Zadvydas did not automatically authorize all detention until it reaches constitutional limits.“); Hoang Trinh v. Homan, 333 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“The six-month Zadvydas presumption is just that—a presumption ... not a prohibition on claims challenging detention less than six months.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cesar v. Achim, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (E.D. Wisc. 2008) (“The Zadvydas Court did not say that the presumption is irrebuttable, and there is nothing inherent in the operation of the presumption itself that requires it to be irrebuttable.“)
10. “[I]f a detainee provides ‘good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ the government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Munoz-Saucedo, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 395 (emphasis in original) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
11. Petitioner asserts that his “identity, Ecuadorian nationality, and final order have been known to immigration authorities for many years. Yet, after more than eighteen years since the removal period expired and more than one month of renewed detention, no travel document, confirmed acceptance, itinerary, or removal date has been disclosed.” (ECF No. 1. ¶ 63.)
12. Petitioner represents that he is willing to comply with reasonable alternatives to detention. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 82.)
13. Respondents submit the declaration of ICE Detention and Deportation Officer Syed Jeelani in opposition to the Second Petition. (Jeelani Dec.) (ECF No. 8–1.)
15. I conclude that petitioner has not rebutted the presumption of the reasonableness of his detention. Petitioner was detained on July 6, 2026, and respondents were prohibited from transferring him from July 7 to July 22, 2026 while the First Petition was pending. (Id. ¶ 6.)
16. Respondents transferred petitioner to Texas on August 7, but returned him to New Jersey because of the Second Petition. (Id. ¶ 8 & n.1.) Respondents have been prohibited from further transferring him since August 8, 2026. (ECF No. 2.)
17. Petitioner unquestionably has the right to challenge his detention via habeas corpus, but I cannot say that respondents have made no effort to remove petitioner when there have been orders preventing his transfer for most of his detention.
18. Respondents have produced evidence that petitioner was transferred to Texas for the express purpose of removal once the First Petition‘s transfer restriction was lifted. (Jeelani Dec. ¶ 8.) It therefore appears that respondents expect to remove petitioner from the country soon.
19. Petitioner retains the right to challenge his detention in the appropriate district court should this not be the case, but his immigration detention under
Accordingly,
IT IS on this 1st day of September 2026 ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner‘s Second Petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. Any restrictions imposed by this Court on petitioner‘s location are LIFTED.
/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE