*2 NIX, C.J., Before FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, MONTEMURO, CASTILLE and JJ.

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT

OF THE COURT FLAHERTY, Justice. appeal

This involves the statutory construction of the limita- tions period for occupational disease under the workers’ com- law, pensation specifically raising question whether manifestation of the disease must occur within three hundred weeks after exposure to the hazard or within three hundred weeks after employment occupation in which the expo- sure occurred. This is the sole question case, in the for there is dispute no as to the relevant facts.

Appellee, Cable, Kenneth worked approximately twelve years for appellant Gulf Oil as a laborer and pipefitter. Dur- ing career, most his he was periodically exposed to the carcinogens 1979, coumene and benzene. explosion at work severely injured legs, his resulting in total disability. He returned to work for three months and was last exposed to coumene and benzene in July, 1981. His status as a Gulf employee was March, terminated in

In July, he diagnosed with bladder cancer and by physician advised his that the condition was caused exposure to coumene and benzene. He immediately notified Gulf, and shortly thereafter filed a workers’ claim petition. The manifestation of the condition occurred less than three hundred weeks after appellee left employ- Oil, hundred weeks occurred more than three ment of Gulf but last the hazard. after his appellee found that suf- compensation referee The workers’ he and that had established disease fered disease and necessary relationship between the causal was entitled appellee The referee held that employment. benefits, three hundred discovered within the disease was Compensa- The Workmen’s appellee’s employment. weeks reversed, three that Appeal holding tion Board measured, not from the last date week hundred to the hazard. but from the date last employment, benefits, reversed, rely- reinstating Court Commonwealth Appeal L ing Corp. Compensation on J & Steel Workmen’s (1992). (Jones), 201, 602 We Board 145 Pa.Cmwlth. A.2d meaning of the granted question allocatur to resolve *3 requirement compen- in the workers’ the three hundred week statute. sation in period is set forth

The three hundred week limitations 301(c)(2) act, compensation of workers’ 77 P.S. section the 411(2), § provides: which

(2) “injury,” “personal injury,” “injury The and terms act, in his used in this arising employment,” the course of as otherwise, include, clearly requires shall unless the context in 108 of act: disease as defined section this occupational Provided, That disease the basis occupational whenever act, it compensation, disability for for or death under this apply only disability resulting to or death from such shall weeks the occurring and within three hundred disease after industry in or to employment occupation last date of And which was to hazards such disease: exposed he [sic] of further, provided employe’s compensable That if the disabil- period, subsequent has within such death ity occurred compensable. a of The result the disease shall likewise be (2) only respect of with provisions paragraph apply shall of in disability employe to the or which results death exposure or in from to hazard employe’s whole the the part after occupational employment disease June 1973 by Pennsylvania Compensation covered Workmen’s employer compensation provided Act. The liable for by (l), (k), (m), (o), section or (p) 305.1 section subsections or (q), employment shall be the whose employer the last for a employe exposed period was of not less than one year to the hazard of the disease claimed. In the employe exposure the event did not work in an at least year any during one for the employer three hundred week death, period to prior disability or the liable for employer employer the shall that the giving longest be employment in period employe which the to the hazards the disease claimed. added.)

(Emphasis In interpreting foregoing language, primary our func- tion is to legislature. ascertain effectuate the intent of the 1921(a). § Pa.C.S. Appellee argues that he has complied period with the he limitations because suffered an occupational disease which he discovered within three hundred weeks of last employment appellant corporation. Ap- hand, pellant on the last argues, other that factor, controlling to hazard is the not the last date employment, concluding that appellee’s disease failed 301(c)(2), requirements meet of section as it did not manifest within appellee’s itself three hundred weeks of last hazard.

Our conflict resolution of this rests on largely the need to whole, understand the entire section as a than focusing rather 1922(2). another. See § on one or sentence Pa.C.S. reading conclude, entire section we are forced to as the *4 Commonwealth Court did in Avalotis Painting Workmen’s (Markulin), Compensation Appeal Bd. 511, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 515, 1167, (1993), 621 A.2d 1169 that “period exposure, of not the total of period employment, is the governing factor 301(c)(2) 411(2) throughout § section P.S. The in [77 court ].” Avalotis the concentrating on last two sentences of the section because Markulin had worked for more than one employer exposure with to hazardous substances. The court employer exonerated one which had employed Markulin for year more than and a instead held liable a employer second longer exposure to a of subjected period had Markulin which than the first period it him for a shorter though employed had employer. Avalotis, in prior to decision the court referred its Compensation Appeal v.Co. Workmen’s Engineering

Hoosier (1993), (Winters), in 620 A.2d Bd. 153 Pa.Cmwlth. of focusing length of on anomaly which it had discussed the to hazards. The length exposure than employment rather than exposure, that the of actual rather period court reasoned controlled, employer that the length employment, held was liable for employment but shorter giving longer occupational disease. the claimant’s reasoning impeccable, in is and we these two cases principle applies throughout the section governing believe that 301(c)(2): which a employment employment the relevant This occupational worker is to the hazard disease. legislature only of the and the appears to be the intent logically interpretation language. sound the hand, other interpretation, on the creates Appellee’s the appears contrary which to to intent of the aberration be legislature, pointed dissenting opinion out in the together who un- employees Commonwealth Court. Fellow a to hazard and then dergo period occupational later would occupational contract the identical disease decades differently if one had employee be treated under statute for employer continued to work the same but another had job. opinion indicates, to As dissenting moved a different fashion; to all in consistent employees statute seeks treat a compensation to provide employee it would be unfair one simply employee not another because first was fortu- but throughout nate enough employer remain with the same Rather, is to purpose career. of the limitations for limit diseases to those which of exposure manifest themselves within three hundred weeks Compensation Appeal to a See Cable v. Workmen’s hazard. Inc.), 201, 210, (Gulf Bd. 168 Pa.Cmwlth. Oil/Chevron USA (1994) J., (Pellegrini, dissenting). 649 A.2d *5 Accordingly, Compensation Appeal the Workmen’s Board in denying occupational appel- was correct disease benefits to lee, who was not to the hazard within the three disease, preceding hundred weeks the onset and the in reversing Commonwealth Court erred that determination. Order reversed.

NIX, C.J., concurs the result.

CAPPY, J., a dissenting opinion joined files which is CASTILLE, J.

MONTEMURO, J., sitting by designation.

CAPPY, Justice, dissenting: I respectfully dissent on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the Commonwealth Court.

CASTILLE, J., joins dissenting opinion.

664 A.2d 1352 WINNING, Winning, James III and Hilda wife, Winning and Brent COMPANY, Appellant. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of Argued Sept. 19, 1995. Decided Oct.