C. v. U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityC. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security
On August 25, 2026, petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under
As petitioner acknowledges, to obtain a TRO a movant must make the same showing required to obtain a preliminary injunction. See Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of Kansas City v. Industrial Maintenance of Topeka, Inc., 2023 WL 1394884, at *1 n.1 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2023) (courts in this district apply the same procedures to TRO motions and motions for preliminary injunction). Thus, a movant must establish that she is likely to succeed on the merits, that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in her favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the [movant] is entitled to such relief.” See id. at 22.
In this case, petitioner has failed to demonstrate any likelihood that she will succeed on the merits of her claim that due process requires the Government to follow certain procedures before removing her to an alternative third country. In particular, petitioner has failed to show that this Court has jurisdiction to rule in this case or, more specifically, to enjoin her removal as requested. For that reason, the Court has denied the motion for a TRO.
First, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition in this case. Petitioner was previously detained within this judicial district, and she filed her petition in this Court naming her Kansas custodian as a respondent. A district court may grant habeas relief only
Petitioner argues nevertheless that the Court may exercise jurisdiction under the so-called “unknown custodian” doctrine. In a footnote in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Supreme Court stated that a case from the D.C. Circuit, cited in the dissent, was not helpful for the following reason:
When, as in that case, a prisoner is held in an undisclosed location by an unknown custodian, it is impossible to apply the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules. That is not the case here, where the identity of the immediate custodian and the location of the appropriate district court are clear.
See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 450 n.18 (distinguishing Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy further elaborated, after first noting that a court may deviate from the rule requiring filing in the district of confinement “[o]nly in an exceptional case,” as follows:
I would acknowledge an exception if there is an indication that the Government‘s purpose in removing a prisoner were to make it difficult for his lawyer to know where the habeas petition should be filed, or where the Government was not forthcoming with respect to the identity of the custodian and the place of detention. In cases of that sort, habeas jurisdiction would be in the district court from whose territory the petitioner had been removed. In this case, if the Government had removed Padilla from the Southern District of New York but refused to tell his lawyer where he had been taken, the District Court would have had jurisdiction over the petition. Or, if the Government did inform the lawyer where a prisoner was being taken but kept moving him so a filing could not catch up to the prisoner, again, in my view, habeas jurisdiction would lie in the district or districts from which he had been removed.
See id. at 454 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Petitioner has not shown that either circumstance described by Justice Kennedy is present here, as there is no evidence or suggestion that the Government refused to disclose petitioner‘s location at any time or that it transferred petitioner out of Kansas to thwart a habeas filing in this Court. Rather, the only evidence suggests that petitioner was transferred solely to facilitate her removal by charter flight. See Villalta v. Woosley, 2026 WL 973279, at *2-4 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 10, 2026) (refusing to apply this exception in a case involving neither circumstance described in Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence); Y.G.H. v. Trump, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1105-07 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (same). Thus, petitioner has not shown that this is the exceptional case in which the district-of-confinement rule should not be applied; and accordingly, petitioner has not established the Court‘s jurisdiction to hear this habeas case.
Second, petitioner has not shown that the requested injunction falls outside the scope of
For these reasons, the Court has denied the motion for a TRO prohibiting petitioner‘s removal. The parties have not notified the Court whether the scheduled removal of petitioner occurred; thus, it is not clear whether this case has been rendered moot. Accordingly, respondents are ordered to file a notice on or before September 2, 2026, in which they provide an update on petitioner‘s removal.
Dated this 1st day of September, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge