70 Ohio St. 3d 541 | Ohio | 1994
Lead Opinion
This case presents the court with two interrelated issues. First, we must decide whether Cablevision is a communications business under R.C. 4931.11, thereby entitling it to exercise the power of eminent domain described in R.C. 4931.04. Second, in the event we answer the first issue in the negative, we must decide whether the city of North Royalton, which possesses the power of eminent domain as an Ohio municipality, validly delegated that power to Cable-
It is the responsibility of courts to enforce the literal language of a statute whenever possible. Pike-Delta-York Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Fulton Cty. Budget Comm. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 147, 70 O.O.2d 300, 324 N.E.2d 566. A court’s role is to interpret, not legislate. Seeley v. Expert, Inc. (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 61, 55 O.O.2d 120, 269 N.E.2d 121. Absent ambiguity, the court must give effect to the plain meaning of a statute even when a court believes that the statute results in an unfavorable outcome. Id.; R.C. 1.49. In this context we address R.C. 4931.11.
R.C. 4931.11 provides:
“Any company organized at any time to transact a telegraph, telephone, or communications business may construct, reconstruct, own, use, lease, operate, maintain, and improve communications systems for the transmission of voices, sounds, writings, signs, signals, pictures, visions, images, or other forms of intelligence, as public utility services, by means of wire, cable, radio, radio relay, or other facilities, methods, or media. Any such company has the powers and is subject to the restrictions prescribed in sections 4931.01 to 4931.23, inclusive, of the Revised Code, for telegraph or telephone companies.”
R.C. Chapter 4931 does not define “communications business.” However, the inclusion of the term in the statute suggests an intent of the General Assembly to broaden the reach of R.C. 4931.11 to forms of communication beyond a telegraph or telephone business and the technology available at the time the statute was enacted. The express terms of the statute include within a “communications business” those entities that “operate * * * systems for the transmission of voices, sounds, * * * signals, pictures, visions, * * * or other forms of intelligence * * * by means of * * * cable * * *.” The clear and unambiguous language used by the General Assembly produces the conclusion that a cable television company is included within the meaning of “communications business” under R.C. 4931.11. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, no construction is necessary or proper.
This conclusion is further buttressed by the definition of a “cable television system” found in R.C. 505.90, which provides:
“As used in sections 505.90 to 505.92 of the Revised Code:
“(A) ‘Cable television system’ means a nonbroadcast facility consisting of a set of transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment, under common ownership and control, that distributes or is designed
These statutes, R.C. 4931.11 and 505.90, describe a cable television system as an entity that transmits or distributes signals. While the scope of R.C. 505.90 is expressly limited to R.C. 505.90 to 505.92, its language is illustrative of the General Assembly’s use of language when describing cable television systems.
It is argued that cable television systems should not have the broad power of eminent domain described in R.C. 4931.04.
The question of whether a municipality’s right to award exclusive local franchises under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Section 521 et seq., Title 47, U.S.Code, preempts the statutory exercise of eminent domain by communications businesses is not before us; What is at issue is whether Section 541(c), Title 47, U.S.Code
The issue before us relates to eminent domain, not the regulation of subscriber rates or service. We will not decide the question of whether a municipality’s authority to grant local franchises conflicts with the statewide power of eminent domain conferred by R.C. Chapter 4931 until that issue is clearly presented.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, but for the reasons stated in this opinion.
Judgment affirmed.
. R.C. 4931.04 provides:
“A telegraph company may enter upon any land held by an individual or a corporation, whether such land was acquired by purchase, appropriation, or by virtue of any provision in its charter, for the purpose of making preliminary examinations and surveys, with a view to the location and construction of telegraph lines, and may appropriate so much of such land in accordance with sections 163.01 to 163.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code, as it deems necessary for the construction and maintenance of its telegraph poles, cables, conduits, piers, abutments, wires, and other necessary fixtures, stations, and the right of way in, through, over, across, and under such lands and adjacent lands, sufficient to enable it to construct and repair its lines.”
. Section 541(c), Title 47, U.S.Code provides:
“Any cable system shall not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable service.”
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. The majority properly concedes that R.C. Chapter 4931 does not define “communications business.” However, the majority improperly goes on to include cable television companies within that general term. Pursuant to ejusdem generis, a rule of statutory construction, “[w]here general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated.” Light v. Ohio Univ. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 66, 68, 28 OBR 165, 167, 502 N.E.2d 611, 613.
Thus, since telephone and telegraph companies are specifically mentioned in the statute, only a company in the same general class as telephone and telegraph companies should be considered a “communications business.” Also, since the broad power associated with eminent domain is being conferred on “communications businesses,” we ought to be doubly certain that a particular company is of the same class as others who have that power.
We cannot be certain what cable television may become and it is not the duty of this court to be the herald of the “hi-tech” future. At this point, cable television is of a different class from telephone and telegraph communications. Telephone and telegraph lines are essential in order for Ohioans to communicate with each other and with people outside Ohio. It is that notion of public necessity that underlies the power of eminent domain. While I may “want my MTV” (as the familiar chorus goes), I do not have to have it. At this point, cable television is essentially an entertainment delivery system between the cable company and its customer. Cable television is not a necessity, and it does not facilitate direct communication between Ohioans.
The majority points to Radio Relay Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 121, 74 O.O.2d 248, 341 N.E.2d 826, for the proposition that a private company may be a communications company without being a public utility. That
Protecting the broad, core freedoms of the United States and Ohio Constitutions in a modern world unimagined by the founding fathers is within this court’s function. Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution states that “[pjrivate property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.” The Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution also states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
The power of eminent domain should be slow to expand. The majority demeans our tradition of the inviolability of private property by elevating cable television to the level of the “public welfare.”