C.K. v. StateC.K. v. State
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals that reversed a grant of summary judgment in its favor in connection with C.K.’s wrongful imprisonment action, which he filed after the appellate court reversed his conviction for the murder of Andre Coleman. The appellate court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether C.K. is a wrongfully imprisoned individual as defined in
{¶ 2} However, the reversal of a conviction as against the manifest weight of the evidence does not bar retrial on the same charges using the same evidence. Here, the prosecutor dismissed the indictment without prejudice. The law provides that charges can be brought at any time because there is no statute of limitations for murder, and although C.K. may be able to demonstrate that the state has deferred prosecution pending discovery of new evidence of guilt, that showing is insufficient as a matter of law to prove, as required by
{¶ 3} Accordingly, because there are no genuine issues of material fact and because the state is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in this case, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the judgment of the trial court in favor of the state of Ohio.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 4} On September 20, 2009, Andre Coleman broke into C.K’s home looking for his girlfriend, Valerie McNaughton, who was C.K.’s tenant. C.K. ordered
{¶ 5} The state indicted C.K. for Coleman’s murder with firearm specifications. At trial, C.K. admitted killing Coleman but relied on Ohio’s “castle doctrine”, asserting that he had acted in self defense. The jury found C.K. guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 18 years to life in prison.
{¶ 6} The appellate court reversed the conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence, explaining that the castle doctrine created a presumption of self defense because Coleman had unlawfully entered C.K’s house, C.K. had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he had no duty to retreat in his own home before using deadly force.
{¶ 7} On remand, the state dismissed the indictment without prejudice. C.K. then moved to seal the criminal record. At a hearing on that motion, a prosecuting attorney for the state asserted that it did not intend to reindict C.K. at that time, but that “it could in the future.” The trial court sealed the records, and the appellate court affirmed that ruling. State v. C.K, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99886,
{¶ 8} In June 2012, C.K. commenced this action seeking a declaration that he is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” entitled to compensation, alleging that the court of appeals held that the castle doctrine permitted him to use deadly force against Coleman and therefore he cannot and will not be retried for murder. The state moved for summary judgment, asserting that C.K. could not meet the requirement of
The State’s Case on Appeal
{¶ 10} The state maintains that
C.K.’s Claim
{¶ 11} C.K. maintains that
Law and Analysis
{¶ 13}
[t]he individual’s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 14} It is well established that a criminal proceeding can be brought against an accused individual after reversal of a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. In such instances, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial. Tibbs v. Florida,
{¶ 15} Further, the dismissal of an indictment without prejudice on remand from a reversal does not bar future prosecution of the accused. As the court explained in Bucolo v. Adkins,
{¶ 16} And the prosecutor has discretion to defer bringing criminal charges against a suspect in the hope of discovering new evidence of guilt. In United States v. Lovasco,
{¶ 17} Courts have therefore recognized that a prosecutor has discretion to dismiss charges without prejudice in order “to allow further investigation of the underlying crime and to avoid putting the defendant in criminal jeopardy on evidence of uncertain credibility.” People v. Small,
{¶ 18} In this case, following reversal of the murder conviction, the prosecutor dismissed the indictment against C.K. without prejudice. Pursuant to
{¶ 19} In asserting that no new charges can or will be brought against him, C.K. can point to the passage of time since the dismissal of the indictment, the absence of any current plans to prosecute him, and the lack of any active investigation seeking new evidence of guilt. Those facts, however, are insufficient as a matter of law to establish the requirement of
Conclusion
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21} Here, the court of appeals assumed that no criminal proceeding can or will be brought against C.K. based on the fact that the state had no new evidence of guilt and no active investigation of the crime. However, because there is no statute of limitations for murder, the state has authority to bring a criminal proceeding against C.K. at some future time. The decision to defer prosecution pending the discovery of stronger evidence of guilt is insufficient to establish that no criminal proceeding can be brought or will be brought against C.K. for any act associated with Coleman’s murder. Therefore, as a matter of law, C.K. cannot establish the requirement of
{¶ 22} Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in judgment.
{¶ 23} It is important to recognize that this is a civil action seeking a declaratory judgment that C.K. was a wrongfully imprisoned individual, and the action is governed by statute. In enacting wrongful-imprisonment legislation, the General Assembly “intended that the court of common pleas actively separate those who were wrongfully imprisoned from those who have merely avoided criminal liability.” Walden v. State,
{¶ 24} We have determined that one who claims to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual under
{¶ 25} We have decided a number of wrongful-imprisonment-claim cases on grounds of statutory construction of
{¶ 26} I would decide this case similarly, on a precise reading of the statute, and hold that C.K. was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he meets the requirement of
The individual’s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 27} We have already held with respect to this section that claimants must prove that they were not engaging in any other criminal conduct arising out of the incident for which they were initially charged. Gover v. State,
{¶ 28} It may well be that the General Assembly does not intend to foreclose compensation to one who has been imprisoned under circumstances such as these. If that is so, the statute should be amended to say so.
{¶ 29} I respectfully concur in judgment.