45 Minn. 421 | Minn. | 1891
The principal question in the case is, are the three written contracts to be taken as covering all the work done or agreed to be done by plaintiff, so as to control as to the terms and • conditions upon which the work was done, and so as to exclude parol evidence thereof ? The work described and provided for in the written contracts appears, upon their face, to be the identical work done by plaintiff, and upon which his causes of action (unless the fifth and seventh) set forth in the complaint are based. There would be no doubt upon it were it not for the fact shown by the testimony that part of the work was done before the contracts were actually executed. That, however, is not conclusive that the entire work was
That the execution of the contracts was procured by duress would not be established by the evidence offered for that purpose. It amounted to no more than that, plaintiff being without means to pay his men, the defendants refused to pay him what was then due him, unless he executed the contracts. The mere threat to withhold from a party a legal right, which he has an adequate remedy to enforce, is not, in the eye of the law, duress; certainly not such as will avoid the execution of a contract. Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, (8 N. W. Rep. 511;) Miller v. Miller, 68 Pa. St. 486. The case com
But there is another defence to all the causes of action that the evidence in no way avoids. The answer alleges a settlement in full, upon which there was found due plaintiff a certain amount; that it was paid; and that he thereupon gave defendants a receipt in full of all demands. The reply may be construed as denying the settlement, but it admits the giving of the receipt, and sets up matter in avoidance of it. In this evidence plaintiff admits the fact of a final settlement, and payment of the sum specified in the answer, but says he would not accept the settlement, because of overcharges in it; but he did not prove the fact of such overcharges, and he made no attempt to prove any of the matters alleged in his reply in avoidance of the receipt. The receipt was at least prima facie evidence of payment in full, and plaintiff could not recover without evidence to avoid that effect of it. The court was therefore right in directing a verdict for defendants.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. A motion for a reargument of this case was denied April 9, 1891.
Vanderburgh, J., took no part in this decision.