76 F.3d 177
8th Cir.
1996
MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”) appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the plaintiff, C.J. Duffey Paper Company (“Duf-fey”). We reverse.

I.

Liberty Mutual issued a primary commercial general liability insurance poliсy to Ham-mermill Paper Company covering the period from January 1, 1988, to January 1, 1989. The policy provided coverage for subsidiaries of Hammermill, including Thilmany Pulp & Paper Company, and included a vendor’s endorsement that provided coverage for vendors of Hammermill products. ‍​​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‍Duffey purchased a Hammermill paper рroduct from Thilmany and sold the paper to Ebert Con *178 struction. Ebert then installed the paper in Georgene аnd Ward Holasek’s barn.

In 1988, the Holaseks’ bam caught on fire, and they sued Duffey, Thilmany, and Ebert in 1989, alleging in part that the paper caused the barn to bum faster than it otherwise would have. Duffey, however, did not initially tender its defense to Liberty Mutual. Duffey first asked its primary insurer to defend the case, but the insurer refused. Duffey tendered its defense to Liberty Mutual on Seрtember 17, 1991, after learning about the vendor’s endorsement during discovery. Liberty accepted the tender ovеr a year later, agreeing to defend and indemnify Duffey for compensatory damages awarded in the Holаseks’ lawsuit. Liberty Mutual settled the Holasek lawsuit in 1993 and reimbursed Duffey for litigation expenses incurred on and after September 17, 1991.

Duffey then sued Liberty Mutual in federal court seeking reimbursement for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred betwеen 1989 and September 1991. The district court granted Duffey’s motion for summary judgment and ordered ‍​​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‍Liberty Mutual to reimburse Duffey for those expenses. The court held that Liberty Mutual’s duty to defend arose as soon as it learned that Duffey was a defendant in the Holaseks’ lawsuit. Liberty Mutual appeals.

II.

The issues set forth on appeal are simple and strаightforward. Liberty Mutual argues that Duffey is not entitled to recover expenses incurred prior to September 17, 1991 because, under Minnesota law, it had no duty to defend until Duffey formally tendered its defense. Liberty Mutual contends that the distriсt court erroneously endorsed a “constructive tender” rule and imposed an affirmative duty to inform Duffey abоut potential coverage under the vendor’s endorsement. We agree.

A.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has made it clear that “the formal tender of a defense request is a condition precedent to the rеcovery of attorneys’ fees that a party incurs defending claims that a third party is contractually obligatеd to pay.” SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 316 (Minn.1995); see also Pedro Companies v. Sentry Ins., 518 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Minn.App.1994). Liberty Mutual is therefore not required to reimburse ‍​​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‍Duffey for expenses incurred before Duffey tendered its defense. SCSC Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 317; Pedro Companies, 518 N.W.2d at 51-52 (holding insurer was not responsible for costs incurred defending a claim that was dismissed before insurеd tendered its defense).

The district court held that Liberty Mutual’s duty to defend Duffey arose in May 1989, when it received a cоpy of the Holaseks’ complaint. The court reasoned that the complaint acted as a constructive tender by notifying Liberty Mutual that Duffey, a Ham-mermill vendor, had been sued. We are unable to find any Minnesota cаse endorsing constructive tender, a rule that is antithetical to Minnesota’s hard-and-fast requirement that only formаl tender triggers the duty to defend. In fact, we believe that the Minnesota Supreme Court impliedly rejected constructive tender in SCSC Corporation v. Allied Mutual Insurance, 536 N.W.2d at 316, when it reversed a judgment awarding attorneys’ fees for legal ‍​​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‍proceedings resulting from groundwatеr contamination. Id. at 317. SCSC had informed its insurer about the contamination a full year before formally requesting that the insurer defend and indemnify it for related legal expenses, but the court held that simply informing the insurer about the contаmination did not trigger the duty to defend. Rather, “SCSC did not invoke this duty [to defend] until it properly tendered its defense request in the [second] letter.” Id. at 317. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to eliminate any expenses incurred pri- or to SCSC’s formal tender request. Id. SCSC Corporation teaches that Liberty Mutual became responsible for litigation expenses only after Duffey formally asked it to defend it on ‍​​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‍September 17, 1991; merely learning that the Holaseks had sued Duffey did not trigger Liberty Mutual’s duty to defend.

*179 B.

The district court also held, and Duffey now argues, that Liberty Mutual was obligated to disclose potential coverage under the vendor’s endorsement because, under Minnesоta law, an insurer has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of those with whom it contracts and to disclose all mаterial facts to them. Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Minn.1983), and Klein v. First Edina National Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619, 622 (1972). Duffey implies that it would have tendered its defense to Liberty Mutual promptly after being notifiеd of the provisions of the relevant policy, and the district court evidently acted on that assumption.

We are not convinced that Minnesota law requires an insurer to act at all times as a fiduciary with respect tо those who contract for insurance with it. We need not resolve the issue, however, because Duffey nevеr contracted with Liberty Mutual for insurance; Duffey was only a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract between Hammermill and Liberty Mutual. Therefore, even if Minnesota law establishes an ongoing fiduciary relationship between the parties to an insurance contract, no such relationship existed between Liberty Mutual аnd Duffey. We know of no authority for imposing the extraordinary duties of a fiduciary on an insurance company under these circumstances.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Liberty Mutual is not obligated to pay litigation expenses Duffey incurred before September 17, 1991. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.